Karnataka High Court
Siddharth Sharma vs State Of Karnataka on 10 January, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 183 OF 2023 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
BETWEEN:
1. SIDDHARTH SHARMA
S/O CHANDRAPRAKASH,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT NO.10,
NANDKUMAR NAGAR SOCIETY,
SECTOR 6, NIMAYANAGAR, DASKROI,
AHMEDABAD -382481
NOTE
PETITIONER NO.1 IS PRESENTLY IN INDIA
2. RAHUL NAI @ RAHUL NAIR @ NAI RAHUL ANAND KUMAR
S/O ANAND KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/AT NO. 16, AASTHA VILLA,
SCIENCE CITY ROAD, SOLA,
CHANDLODIYA, AHMEDABAD -382481
Digitally
signed by 3. BLUE INK INFOTECH
LEELAVATHI REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER AND
SR
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR RAHUL NAI,
Location:
High Court HAVING OFFICE AT 408, MAURYA ATRIA,
of Karnataka OPP KALGI APARTMENT, BODAKDEV,
AHMEDABAD 380 054
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. HITESH GOWDA B J, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY VIDYARANYAPURA POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BANGALORE -560 001
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023
2. HOYSALA M R
S/O M RAJESH PALANI
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
R/AT NO. G5
BRIGADE HABITAT, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
LAKSHMIPURAM, MYSURU 570 004
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI JADHAV, ADDL. SPP FOR R1
R2 SERVED BUT UNREPRESENTED)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLAINT IN
CR.NO.276/2022 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 66(C) AND (D) OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT AND SEC.120B, 417, 418, 419,
420 OF IPC PENDING BEFORE THE HON'BLE COURT OF 1ST
A.C.M.M, AT BENGALURU AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioners/accused Nos.2, 3 and 5 seek
quashing of the impugned proceedings registered as FIR in Crime
No.276/2022 on the file of I Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bengaluru and for other reliefs.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Addl. SPP for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and perused the material on
record.
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3. Respondent No.2-complainant having been served
with notice of the petition, has chosen to remain unrepresented and
has not contested the proceedings.
4. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged
in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned
counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to the material on
record in order to point out that respondent No.2-complainant had
lodged a complaint on 24.09.2022 against the petitioners which
was registered as Crime No.195/2022. It is submitted that during
the pendency of investigation pursuant to the said FIR, respondent
No.2 lodged the instant second complaint which was registered as
FIR in Crime No.276/2022 on 18.11.2022, which is impermissible in
law as held by this Court in Shakib Vs. The State of Karnataka
and Anr1.
5. It is therefore submitted that the impugned
proceedings pursuant to the second complaint tantamounts to
abuse of process of law warranting interference of this Court in the
present petition since respondent No.2 is in the habit of filing
repeated complaints, which deserves to be quashed.
1
W.P.No.15266/2021 dated 08.07.2022
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6. As stated supra, respondent No.2- complainant having
been served with notice of the petition, has chosen to remain
unrepresented and has not contested the proceedings.
7. In the case of Shakib (supra), a co-ordinate bench of
this Court held as under:
“12. Before consideration of the said issue, I deem it
appropriate to notice the judgments rendered by the Apex Court
from time to time concerning registration of multiple FIRs on the
very same incident against the same accused, in the cases of:
(i) T.T.ANTONY v. STATE OF KERALA AND
OTHERS – (2001) 6 SCC 181;
(ii) UPKAR SINGH v. VED PRAKASH AND
OTHERS – (2004) 13 SCC 292;
(iii) BABUBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND
OTHERS – (2010) 12 SCC 254;
(iv) SURENDER KAUSHIK AND OTHERS v. STATE
OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS – (2013)
5 SCC 148;
(v) ANJU CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF
UTTARPRADESH AND ANOTHER - (2013) 6
SCC 384;
(vi) P.SREE KUMAR v. STATE OF KERALA AND
OTHERS – (2018) 4 SCC 579;
(vii) ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI v. UNION OF
INDIA AND OTHERS – (2020) 14 SCC 12; and
(viii)KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA v. STATE OF U.P –
(2021) 5 SCC 435.
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13. The Apex Court right from the judgment in the case of
T.T. ANTONY (supra) has held as follows:
“15. On these contentions, four points arise for
determination:
(i) whether registration of a fresh case, Crime
No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station on
the basis of the letter of the DGP dated 2-7-1997
which is in the nature of the second FIR under
Section 154 CrPC, is valid and it can form the
basis of a fresh investigation;
(ii) whether the appellants in Appeals Nos. 689
and 4066 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos.
1522 and 8840 of 2000] and the respondent in
Appeals Nos. 690-91 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs
(Crl.) Nos. 2724-25 of 2000] have otherwise made
out a case for quashing of proceedings in Crime No.
268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station;
(iii) what is the effect of the report of Shri K.
Padmanabhan Commission of Inquiry; and
(iv) whether the facts and the circumstances of
the case justify a fresh investigation by CBI.
… … … …
18. An information given under sub-section
(1) of Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as
first information report (FIR) though this term is
not used in the Code. It is a very important
document. And as its nickname suggests it is the
earliest and the first information of a cognizable
offence recorded by an officer in charge of a
police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and
marks the commencement of the investigation which
ends up with the formation of opinion under Section
169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and
forwarding of a police report under Section 173
CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not
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infrequently that more informations than one are
given to a police officer in charge of a police station in
respect of the same incident involving one or more
than one cognizable offences. In such a case he
need not enter every one of them in the station house
diary and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart
from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic
telegram, the information first entered in the station
house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer
in charge of a police station is the first information
report — FIR postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All
other informations made orally or in writing after the
commencement of the investigation into the
cognizable offence disclosed from the facts
mentioned in the first information report and entered
in the station house diary by the police officer or such
other cognizable offences as may come to his notice
during the investigation, will be statements falling
under Section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an
FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it
would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot
be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a
case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence
under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating
agency learns during the investigation or receives
fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR
under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will
be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision
of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt.
Let us consider a different situation in which H having
killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed
by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by
his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and
during investigation the truth is detected; it does not
require filing of fresh FIR against H — the real
offender — who can be arraigned in the report under
Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be.
It is of course permissible for the investigating officer
to send up a report to the Magistrate concerned even
earlier that investigation is being directed against the
person suspected to be the accused.
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27. A just balance between the fundamental
rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by
the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-
section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police
to make further investigation, obtain further evidence
(both oral and documentary) and forward a further
report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang
case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was,
however, observed that it would be appropriate to
conduct further investigation with the permission of
the court. However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to fresh investigation by the police in
respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
successive FIRs whether before or after filing the
final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would
clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and
156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory
power of investigation in a given case. In our view a
case of fresh investigation based on the second or
successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in
connection with the same or connected cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed in the course
of the same transaction and in respect of which
pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under
way or final report under Section 173(2) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for
exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
35. For the aforementioned reasons, the
registration of the second FIR under Section 154
CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director
General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of
Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and
consequently the investigation made pursuant
thereto is of no legal consequence, they are
accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this
does not preclude the investigating agency from
seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and
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354 of 1994 for making further investigations and
filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8)
CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said
cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined
to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under
challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime
No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station
against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other
aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court
shall stand set aside.”
(emphasis supplied)
Again, the Apex Court in the case of Babubhai
(supra) holds as follows:-
“23. If the two FIRs are read together, it
becomes clear that the incident started in the
morning as per both the FIRs CR No. I-154 of
2008, lodged by Mr M.N. Pandya, Sub-Inspector of
Police, stated that he reached the place of
occurrence after receiving the information from
the police station and found that the mob had
already dispersed. The case of the prosecution is
that when the police reached the place of occurrence
of the first incident, the mob had already dispersed,
could not be correct for the reason that some of the
witnesses have stated that the clash was going on
when the police arrived and police resorted to force
to disperse the mob. In fact, it was the police who
summoned the ambulances which took the injured
persons to hospitals.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of SURENDER KAUSHIK (supra),
the Apex Court holds as follows:
“24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite
luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not
permissible in respect of one and the same
incident.The concept of sameness has been
given a restricted meaning. It does not
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the
same or connected cognizable offence. What is
prohibited is any further complaint by the same
complainant and others against the same
accused subsequent to the registration of the
case under the Code, for an investigation in that
regard would have already commenced and
allowing registration of further complaint would
amount to an improvement of the facts
mentioned in the original complaint. As is further
made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar
Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC
292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , the prohibition does not
cover the allegations made by the accused in the first
FIR alleging a different version of the same incident.
Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident
do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment
of two FIRs is permissible.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY (supra), the
Apex Court holds as follows:
“14. On the plain construction of the language
and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the
Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there
can be more than one FIR about an occurrence.
However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest
that every information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by
the officer-in-charge of a police station. This implies
that there has to be the first information report about
an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence.
The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the
machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which
culminates with filing of the police report in terms of
Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be
appropriate to follow the settled principle that
there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same
offence. However, where the incident is separate;
offences are similar or different, or even where
the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023does not fall within the ambit and scope of the
FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be
registered. The most important aspect is to
examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the
legislature in the very language of Section 154 of
the Code. These safeguards can be safely
deduced from the principle akin to double
jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to
prevent abuse of power by the investigating
authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for
the same incident cannot be registered. Of course,
the investigating agency has no determinative right. It
is only a right to investigate in accordance with the
provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon
completion of investigation, either for cancellation or
alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which
once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction
attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned,
may be in a given case, subject to the right of further
investigation but wherever the investigation has been
completed and a person is found to be prima facie
guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re-
examination by the investigating agency on its own
should not be permitted merely by registering another
FIR with regard to the same offence. If such
protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of
abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be
ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such
interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the
Code, as it would not only further the object of law
but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in
the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal
jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo
investigation is beyond the competence of not only
the investigating agency but even that of the learned
Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily
for the reason that it would be opposed to the
scheme of the Code and more particularly Section
167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of
W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051]
and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of
the same date.)
(emphasis supplied)
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023In the case of P. SREEKUMAR (supra) the Apex
Court holds as follows:-
“30. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in
mind when we examine the facts of the case at
hand, we find that the second FIR filed by the
appellant against Respondent 3 though related to
the same incident for which the first FIR was filed
by Respondent 2 against the appellant-
Respondent 3 and three bank officials, yet the
second FIR being in the nature of a counter-
complaint against Respondent 3 was legally
maintainable and could be entertained for being
tried on its merits.
31. In other words, there is no prohibition in law
to file the second FIR and once it is filed, such FIR is
capable of being taken note of and tried on merits in
accordance with law.
32. It is for the reasons that firstly, the second
FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed
the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would
have been somewhat different. Such was not the
case here; second, it was filed by the appellant as a
counter-complaint against Respondent 3; third, the
first FIR was against five persons based on one set
of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on
the allegations different from the allegations made in
the first FIR; and lastly, the High Court while
quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not
examine the issue arising in the case in the light of
law laid down by this Court in the two aforementioned
decisions of this Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar
Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005
SCC (Cri) 211] and Surender Kaushik [Surender
Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148: (2013) 2
SCC (Cri) 953] and simply referred the three
decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this
Court has laid down general principle of law relating
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI
(supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
“37. In the present case, all the FIRs or
complaints which have been lodged in diverse
jurisdictions arise out of one and the same
incident — the broadcast by the petitioner on 21-4-
2020 on R. Bharat. The broadcast is the foundation
of the allegation that offences have been committed
under the provisions of Sections 153, 153-A, 153-B,
295-A, 298, 500, 504 and 506 IPC. During the course
of the hearing, this Court has had the occasion, with
the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel, to
peruse the several complaints that were filed in
relation to the incident dated 21-4-2020. They are
worded in identical terms and leave no manner of
doubt that an identity of cause of action underlies the
allegations levelled against the petitioner on the basis
of the programme which was broadcast on 21-4-
2020. Moreover, the language, content and
sequencing of paragraphs and their numbering is
identical. It was in this backdrop that Mr Kapil Sibal,
learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted (in our view
correctly) that this Court may proceed to quash all the
other FIRs and complaints lodged in diverse
jurisdictions in the States, leaving open, however, the
investigation in respect of FIR No. 238 of 2020 dated
22-4-2020 transferred from Police Station Sadar,
District Nagpur City to N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station
in Mumbai.
… … … …
39. A litany of our decisions — to refer to
them individually would be a parade of the
familiar — has firmly established that any
reasonable restriction on fundamental rights
must comport with the proportionality standard,
of which one component is that the measure
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023adopted must be the least restrictive measure to
effectively achieve the legitimate State aim.
Subjecting an individual to numerous
proceedings arising in different jurisdictions on
the basis of the same cause of action cannot be
accepted as the least restrictive and effective
method of achieving the legitimate State aim in
prosecuting crime. The manner in which the
petitioner has been subjected to numerous FIRs in
several States, besides the Union Territories of
Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of identical
allegations arising out of the same television show
would leave no manner of doubt that the intervention
of this Court is necessary to protect the rights of the
petitioner as a citizen and as a journalist to fair
treatment (guaranteed by Article 14) and the liberty to
conduct an independent portrayal of views. In such a
situation to require the petitioner to approach the
respective High Courts having jurisdiction for
quashing would result into a multiplicity of
proceedings and unnecessary harassment to the
petitioner, who is a journalist.”
(emphasis supplied)
The law, in this regard, as laid down in the
aforesaid cases is followed in the latest judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA LAL
CHAWLA (supra) wherein, it is held as follows:
“6. Indeed, a closer look at the decision
in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash,
(2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] takes us
to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the
question of material improvements made in a
subsequent private complaint by the same
complainant against the same accused with
regard to the same incident, it may be useful to
refer to the following excerpt from Upkar
Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC
292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], which further clarifies the
holding in T.T. Antony [T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala,
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(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]: (Upkar
Singh case [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13
SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], SCC pp. 297-98,
para 17)
“17. … In our opinion, this Court in that case only
held that any further complaint by the same
complainant or others against the same accused,
subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited
under the Code because an investigation in this
regard would have already started and further
complaint against the same accused will amount to
an improvement on the facts mentioned in the
original complaint, hence will be prohibited under
Section 162 of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied in the original)
It is the aforementioned part of the holding
in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash,
(2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] that bears
directly and strongly upon the present case.
(emphasis supplied)
If the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the
afore-extracted judgments is considered qua the
facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would
unmistakably emerge is, the registration of multiple
FIRs on the same incident would be hit by the
doctrine of sameness and would have to be
obliterated, as it would amount to violation of
fundamental rights of a citizen.
14. As quoted hereinabove, the incidents have happened at
two different spells – first spell being 5.50 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. and
the second spell being 10.00 a.m. to 10.05 a.m. For the incident
that has happened in the first spell three FIRs are registered and
for the incident that happened in the second spell two FIRs are
registered. The incident that runs through the stream of three
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FIRs in Crime Nos. 15 of 2021, 16 of 2021 and 19 of 2021 are
the same having taken place between 5.50 a.m. and 7.00 a.m.
The incident that runs through Crime Nos. 17 of 2021 and 18 of
2021 have taken place between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05 a.m.
Therefore, crime Nos. 16 of 2021 and 19 of 2021 are a repetition
of FIRs of the crime that is first registered in Crime No.15 of
2021 and crime No.18 of 2021 is the second FIR registered for
the incident that has taken place between 10.00 a.m. and 10.05
a.m. The offences in crime Nos. 15 of 2021, 16 of 2021 and 19
of 2021 are the same and offences in crime Nos. 17 of 2021 and
18 of 2021 are the same. Therefore, undoubtedly registration of
multiple FIRs is hit by the doctrine of sameness.
15. The issue before the Court is not concerning merits of
registration of complaints or FIRs. It is the registration of multiple
FIRs that is called in question. Therefore, the contention of the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner merits acceptance
on juxtaposition of FIRs and when it is tested on the anvil of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted
judgments. Therefore, crime in FIR Nos. 16 of 2021 and 19 of
2021 for the incident that took place between 5.50 a.m. and 7.00
a.m. would stand obliterated as Crime No.15 of 2021 is the
same. Crime No.18 of 2021 would stand obliterated as Crime
No.17 of 2021 is the same. Therefore, for the two incidents,
registration of two FIRs are sustained – one in Crime No.15 of
2021 and the other in crime No.17 of 2021. Rest of the FIRs
would be hit by the doctrine of sameness.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
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CRL.P No. 183 of 2023
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) FIRs in Crime Nos. 16 of 2021, 19 of 2021
and 18 of 2021 stand quashed, qua the
petitioner.
(iii) The respondents are at liberty to take recourse
to such avenues in law against all the accused
in all these FIRs to be brought under the ambit
of Crime No.15 of 2021 and Crime No.17 of
2021.
Ordered accordingly.”
8. As held by this Court in the aforesaid judgment on the
doctrine of sameness holding that registration of multiple FIRs for
the same offences is impermissible in law and practice of
registering multiple FIR was deprecated as can be seen from the
said judgment, I am of the considered opinion that the instant
second complaint making exactly identical/similar allegations as
earlier complaint which was registered as FIR in Crime
No.195/2022 is contrary to the aforesaid principles warranting
interference by this Court in the present petition.
9. In the result, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) The petition is hereby allowed.
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ii) The impugned proceedings registered as FIR in Crime
No.276/2022 on the file of I Addl. Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru qua the petitioners are hereby
quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
MDS
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1