Delhi High Court
Smt. Nirmala Devi (D) Through Her Lr Smt. … vs Smt Kamla Gupta on 9 October, 2024
$~11
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 09.10.2024
+ CM(M) 3227/2024 & CM APPL. 48749-48751/2024
SMT. NIRMALA DEVI (D) THROUGH HER LR SMT. ILASHREE
NATH GUPTA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Atul Agarwal (AR of Petitioner)
versus
SMT KAMLA GUPTA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Shikhar Gupta & Mr. Shashak
Upadhyay, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J.: (Oral)
1. This Petition was listed before the Court pursuant to an order dated
27.08.2024 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court and was listed along
with RC. REV. 271/2024.
2. The present Petition impugns the order dated 09.07.2024 [hereinafter
referred to as the “Impugned Order”] passed by learned District and
Sessions Judge (Central) sitting as Rent Control Appellate Tribunal, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi.
3. Briefly the facts are:
3.1 By the Impugned Order, the Application filed by the Respondent
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under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as the
“Limitation Act”] seeking dismissal of the Appeal was allowed and the
Appeal was found to be barred by limitation.
3.2 The Petitioner challenged an order dated 27.07.2022 whereby the
Petitioner was arrayed as a legal representative of the sole Respondent in
Eviction case no. E-584/2017. An Appeal was preferred against the order
dated 27.07.2022 by the Petitioner on 09.05.2024. In the interregnum period,
the Petitioner had filed a Revision Petition before the High Court. The
Revision Petition was dismissed as withdrawn by the Petitioner on
15.04.2024.
3.3 Thereafter, the Appeal was filed before the learned Trial Court. It was
contended by the Petitioner that the learned Trial Court has wrongly arrayed
the Petitioner as a party to the Eviction proceedings. During the proceedings,
the Respondent filed an Application for dismissal of the Appeal as being
barred by limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. This Application
was allowed by the learned Trial Court, which is the order impugned before
the Court.
4. Mr. Atul Aggarwal, the power of attorney holder of the Petitioner,
who appears in person [henceforth for the purpose of this Order called the
counsel for the Petitioner] submits that the Impugned Order suffers from an
infirmity. He submits that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable
in the present case since the heading of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
only with respect to matters which are being adjudicated “withoutSignature Not Verified
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jurisdiction”. It is thus contended that the learned Trial Court has wrongly
applied the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act while deciding the
Application filed by the Respondent. Reference is drawn to the heading of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act as appearing in the statute book which
reads as follows:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction –”
5. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, contends that
the learned Trial Court, after an examination of the documents on record,
found that there is inordinate delay of 614 days in filing the Appeal
challenging the Impugned Order, and before the learned Trial Court, there
was a submission made by the Petitioner that the time spent in litigation
before another forum is to be excluded in calculation of limitation.
5.1 Learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that pursuant to
execution proceedings filed by the legal heirs of the Respondent, the
Executing Court, in Execution No. 12EX2517/24 captioned as Kamala
Gupta v. Nirmala Nath Gupta Since Deceased through LRs, Ms. Illashree
Nath Gupta, on 24.08.2024, directed appointment of a bailiff, and
thereafter, on 20.09.2024, the possession of the subject premises has been
taken over by the bailiff.
5.2 Learned Counsel for the Respondent further submits that the
Petitioner was pursuing a wrong remedy before a Coordinate Bench of this
Court, and this was for an extended period of time. The Court permitted him
to withdraw the case noting that the issue of maintainability was raised by
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the predecessor Bench in its order dated 01.09.2022, on the first date itself.
6. The submissions of the Petitioner with respect to the non-applicability
of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are without merit. The Supreme Court in
H.M Kamaluddin Ansari & Co. v. Union of India & Ors.1 has set out that
headings prefixed to sections are like a preamble which can be used to
clarify a doubtful expression but cannot be used to give a different effect to
clear words in a section, where there cannot be any doubt as to the ordinary
meaning of the words. The relevant extract is below:
“27. The headings prefixed to a section or a group of sections in some
modem statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They
cannot control the plain words of the statutes but they may explain
ambiguous words. The view is now well settled that the headings or
titles prefixed to a section or a group of sections can be referred to in
determining the meaning of doubtful expressions. It is true that the
court is entitled to look at the headings in an Act of Parliament to
resolve any doubt they may have as to ambiguous words. The law is
clear that those headings cannot be used to give a different effect to
clear words in the section where there cannot be any doubt as to the
ordinary meaning of the words. The golden rule is that when the
words of a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, that is, they are
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to
give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The duty
of a Judge is to, expound and not to legislate, is a fundamental rule…”
[Emphasis supplied]
7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable. As set out above, it is
contended by the Petitioner that Section 14 of the Limitation Act would only
apply where the Court does not have a jurisdiction and since this Court did
have jurisdiction, the Section is inapplicable.
1
(1983) 4 SCC 417
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7.1 The contention of the Petitioner is misconceived. Section (1) and (2)
of Sub-section 14 of the Limitation Act itself provides that in addition to
setting out a defect in jurisdiction, other causes of like nature are also
governed by its provision. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is reproduced
below for ready reference:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction.
(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during
which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil
proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision,
against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to
the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is
unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time
during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence
another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be
excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court
which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is
unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted
by the court under rule 1 of that Order, where such permission is granted
on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,–
(a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was
pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on
which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be
prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a
cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.”
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[Emphasis supplied]
7.2 Thus, the Section itself provides that a defect of jurisdiction or other
cause of such a nature for a proceeding to be applicable therein. The
Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. &
Anr.2, has even clarified that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, should be
interpreted liberally and the phrase “other cause of like nature” extends
beyond jurisdictional defects.
8. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which has been reproduced above
sets out that in computing the period of limitation, where a plaintiff has been
prosecuting any other civil proceeding, whether in Appeal or Revision
otherwise, the time for prosecuting such proceeding shall be excluded for
the purposes of limitation. The Section also sets out certain pre-requisites for
the exclusion of time which include due diligence and undertaking
prosecution in good faith before another Court.
9. The Supreme Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs.
Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department & Ors.3, while elaborating on
the principles of case of Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan vs.
Ramkrishnagovind Bhanu4, has held that in order for Section 14 of the
Limitation Act to be applicable, the following conditions need to be
satisfied:
“21…..
(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings
prosecuted by the same party;
2
(2004) 3 SCC 458
3
(2008) 7 SCC 169
4
AIR 1959 SCR 564Signature Not Verified
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(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in
good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction
or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the
same matter in issue and;
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court ….”
10. A Division Bench of this Court in U.P. Jal Vidyut Nigam vs. C.G.
Power & Industrial Solution Ltd.5, while discussing the Madhavrao
Narayanrao case and Consolidated Engineering case, has held that all five
pre-conditions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as set out above, need to
co-exist in the following terms:
“17. It has further been held in the Consolidated Engineering case that
to attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, all five pre-
conditions have to co-exist. It is not enough if only some of these pre-
conditions are present, all these must exist side by side.”
[Emphasis supplied]
10.1 In order to fall under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, a party is
required to prosecute the prior proceeding in good faith and with due
diligence in a Court. The Division Bench of this Court in U.P. Jal Vidyut
case held that good faith is defined under the provisions of Section 2(h) of
the Limitation Act as an act which is done with due care and attention.
While interpreting Madhavrao Narayanrao case, the Court further held that
previously instituted suit should have been prosecuted with due diligence.
The relevant extract is set out below:
“18. So what is good faith? The Supreme Court in Madhavrao
Narayanrao case has clarified that since the Limitation Act provides for
its own definition of good faith, the definition as contained in General
Clauses Act, 1897 would not apply.
5
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7916
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19. Good faith is defined in Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act as:
“2. Definitions. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
…. (h) “good faith”– nothing shall be deemed to be done in good
faith which is not done with due care and attention;”
[Emphasis is ours]
20. The Madhavrao Narayanrao case while discussing the term ‘due care
and attention’ in the context of Section 14 of the Limitation Act has held
that what needs to be seen is whether the Plaintiff (Appellant herein)
has brought on the record any evidence to show that he was
prosecuting the previously instituted suit with due diligence.
21. The measure of due diligence and prosecuting in good faith is to be
decided on the facts of each case. The Supreme Court in
the Consolidated Engineering case has explained this principle in a
succinct manner below:
“31. To attract the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
five conditions enumerated in the earlier part of this judgment have
to co-exist [Ed. : See para 21, above.]. There is no manner of
doubt that the section deserves to be construed liberally. Due
diligence and caution are essential prerequisites for attracting
Section 14. Due diligence cannot be measured by any absolute
standards. Due diligence is a measure of prudence or activity
expected from and ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and
prudent person under the particular circumstances. The time
during which a court holds up a case while it is discovering that it
ought to have been presented in another court, must be excluded,
as the delay of the court cannot affect the due diligence of the
party. Section 14 requires that the prior proceeding should have
been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence. The
definition of good faith as found in Section 2(h) of the Limitation
Act would indicate that nothing shall be deemed to be in good
faith which is not done with due care and attention. It is true that
Section 14 will not help a party who is guilty of negligence, lapse
or inaction. However, there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to
what amounts to good faith. It is a matter to be decided on the facts
of each case. It will, in almost every case be more or less a
question of degree. The mere filing of an application in wrong
court would not prima facie show want of good faith. There must
be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying
the proceedings or harassing the opposite party. In the light of
these principles, the question will have to be considered whether
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diligence and in good faith.”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. The learned Trial Court has relied upon the judgment of this Court in
T. Venkat Ram Reddy v. Blue Chip Capital Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.6 and
Nina Garments (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Unitech Ltd.7, and reached the conclusion that
the essential ingredients of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are lacking.
12. The Petitioner contended before the learned Trial Court that the High
Court permitted the Petitioner to withdraw the Revision Petition “with
liberty to institute appropriate legal proceedings in accordance with law”
and that liberty given by the High Court meant that the delay stands
condoned. The learned Trial Court examined the order dated 15.04.2024
passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court and found that the order was
clear and specific but was wrongly interpreted by the Petitioner.
13. The order dated 15.04.2024 passed by a Coordinate Bench is brief and
sets out that the High Court on the very first date itself by order dated
01.09.2022, had issued notice limited to the question of maintainability of
those proceedings. The relevant extract of order dated 01.09.2022 is set out
below:
“RC.REV. 209/2022 & CM APPL. 38222/2022
RC.REV. 210/2022 & CM APPL. 38253/2022
Issue notice on the maintainability of the present petition.
Learned counsel, as aforesaid, appears and accepts notice
on behalf of the respondent.
6
2017 SCC OnLine Del 8339
7
2012 SCC OnLine Del 5012Signature Not Verified
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List on 18.10.2022.”
[Emphasis supplied]
13.1 Despite the same, the Petitioner chose to continue with the
proceedings before the High Court for a period of about 19 months until
15.04.2024 when the proceedings were dismissed as withdrawn by the
Petitioner.
14. In the present case, the Petitioner sought challenge to an order passed
by the learned Trial Court by filing an Appeal before the Appellate Court
(District Judge) after a gap of almost 22 months (July, 2022 to May, 2024).
This period was spent pursuing a wrong remedy before the High Court.
14.1 In order to apply the principles as set out in the Madhavrao
Narayanrao case and Consolidated Engineering case to extend the period
of limitation available to the Petitioner, it has to be seen if prior proceedings
were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith by the Petitioner. The
conduct of the Petitioner however shows exactly the opposite. The Petitioner
continued to prosecute wrongful remedy before this Court inspite of a
challenge on the maintainability of such remedy made by the Court on the
very first date itself. In fact, as seen from the order, the Court only issued
notice on the limited aspect of maintainability of the said Petition on
01.09.2022. Thereafter, the matter could not be heard until 15.04.2024 when
it was dismissed as withdrawn by the Petitioner.
15. The learned Trial Court found that the Petitioner had not acted in a
bona fide manner or with due diligence. In addition, no pleadings qua the
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exclusion of time as is set out in Section 14 of the Limitation Act were
raised before the learned Trial Court. In these circumstances, the learned
Trial Court allowed the Application filed by the Respondent and dismissed
the present Appeal.
16. This Court finds no infirmity with this finding. An examination of the
record shows that the pre-requisites applicable for extension of time under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act do not show the co-existence of all five
statutory pre-requisites. The prior proceeding was not diligently pursued by
the Petitioner. Thus, the Impugned Order rightly held that Appeal to be
barred by limitation.
17. In addition, this Court has also examined the order dated 27.07.2022
passed by the learned Trial Court which was impugned by the Petitioner by
filing the Appeal before the learned District Judge. As stated above, the
Respondent had filed Eviction proceedings against the mother of the
Petitioner under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
During the pendency of these proceeding, the mother of the Petitioner
passed away, which lead to the Respondent filing an Application to make
Petitioner/the daughter and the only legal heir of the tenant, as a party to the
proceedings. A Reply to this Application was filed by the Petitioner
objecting to the impleadment. The stand of the Petitioner as taken before the
learned Trial Court was that although she is the only child of late Smt.
Nirmala Devi, her mother on 12.06.2017 transferred the rights of the
demised premises by a Gift Deed in favour of her younger sister Smt.
Prabha Aggarwal and her daughter in law Ms. Pragya Aggarwal and that
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they are true and registered owners of the property at present. It was thus
contended by the Petitioner that she could not be impleaded as a legal heir of
her mother in the present Eviction Petition. The learned Trial Court held that
since the right to sue survives on the death of a tenant, the landlord is bound
to make the legal representative(s) as a party to proceed with the Eviction
Petition.
18. The Petitioner is admittedly the daughter of the deceased tenant who
passed away on 08.02.2021. The Petitioner has been prosecuting
proceedings both before the learned Trial Court and this Court though her
special power of attorney holder, for several years. These include filing of
Review Petition no. 14/2014 under Section 25(B)(9) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 19588 seeking to challenge the judgment dated 22.01.2024
passed in Eviction Petition. The only ground of challenge raised by the
Petitioner was that the subject premises had been purchased from its original
owner in the year 1982 and transferred through a gift deed to her younger
sister and daughter-in-law/Smt. Prabha Agarwal. A copy of the agreement to
sell dated 30.12.1982 was relied upon by the Petitioner. The learned Trial
Court examined both the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 and the gift
deed dated 12.06.2007 in its judgment dated 22.01.2024. By its order dated
19.03.2018, the Application for leave to defend filed by the Petitioner was
allowed and a complete trial was conducted in the matter. The learned Trial
Court examined the agreement to sell dated 30.12.1982 and the evidence in
8
Although copy of the Review Petition does not form part of the record in this case, it was annexed at
Annexure 2 in the connected matter being RC REV. 217/2024 captioned Smt. Nirmala Devi (D) Thru Her
LR Smt Ilashree Nath Gupta v. Smt Kamla Gupta
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its support and held that it did not create any right in favour of the Petitioner.
Thus, it was held that the gift deed dated 12.06.2007 which purported to
transfer rights from the late Smt. Nirmala Devi to her sister/daughter-in-law
of the sister was also void.
19. In any event, since admittedly the Petitioner has no right, title or
interest in the subject property, the challenge by the Petitioner to being
impleaded in the Eviction Petition as legal heir, would not affect the rights
of the Petitioner in any manner.
20. Concededly, the possession of the demised premises has been
obtained by the Respondent in accordance with law. This Court in its
judgment dated 04.10.2024 in RC. REV. 419/2018 captioned Ashok Gupta
& Anr. v. Deepak Rao, has after examining the law as set down by the
Supreme Court in NC Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana9 and Vinod
Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma10 has held that once possession has
been taken in accordance with law, the Revision Petition becomes
infructuous. The relevant extract is below:
“10. The issue of whether a Revision Petition is maintainable when
the tenanted premises have been legally restored to the
Respondents/landlord, either during or before the filing of the
Revision Petition, has been addressed by the Supreme Court as well
as by Coordinate Benches of this Court.
11. The Supreme Court in NC Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana,
dealt with a similar situation while dismissing a challenge by a tenant
to a judgment passed by this Court upholding an order declining leave
to defend passed by the learned Trial Court. The facts in the case were9
(2003) 1 SCC 453
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that pursuant to order passed by the learned Trial Court, possession
had been taken pursuant to an order passed by the Executing Court.
The Supreme Court dealt with the similar arguments raised on behalf
of the Respondents/landlord that the Petition has become infructuous
pursuant to the possession having been taken.
12. After briefly examining the contention of the parties, the Supreme
Court held that in view of the admitted position of possession being
taken in execution proceedings, it was not necessary to go into the
further details since such a decision would be a purely academic
question. The Supreme Court held as follows:
“6. In view of the admitted position that pursuant to the order
passed by the Rent Controller, possession has been taken on
execution of the order permitting eviction, and absence of
specific stand regarding implied consent it is, however, not
necessary to go into the finer details and to examine the rival
stand in the background of legal position as it would amount to
rendering decision on a purely academic question. The appeal
is, therefore, dismissed, without any order as to costs.”
[Emphasis supplied]
13. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar
Verma v. Manmohan Verma where on an averment by the
Respondent/landlord that possession of the premises has already been
taken over, the Supreme Court held that nothing further survives in
the Appeal and disposed the Appeals filed as being infructuous. The
order being brief is extracted below:
“Leave granted.
At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the landlord-respondent submits, on
instructions, that the possession of the premises in question has
already been taken over by the landlord-respondent. That being
the position, these appeals have now become infructuous, which
have been filed against the final judgment and order
dt.25.02.2008 and 28.03.2008 passed by the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No.49 of 2007 and C.M.No.119 of
2008 (Review) in RCR No.49 of 2007, by which the Revision
Petition filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and order of
eviction was affirmed. Since the possession has already been
taken over by the landlord-respondent, in our view nothing
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disposed of as infructuous.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
There will be no order as to costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. Various Coordinate Benches of this Court have also similarly held
that the tenant’s Petition have become infructuous in view of
possession being taken. Reliance is placed on Neelam Sharma v.
Ekant Rekhan and Bhawani Shankar v Nand Lal and Ors.
14.1 In Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana while
relying on the NC Daga case and several other cases, a Coordinate
Bench held as follows:
“10. This Court in various decisions has followed the decision
given by the Supreme Court in N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh
Rana. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Poonam Bangia v.
Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV. no. 16/2021 vide
order dated 22.07.2021 after following the law laid down in
N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, dismissed the revision
petition after observing that the landlord has received the
possession of the tenanted premises through execution
proceedings. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mange
Ram v. Rajesh Narain Goel, in RC. REV. no. 147/2021, decided
on 19.03.2024 after following N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh
Rana and Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma, in Civil
Appeal nos. 5220 -5221/2008 passed by the Supreme Court and
in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC.
REV no. 16/2021 passed by this Court as mentioned
hereinabove also dismissed the revision petition as became
infructuous due to the reason that the possession of the subject
premises has been restored to the respondent/landlord. The
same view was also taken by another Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla in RC. Rev. Bearing no.
104/2021 vide order dated 03.11.2023, the revision petition was
ordered to be dismissed as the possession of the tenanted
premises has already been taken by the respondent/landlord in
accordance with law.
xxx
12. In the present case as reflected from the order dated
10.05.2024, the possession of the tenanted premises hasSignature Not Verified
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already been restored back to the respondent/landlord in
execution of warrant of possession in accordance with law.
This Court is also of the view that the present petition is not
maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition, along with
pending applications stands dismissed being infructuous.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
15. This Court in various orders including Order dated 14.12.2023
passed in RC. REV. 335/2019 captioned Ajay Kumar v. Ranbir
Singh & Ors., Order dated 06.12.2023 passed in RC.REV. 52/2023
captioned Govardhan Lal v. Smt. Vidya Rani (Deceased) Through
Lrs and Order dated 03.11.2023 passed in RC. REV. 104/2021
captioned Ram Avtar v. Smt. Anuradha Shukla has held that when a
Revision Petition has been filed challenging an order of learned Trial
Court which has now gained fruition and has already been
implemented through execution proceedings, in such circumstances,
the Revision Petition has become infructuous. In addition, it was held
that once possession was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in
accordance with law, the Petition becomes infructuous. The relevant
extract of the Ram Avtar case reads as follows:
“4.1 This Court has considered this contention of the learned
Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant. The Revision Petition has
been filed challenging the order of the Trial Court which has
now gained fruition, and has already been implemented
through execution proceedings. In these circumstances, the
Revision Petition has become infructuous.
5. Furthermore, this Court in various judgments held that once
possession has been taken over by the Respondent/landlord in
accordance with law, this petition becomes infructuous and in
view thereof, nothing survives in the petition.”
[Emphasis supplied]
16. The present Petition has been filed impugning the order and
judgment of the learned Trial Court which has directed vacation of
the subject premises in issue. The jurisdiction of this Court is only
revisionary in nature and limited in scope. The Supreme Court while
interpreting the intendment of the legislature in removing two stages
of Appeal that were earlier provided in the Act has held that this is a
conscious omission. The High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its view with that of the learned Trial Court, its only role is
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to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thus, the scope of revisionary
jurisdiction of this Court has been limited to examine if there is an
error apparent on the fact of the record or absence of any
adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the
High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. This has been elucidated at
length by Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua in the
following manner:
“Scope of revision
22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of
the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct
and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against
the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an
application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the
legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate
remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear
omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a
covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned
Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an
inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of
procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected
to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court
by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy
itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the
High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there
is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would
only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the
High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There
is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which
would otherwise amount to converting the power of
superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.
xxx
25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and
approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal
[Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327 :
(2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107] : (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)
“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. [Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,Signature Not Verified
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(1998) 8 SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. This Court found, that though the word “revision”
was not employed in the said proviso, from the language
used therein, the legislative intent was clear that the power
conferred was revisional power. This Court observed thus :
(SCC p. 124, para 11)
’11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in
the present case has reassessed and reappraised the
evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though
it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even
while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal
of evidence can be made, but that should be for the
limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion
arrived at by the factfinding court is wholly
unreasonable.’
It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court
while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as
if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was
empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as
to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding
court is wholly unreasonable.
23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [Ram Narain
Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141] , this Court had an
occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 148, para
12)
’12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under
Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very
limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of
the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court
could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he
had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on
record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open
to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of
fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be
open to the Revisional Court to interfere with such a matter.’
It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the
High Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the
legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,
the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out
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matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held, that pure
findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but in a given
case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, it would
be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with the same.”
[Emphasis is ours]
17. The provisions of the Act provide for a remedy of restoration of
possession to a Petitioner/tenant in one situation and, i.e., under
Section 19 of the Act. In cases allowed under Section 14(1)(e) of the
Act, the recovery of possession by a tenant under Section 19(1) can be
obtained if the landlord re-let the whole or part of the premises within
three years from the date of obtaining possession from the evicted
tenant. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act further provides that
where such premises are not occupied within two months or within
three years from the date of possession, are re-let to a person without
permission of the Rent Controller within three years from the date of
possession, the Rent Controller may direct the landlord to put the
tenant in possession or pay him such compensation as is deemed fit by
the Rent Controller. Section 19 is set out below:
“19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry.–(1)
Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the
tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (e) of the
proviso to sub- section (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A,
14B, I4C, 14D and 21, the landlord shall not, except with the
permission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner,
re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years
from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such
permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such
evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as
aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or
by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within
two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having
been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the
date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the
evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the
Controller under sub-section (1) or the possession of such
premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do
not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may,
on an application made to him in this behalf by such evicted
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landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay
him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”
17.1 The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam case has held that Section
19 of the Act gives a right of re-possession to the dispossessed tenant
if landlord recovers possession under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and
thereafter, the landlord does not use the subject premises for the
purpose that it was intended and set out in such Eviction Petition on
which basis, an order for eviction was obtained by the landlord. The
relevant extract is set out below:
“19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound
to place prima facie material supported by the adequate
averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted
and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e)
vis-à-vis Section 25-B has to be seen in the light of yet another
provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right
to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-
compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to
put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is
available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the
application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e)
being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on
the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The
object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25-B(8),
denying a right of appeal..”
[Emphasis Supplied]
18. The Eviction Petition was filed by the Respondent/landlord under
Section 141(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 setting out the
requirement to open his law offices. The proceeding was contested by
the Petitioner/tenant and an Eviction Order was passed by the learned
Trial Court. Pursuant thereto, the Respondent/landlord recovered
possession of the demised premises in accordance with law. As such
the Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the
learned Trial Court which has now gained fruition and was executed
and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. In
these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
19. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising
revisionary powers is limited and circumspect. The Petitioner/tenant
did not initiate civil proceedings for recovery of possession, instead
the present Revision Petition was filed. The Petitioner/tenant has not
contended that Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has
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been violated. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
NC Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this Court finds that
this Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.”
21. In view of the aforegoing discussion, no infirmity is found in the
Impugned Order.
22. The Petition and all pending Applications stand dismissed.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J
OCTOBER 9, 2024/ ha
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