Delhi High Court – Orders
Snehi vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors on 29 October, 2024
Author: Yashwant Varma
Bench: Yashwant Varma
$~85
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 15273/2024
SNEHI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Dewan, Sr. Adv
with Ms. Manpreet Kaur, Adv.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, SC
with Ms. K. Kaomudi Kiran,
Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Ms.
Mussarrat B. Hashmi & Ms.
Sami Sameer Siddiqui, Advs
for R -1 & 2.
Ms. Shobhana Takiar, SC with
Mr. Prateek Dhir, Mr. Shivam
Takiar & Mr. Kuljeet Singh,
Advs. for DDA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YASHWANT VARMA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
ORDER
% 29.10.2024
CM APPL. 64210/2024 ( Ex.)
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 & CM APPL. 64209/2024 (Interim Relief)
1. The instant writ petition has been preferred seeking the
following reliefs:
“(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of
certiorari thereby quashing the Public Notice dated 21.11.2012
(Annexure P-1) issued by Respondent No.1 and 2 pursuant to
Notification dated 27.06.1996 issued U/sec. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of land comprises of 34/
864th share measuring 1700 square yards out of land measuring 43
Bighas and 4 Biswas comprising Khasra Nos. 1269 (4-16); 1272W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 1 of 14
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(4-16); 1273 (4-16); 1284 (4-16); 1285 (4-16); 1286 (4-16); 1287
(4-16); 1288 (4-16) and 1292 (4-16) situated at Ruchi Vihar in
Revenue Estate of Village Rangpuri @ Malikpur Kohi Tehsil,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi;
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari
thereby quashing the Corrigendum Notice dated 08.07.2013
(Annexure P-2) issued by Respondent No.1 and 2 to the Public
Notice dated 21.11.2012 for acquisition of land comprises of 34/
864th share measuring 1700 square yards out of land measuring 43
Bighas and 4 Biswas comprising Khasra Nos. 1269 (4-16); 1272
(4-16); 1273 (4-16); 1284 (4-16); 1285 (4-16); 1286 (4-16); 1287
(4-16); 1288 (4-16) and 1292 (4-16) situated at Ruchi Vihar in
Revenue Estate of Village Rangpuri @ Malikpur Kohi Tehsil,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi;
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of
certiorari thereby quashing all land acquisition proceedings
initiated under Notification bearing No. F.9 (12)/95/L&B /LA/ 97
43 dated 27.06.1996 (Annexure P-3), qua the land of the petitioner
comprises of 34/ 864th share admeasuring 1700 square yards out of
land measuring 43 Bighas and 4 Biswas comprising Khasra Nos.
1269 (4-16); 1272 (4-16); 1273 (4-16); 1284 (4-16); 1285 (4-16);
1286 (4-16); 1287 (4-16); 1288 (4-16) and 1292 (4-16) situated at
Ruchi Vihar in Revenue Estate of Village Rangpuri @ Malikpur
Kohi Tehsil, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, as deemed to have lapsed
on 01.01.2014 in view of Section 24(2) of Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act, 2013;
(iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of
certiorari thereby quashing the demolition action dated 12.09.2024
taken against the subject property and issuing a writ of mandamus
directing the Respondent No.1 to 3 to restore the subject property
as it was prior to demolition action and pay damages to the
petitioner for the loss caused to it;
(v) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of
mandamus thereby directing the Respondent No.1 to 3 to
favourably consider the application of the petitioner dated
14.07.2020 submitted vide Registration slip (Annexure P-31) for
recognition of right to subject property under PM-UDAY
expeditiously; ”
2. We find that there has been a complete failure on the part of the
writ petitioner to provide any details with respect to when the originalW.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 2 of 14
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Notifications under Sections 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
18941 may have been issued. The writ petition proceeds on the basis
of a public notice dated 21 November 2012 from which we gather that
a Notification under Section 4 had been issued on 27 June 1996.
Contemporaneously, the respondents also appear to have invoked the
powers conferred by Section 17(4) and thus, dispensed with the need
for an enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act.
Although, that decision is stated to have formed subject matter of
litigation before this Court and which ultimately culminated in an
order passed by the Supreme Court on 21 March 2012 passed in Civil
Appeal No. 3001/2012, we are presently not apprised of whether the
writ petitioner was one of the petitioners before this Court or a party
before the Supreme Court.
3. The challenge also has to be necessarily examined and
evaluated bearing in mind the averments made by the writ petitioner in
para 5 of the writ petition and which reads as follows:-
“That the Petitioner has purchased the subject property on
05.12.2008 vide Agreement to Sell, GPA, Power of Attorney, Will,
Affidavit. Copy of title documents of the property of petitioner are
annexed along with the present petition as ANNEXURE P-5
(Colly.)”.
4. It is thus ex facie and manifestly evident that the petitioner is a
subsequent purchaser, who asserts having obtained a right in the land
only on 05 December 2008 and that too by way of an Agreement to
Sell, General Power of Attorney, Power of Attorney, Will and
Affidavit. We presently and in this connection bear in mind the
decision of the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd.
(2) v. State of Haryana2 wherein the following was observed:-
1
Act
2
(2012) 1 SCC 656W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 3 of 14
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“16. Section 54 of the TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale,
that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest
in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas
Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam[(1977) 3 SCC 247] observed: (SCC pp.
254-55, paras 32-33 & 37)
“32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest
in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. (See Ram
Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra[AIR 1967 SC 744 :
(1967) 1 SCR 293] .) The fiduciary character of the
personal obligation created by a contract for sale is
recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal
obligation created by a contract of sale is described in
Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation
arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of
property, but not amounting to an interest or easement
therein.
33. In India, the word ‘transfer’ is defined with reference
to the word ‘convey’. … The word ‘conveys’ in Section 5
of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense
of conveying ownership.
***
37. … that only on execution of conveyance, ownership
passes from one party to another….”
17. In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [(2004)
8 SCC 614] this Court held: (SCC p. 619, para 10)
“10. Protection provided under Section 53-A of the Act to
the proposed transferee is a shield only against the
transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the
possession of the proposed transferee who is put in
possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has
nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed
transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is
legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in
favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession
against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed into service
against a third party.”
18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of
sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the
absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as
required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable
property can be transferred.
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 4 of 14
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19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a
registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the
requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of the TP Act and will not
confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property
(except to the limited right granted under Section 53-A of the TP
Act). According to the TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with
possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54
of the TP Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made
only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not
create any interest or charge on its subject-matter.
20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to
any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of
attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorises
the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor,
which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by
him (see Section 1-A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act,
1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made
irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable
attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee.
21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005) 12 SCC 77] this
Court held: (SCC pp. 90 & 101, paras 13 & 52)
“13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed
by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of
power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act
for the principal in one transaction or a series of
transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal
generally conferring necessary authority upon another
person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the
principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right
to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him
and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed,
the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of
attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
***
52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the
provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers of
Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have
noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to
enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases
where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is
revocable. The donee in exercise of his power under such
power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject
of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof.
He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit.
He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or
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breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the
donee.”
An attorney-holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in
exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and
convey title on behalf of the grantor.
22. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous
disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his
estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivos. The two
essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into
effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any
time during the lifetime of the testator. It is said that so long as the
testator is alive, a will is not worth the paper on which it is written,
as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not
married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will
stands revoked. (See Sections 69 and 70 of the Succession Act,
1925.) Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.
23. Therefore, an SA/GPA/will transaction does not convey any
title nor creates any interest in an immovable property. The
observations by the Delhi High Court in Asha M. Jain v. Canara
Bank [(2001) 94 DLT 841] , that the “concept of power-of-attorney
sales has been recognised as a mode of transaction” when dealing
with transactions by way of SA/GPA/will are unwarranted and not
justified, unintendedly misleading the general public into thinking
that SA/GPA/will transactions are some kind of a recognised or
accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a
sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognise or accept
SA/GPA/will transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted
from an agreement to transfer, are not good law.
24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally
and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of
conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA sales” or
“SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey title and do not amount to
transfer, nor can they be recognised or valid mode of transfer of
immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as
completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither
convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They
cannot be recognised as deeds of title, except to the limited extent
of Section 53-A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied
upon or made the basis for mutations in municipal or revenue
records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of
conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of
leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a
registered assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the
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pernicious practice of SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA
sales.”
However, we need not render any definitive findings in this respect,
since it may ultimately prejudice the claim which the petitioner raises
in terms of a document which stands placed at Annexure P-30 of our
record.
5. The document to which our attention was drawn appears to
relate to an exercise for regularization of unauthorized colonies
undertaken by the respondents. However, that order dated 13
December 2019 makes qualifications in respect of persons who may
assert coverage under that scheme or claim benefits thereunder. This
becomes evident from a reading of Notes I, II and III which are
extracted hereinbelow:-
“Note-I: The above directions/order shall be subject to the orders/
directions and judgments of the competent court (s) and would be
subject to the final outcome of any legal proceedings which have
not attained finality including the final decision of the Constitution
Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the pending reference
relating to the provisions of The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition. Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act. 2013.
Note-II: Nothing in this order/direction shall apply to such cases
where the compensation has been paid to the persons interested or
deposited under section 30 and / or 31 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 by the Land Acquisition Collector pursuant to the land
acquisition proceedings.
Note-III: Nothing in this order/direction shall apply to lands
excluded under Clause 7 of National Capital Territory of Delhi
(Recognition of Property Rights of Residents in Unauthorised
Colonies) Regulations, 2019 notified by the DDA.”
The petitioner, however, fails to lay any foundation in the writ petition
which may establish whether it would fall within those exceptions or
stand excluded from consideration and fail to meet the criteria of
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eligibility.
6. Reverting then to the challenge which stands raised to the
original acquisition itself, and bearing in mind the fact that the
Notification under Section 4 was issued on 27 June 1996 followed by
a public notice issued on 21 November 2012 coupled with the fact that
the petitioner of its own admission acquired interest only post
acquisition, we find absolutely no justification to consider granting
prayers (i) to (iii) as sought.
7. We bear in mind the following pertinent observations that came
to be rendered by Supreme Court in Mahavir and Ors. vs. Union of
India and Ors.3. Dealing with the assertion of stale claims and in the
context of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 20134 , the Supreme Court in Mahavir had held as
follows:
“21. The Court is duty-bound to prevent the abuse of the process of
law in the cases which have been concluded several decades
before, in our considered opinion, the provisions of Section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked in such cases of dead claims or
stale claims. There are several numbers of cases coming to this
Court in which matters had been contested up to this Court
questioning the acquisition and the petitions have been dismissed
by this Court, and acquisition has attained finality, possession was
taken, the award passed. Notice had been issued under Section
12(2) of the Act tendering the awarded amount but it has not been
collected by the claimants/landowners deliberately or they had
refused to collect it and are not ready and willing to accept it and,
thereafter, it has been deposited in the name and account of the
owners in the treasury which is also deposited as per the State
Government’s instructions issued time to time relating to how
government money is to be dealt with. The act of failure to deposit
money under Section 31 after possession is taken only imposes
liability to pay higher interest under Section 34. The acquisition
would not lapse under the Act.
3
(2018) 3 SCC 588
4
2013 ActW.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 8 of 14
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22. In our opinion, the cases in which there is deliberate action of
the owners for not collecting the compensation and they do not
want to receive it, Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not come to
their rescue as provisions are to help those persons who are
deprived of compensation but not for those who deliberately had
not received it and litigated for decades for quashing of
proceedings avoiding to receive compensation by wilful act. The
failure to deposit in court under Section 31(1) in such cases would
attract only interest as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act and
the provisions of Section 24 cannot be so invoked in such cases.
23. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly,
but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had
ever approached any of the authorities in writing for claiming
compensation. No representation had ever been filed with any
authority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made in
the petition that any such representation had ever been filed. The
claim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This
we are mentioning as additional reasons, as such claims not only
suffer from delay and laches but courts are not supposed to
entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful,
cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and
laches.
24. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot be
permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as
they are barred. The High Court has rightly observed that such
claims cannot be a subject-matter of inquiry after the lapse of a
reasonable period of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24
of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In our
opinion, Section 24 cannot revive those claims that are dead and
stale.
25. The High Court has observed that Raisina is a part of the
Lutyens zone of Delhi. It is prime locality of New Delhi and
government offices, etc. are located. The petitioners asked the High
Court to infer and conclude that in the absence of some indication
of the record being made available by them that their ancestors
have not ever received any compensation. How the petitioners
came to know that their ancestors had not received compensation
has not been disclosed in the petition. The High Court has rightly
declined to entertain such claims. The protective umbrella of
Section 24 is not available to barred claims. If such claims are
entertained under Section 24, it would be very-very difficult to
distinguish with the frivolous claim that may be made even after
tampering the records, etc. or due to non-availability of such record
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 9 of 14
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after so much lapse of time. Once right had been lost due to delay
and laches or otherwise, it cannot be revived under provisions of
Section 24 of the 2013 Act. The intendment of the 2013 Act is not
to revive stale and dead claims and in the concluded case when
rights have been finally lost. If there is delay and laches or claim is
otherwise barred, it is not revived under Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act. The provision does not operate to revive legally barred claims.
26. The provision of Section 24 does not invalidate courts
judgments/orders in which right have been finally lost or due to
inaction is barred. Law does not permit examination of barred or
totally fraudulent claims. The provisions of the law cannot be
permitted to be defrauded or misused. Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act cannot be invoked in such cases. The High Court has rightly
declined to entertain the writ petitions filed by the petitioners. It is
not conceivable how the petitioners could file such a petition in a
laconic manner relating to the prime locality at New Delhi that too
for hundreds of acres with the delay of more than 100 years.
27. The prayers that have been made in writ petition are not only
misconceived, there is an attempt to stop the ongoing construction
activity. It has also been mentioned that government offices, etc.
have come up and the Government has leased property to private
parties also but still, the prayer has been made to stop the
construction activity. It passes comprehension how such relief
could ever be asked for. No authority had ever been approached by
the petitioners or by their ancestors. As such the petition is aimed
at the total misuse of the process of law. Even for a moment, such a
petition could not have been received for consideration.
28. We have seen in a large number of cases that the acquisition
had attained finality, compensation had been tendered but not
received and development had also taken place. The petitions are
being filed in the courts under the provisions of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act that they have not been paid any compensation. In
fact, if there is any such grievance, they themselves are responsible
for not collecting the compensation that was offered and tendered
to them. The provision of Section 24 is not intended to apply and
extend help in such cases.”
8. Following, the aforesaid view as expressed and in a string of
decisions rendered thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in
Baldev Singh and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors5 had held:
5
2020 SCC OnLine Del 1752
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 10 of 14
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“11. The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of delay and
laches in Mahavir v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC 588, in the
context of the 2013 Act. The said judgment is unambiguous in
emphasising that claims where there is total inaction are not meant
to be revived by the 2013 Act…….
xxxxxx
12. The aforesaid Judgment has been considered by the Supreme
Court in the decision of Indore Development
Authority v. Shailendra reported at (2018) 3 SCC 412, relevant
portion of which is reproduced hereinunder:–
“128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be
used to revive the dead or stale claims and the matters,
which have been contested up to this Court or even in the
High Court having lost the cases or where reference has
been sought for enhancement of the
compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urged
that physical possession has not been taken from them,
such claims cannot be entertained under the guise of
section 24(2). We have come across the cases in which
findings have been recorded that by which of drawing a
Panchnama, possession has been taken, now again under
Section 24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession
is still with them. Such claims cannot be entertained in
view of the previous decisions in which such plea ought to
have been raised and such decisions would operate as res
judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plea
raised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised
or was not raised in the previous round of litigation.
Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not supersede or annul
the court’s decision and the provisions cannot be misused
to reassert such claims once over again. Once Panchnama
has been drawn and by way of drawing the Panchnama
physical possession has been taken, the case cannot be
reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.
129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those
who first deliberately refuse to accept the compensation,
and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-
motivated dilatory tactics, for decades together. On the
contrary, the section is intended to help those who have
not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being
the legal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or
who have been illegally deprived of their possession for
five years or more; in both the scenarios, fault/cause not
being attributable to the landowners/claimants.
130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot
be the subject-matter of judicial probing under section 24W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 11 of 14
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of the Act of 2013. The provisions of section 24 do not
invalidate those judgment/orders of the courts where
under rights/claims have been lost/negatived, neither do
they revive those rights which have come barred, either
due to inaction or otherwise by operation of
law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to be raised
under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of
section 24(2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the
courts in cases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of
law could never have been the intention behind enacting
the provisions of section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, by
the decision laid down in Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra), and this Court never, even for a moment, intended
that such cases would be received or entertained by the
courts.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. This Court has also dealt with the issue of delay and laches in
the case of Mool Chand v. Union of India (W.P. (C) 4528/2015)
dated 17th January 2019, wherein the Court while elaborating the
decision of Mahavir v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC
588 and Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3
SCC 412, on the aspect of delay and laches, made the following
observations:
“34. The question then arises whether only the points of
difference between the decisions in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) andIndore Development
Authority v. Shailendra (supra) and all issues incidental
thereto have been referred to the Constitution Bench? In
this context it requires to be noted that although several
questions were framed in Indore Development
Authority v. Shailendra (supra), it is only on Question I,
viz., on whether the deposit in the RD Account would
amount to having tendered compensation for the purposes
of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, that there was a
difference of opinion between the view expressed in the
two decisions viz., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)
and Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra).
35. The other point of difference was that arising
in Yogesh Neema v. State of MP (supra) where the
correctness of the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar
Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) as
regards exclusion of the period covered by the interim
orders from the calculation of the period of five years
under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act was questioned. On
this point the three-Judge Bench in Indore Development
Authority v. Shailendra (supra) unanimously overruled the
decision in Sree Balaji Nagar ResidentialW.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 12 of 14
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Association v.State of Tamil Nadu (supra). On this issue
no subsequent Bench of the Supreme Court of co-ordinate
strength appears to have taken a contrary view. It is
doubtful, therefore, whether this issue would be examined
by the Constitution Bench.
36. Relevant to the issue on hand, there was no
difference of view qua Question III addressed in Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) i.e.
“Whether section 24 of Act of 2013 revives barred and
stale claims?” On this question there was no view (much
less a contrary view) expressed in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) or for that matter in any other
subsequent decision of a smaller, co-ordinate or even
larger Bench of the Supreme Court. This question,
therefore, was not the subject matter of reference before
the Constitution Bench.
37. Consequently, this Court is of the view that although
the order passed by the Constitution Bench refers to “all
the aspects” being considered by the Constitution Bench,
that expression would not include questioning the
correctness of the decision of the three-Judge Bench
in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (supra) as
far as it holds by a unanimous opinion that Section 24
(2) of the 2013 Act cannot revive old and stale claims.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Similar orders have been passed in several other cases, such as
in the case of Sushma Purthi v. Union of India (W.P. (C) 586 of
2016) dated 31st January 2019, Krishan v. Union of India (W.P.
(C) 4919 of 2014) dated 25th January 2019, Mohd. Mian v. Union
of India (W.P. (C) 2702/2019) dated 5th February 2019. The
aforenoted cases have been dismissed by this court on the ground
of delay and laches. Challenge against these judgments have been
dismissed by the Supreme Court vide SLP (C) No. 11481/2019,
SLP (C) No. 13423/2019 and SLP (C) No. 8848/2019,
respectively.
15. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, the present petition
is not maintainable on merits as well on the ground of delay and
laches. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Interim
orders stand vacated.”
9. We consequently find no justification whatsoever to entertain
the writ petition for reliefs which are claimed and form part of clauses
(i), (ii) and (iii). We are of the firm opinion that the petitioner is
clearly not entitled to assail or question the acquisition which was
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 13 of 14
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initiated in 1996.
10. However, and in so far as the prayer for regularization is
concerned, the same may be duly examined by the competent
authority, subject to due verification and all contentions on merits
being kept open. Subject to the aforesaid observation, the writ petition
shall stand disposed of.
11. We, however, provide that if any action is taken by the
respondents of the nature which is alluded to in para 35 of the writ
petition, the same would be subject to due verification of the
applications which the writ petitioner is stated to have made for the
purposes of regularization of possession in accordance with the
scheme which has been relied upon. All rights and contentions of
respective parties in that respect are kept open.
YASHWANT VARMA, J.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
OCTOBER 29, 2024
sk
W.P.(C) 15273/2024 Page 14 of 14
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