Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sukhnandan Singh Alias Rajan vs State Of Punjab on 19 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:124354
CRM-M-32109-2024 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
214
CRM-M-32109-2024 (O&M)
Date of decision: 19.09.2024
Sukhnandan Singh alias Rajan
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab
...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present: Mr. P.B.S. Goraya, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Sahil R. Bakshi, AAG, Punjab.
****
KULDEEP TIWARI, J. (ORAL)
1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for
indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case FIR
No. 39 dated 18.05.2023, under Sections 302, 34 of IPC, registered at P.S.
Verowal, District Tarn Taran.
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONER
2. The instant FIR was registered, against the unknown persons,
on the statement of the complaint made by Ranjit Kaur wife of deceased
Mahenga Singh. The relevant extract of the FIR reads as under :
“Statement of Ranjit Kaur w/o late Mahenga Singh r/o Takthu
Chak P.S ‘Verowal’ aged 40 years mobile no. 9780595185.
Stated that I am a house wife and resident of above mentioned
address. About 24 years back, I was married with Mahenga
Singh s/o Teja Singh r/o Takthu Chak and I have three1 of 11
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children, two elder daughters and Virkramjit Singh is my
younger son aged 17 years. Yesterday i.e. 17.05.2023 at 8.00
PM, my husband Mahenga Singh left the house for doing some
household work somewhere on his motorcycle HF Deluxe PB
08 EE-2244 of black color and after some time I came to know
that my husband Mahenga Singh is lying in an injured
condition on Sarli Road at some distance from Takthu Chak.
That I along with my nephew Nishan Singh son of Balwinder
Singh r/o Takthu Chak reached the spot and after arranging a
vehicle took my injured husband Mahenga Singh to Amandeep
Hospital Amritsar but before we could reach Amandeep
Hospital, my husband Mahenga Singh succumbed to his
injuries and doctors after checking him declared him dead. I
am sure that my husband has died due to injuries caused by
some unknown persons. It is requested that the unidentified
persons be searched and action be taken against them.
Statement given, heard, it is correct SD Ranjti Kuar attested
Inspector Upkar Singh SHO Police Station ‘Verowal’ dated
18.05.2023.”
SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in his asking for the
hereinabove extracted relief, has made the following submissions:-
(i) That except the statement of one interested witness
Manpreet Singh, who is implanted as a last seen witness by the
prosecution. There is no other inculpatory evidence with the
prosecution;
(ii) That this is a case of circumstantial evidence and except
one circumstantial evidence, there is no other evidence with
the prosecution against the present petitioner, therefore, the
complete absence of any linked evidence to connect the present
petitioner with the crime in question;
(iii) That by referring to the examination-in-chief of Ranjit
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Kaur (complainant), who stepped into the witness box as PW-1
(Annexure P-2), he submits that Manpreet Singh was stated to
have accompanying the Ranjit Kaur at the time of registration
of the FIR. However, this factum was not mentioned in the FIR,
which was crucial piece of evidence, and, therefore, it is a
clear cut case of creating a false evidence just to implicate the
present petitioner.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL
4. Per contra, the learned State counsel, who is in receipt of
advance notice, has placed on record the custody certificate qua the
petitioner, as issued by the Superintendent, Central Jail Goindwal, Punjab,
and short reply dated 18.09.2024 by way of affidavit of Kamalmeet Singh
PPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sub-Division Tarn Taran, District
Tarn Taran, on behalf of the respondent-State. Learned State counsel
opposed the grant of regular bail to the petitioner, and submits that
Manpreet Singh, is a witness, of last seen, who saw the deceased in the
company of present petitioner and his father and thereupon, after some time
the deceased was found in injured / critical condition. Therefore, there is a
statutory presumption against the accused to give explanation regarding the
incidence, however, there is no such explanation. He further submits that till
date only 4 witnesses, out of total 17 prosecution witnesses, have been
examined, and in case the petitioner is released on bail, the petitioner may
try to influence the prosecution witnesses.
ANALYSIS
5. Before embarking upon the process of evaluating the arguments
addressed by the learned counsels for the parties and penning down any
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opinion upon the instant petition, it is deemed imperative to capture an
overview of some significant legal propositions.
6. “Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception”. This basic principle
of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled “State of Rajasthan V.
Balchand alias Baliay”, 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1) 535. This principle
finds its roots in one of the most distinguished fundamental rights, as
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Though the underlying
objective behind detention of a person is to ensure easy availability of an
accused for trial, without any inconvenience, however, in case the presence
of an accused can be secured otherwise, then detention is not compulsory.
7. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained
person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts
shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal
jurisprudence, which is “the presumption of innocence”, besides the gravity
of offence(s) involved.
8. In “Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab”, (1980) 2 SCC
565 at 586-588,the purpose of granting bail is set out by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court with great felicity as follows:-
“27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the
right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an
exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however,
interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
Court of Calcutta in Nagendra v. King Emperor, AIR 1924
Calcutta 476 (479, 480) that the object of bail is to secure the
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attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be
granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is
not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,
significantly, are the ‘Meerut Conspiracy cases observations
are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a
special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, AIR 1931
Allahabad 504 (SB) it was observed, while dealing with
Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of
the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High
Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped
by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the
Court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible
principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was established
was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In
Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, AIR 1931 Allahabad 356 at p.
358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to
lay down any particular rules which bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the
discretion of the Court unfettered. According to the High
Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an
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attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular
classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was
observed that the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail
is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who
enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his
case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody.
As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to
freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A
presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable
him to establish his innocence.
XX XX XX
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC
118 it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court,
that “there cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of
granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will
govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail”.
30. In American Jurisprudence (2d, Vol. 8, page 806, para 39)
it is stated :
“Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of
the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large
extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular
case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment
of the accused is to secure his appearance and
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submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the
court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or
bond would effect that end.”
It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not
depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the
cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal
validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of
bail.”
9. Also, in “GudikantiNarasimhulu and others Versus Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh”, 1978 AIR (Supreme Court)
429, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J., has
enunciated the principles of bail thus :
“9. Thus the legal principle and practice validate the court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record-
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit
serious offences while on bail. In regard to habitual, it is part
of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has
enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further
crimes on the member of society. Bail discretion, on the basis
of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
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therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.
10. The significance and sweep of Article 21 make the
deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and
permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable,
even-handed and geared to he goals of community good and
State necessity spelt out in Article 19. Indeed, the
considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the
constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness
postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of
freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for
the bi-focal interests of justice – to the individual involved and
society affected.
11. We must weight the contrary factors to answer the test the
reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence
of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on
bail has a better chance to prepare of present his case than one
remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted.
mechanical detention should be demoted. In the United States,
which has a constitutional perspective close to ours, the
function of bail is limited, ‘community roots’ of the applicant
are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation’s Manhattan Bail
Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The
considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no
danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a
negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable
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condition, verging on the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the
unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable
incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a policy
favouring release justly sensible.
12. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All
deprivation of liberty is validated by social defence and
individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public
justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing
justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be
minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even
through community service, meditative drill, study classes or
other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with
public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating
witnesses or committing offences while on judicially sanctioned
‘free enterprise’, should be provided against. No seeker of
justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community.
Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to
cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and
humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion
correlated to the values of our Constitution.
13. Viewed from this perspective, we gain a better insight into
the rules of the game. When a person, charged with a grave
offence, has been acquitted at a stage, has the intermediate
acquittal pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal before this
Court pends? Yes, it has. The panic which might prompt the
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accused to jump the gauntlet of justice is less, having enjoyed
the confidence of the court’s verdit once. Concurrent holdings
of guilt have the opposite effect. Again, the ground for denial of
provisional release becomes weaker when the fact stares us in
the face that a fair finding if that be so – of innocence has been
recorded by one court. It may not be conclusive, for the
judgment of acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the likelihood of
desperate reprisal, if enlarged, may be a deterrent and his own
safety may be more in prison than in the vengeful village where
feuds have provoked the violent offence. It depends.
Antecedents of the man and socio-geographical circumstances
have a bearing only from this angle. Police exaggerations of
prospective misconduct of the accused, if enlarged, must be
soberly sized up lest danger of excesses and injustice creep
subtly into the discretionary curial technique. Bad record and
policy prediction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail
plea are admissible in principle but shall not stampede the
court into a complacent refusal.”
10. This Court has examined the instant petition on the touchstone
of the hereinabove extracted settled legal principle(s) of law and is of the
considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable for being allowed.
FINAL ORDER
11. The reason for forming the above inference emanates from the
factum that:- (i) in the instant FIR, the present petitioner has suffered
incarceration of one year, three months and 27 days, as on today, and is a
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person of clean antecedents; (ii) and further more, from the State reply as
well, except the statement of Manpreet Singh, who is the witness of last
seen, there is no other inculpatory evidence against the present petitioner,
the recovery which alleged to have been effected on behalf of the present
petitioner, whether, such recovery completes the chain of circumstance,
would be the moot question of law, to be adjudicated by the Ld. trial Court
concerned,at the appropriate stage.
12. Considering the fact that the petitioner has suffered
incarceration of one year, three months and 27 days, and the trial is still at
the initial stage, this Court deems it appropriate to grant the concession of
regular bail to the petitioner. Therefore, without commenting upon the
merits and circumstances of the present case, the present petition is allowed.
The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on furnishing of bail bond
and surety bond to the satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial
Magistrate/trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
13. However, it is clarified that if in future, the petitioner is found
indulging in commission of similar offences, as are involved herein, the
respondent-State shall be at liberty to make an appropriate application
seeking cancellation of regular bail, as granted by this Court. Moreover,
anything observed here-in-above shall have no effect on the merits of the
trial and is meant for deciding the present petition only.
18.09.2024 (KULDEEP TIWARI)
Satyawan JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether Reportable: Yes/No
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