Legally Bharat

Supreme Court of India

Suraj Singh Gujar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 30 August, 2024

Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia

Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia

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2024 INSC 661

                                                                        REPORTABLE

                                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                                   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                  CRIMINAL APPEAL No.             OF 2024
                         (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No. 2520 OF 2024)


              SURAJ SINGH GUJAR & ANR.                                …APPELLANTS

                                                     Versus

              THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

                                                 ORDER

Leave granted.

2. The appellants have been convicted by the Trial Court under

Sections 323, 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

three months, six months and one year for respective offences.

Vide the impugned order dated 26.12.2023, Madhya Pradesh

High Court disposed of the criminal appeal of appellants by
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

maintaining their conviction and sentence as awarded by the
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2024.09.06
17:00:11 IST
Reason:

Trial Court.

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3. Now, the appellants have filed the present appeal stating

that they have settled the dispute with the injured persons vide a

Compromise Deed dated 29.01.2024 and thus, pray before us to

grant permission for compounding the offence.

The relevant portion from paragraphs 12 to 17 of the

Settlement Deed reads as follows:

“12. That the First Party and Second Party are Uncle and
Nephew in relation, thereby with the interference of elders of
the family members, the First Party and Second Party have
agreed to settle their dispute amicably.

13. That the First Party has tendered unconditional
apology to the Second Party before the elder members of
their families and the Second Party being the uncle and
looking at the age of First Party has agreed to forgive the
First Party on the unconditional apology tendered by the first
party.

l4. That the Second Party and First Party have agreed to
compound their offence with the leave of the Hon’ble Court.

15. That the present MOU has been signed and executed
by the SECOND PARTY out of his own free will without any
fear, pressure, coercion and undue influence of others.

16. That the FIRST PARTY and SECOND PARTY have also
agreed that in future no such dispute will arise between the
First Party and Second Party and further, they have also
agreed that they will maintain peace and harmony in the
society.

17. That all the disputes in relation to above­mentioned
FIR and Cases have been amicably settled by the parties
and neither party shall file against the other, or against their
family, relative successor or assign any criminal case in
relation to the above­mentioned FIR and Cases.”
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4. When this matter came for hearing before this Court on

22.04.2024, we had directed the appellants to implead the

injured persons as party respondents and thereafter, the

impleaded private respondents were asked to file the affidavits

regarding their stand on compounding of the offences. We have

gone through the affidavits and found that since the appellants

are the cousin of respondents no.2 and 3 and have tendered an

unconditional apology regarding the incident, these respondents

have agreed to compound the offence. A similar stand has been

taken by respondent no. 4, who is the uncle of the appellants.

5. As far as Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC are concerned,

offences under these provisions are compoundable but the

offence under Section 324 of the IPC is a non­compoundable

offence.

6. Courts cannot grant permission to compound the non­

compoundable offences, on the basis of any sort of compromise

between the parties, as it would be contrary to what has been

provided by legislation, except the High Court under Section 482

of Cr.PC and the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
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The compromise between the parties in non­compoundable

cases has been taken into consideration by this Court in various

occasions to reduce the sentence of the convicts. (See: Murali v.

State (2021) 1 SCC 726; Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab &

Anr. (2020) 18 SCC 777) Also, in a series of other cases,

considering that the incident occurred between relatives and the

incident is of such a nature which did not have much impact on

society, this Court had set aside the conviction by invoking its

power under Article 142 of the Constitution in matters involving

non­compoundable offences. (See: Kailash Chand v. State of

Rajasthan (2021) 18 SCC 534; Srinivasan Iyenger & Anr. v.

Bimla Devi Agarwal & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 456; Ramawatar v.

State of M.P (2022) 13 SCC 635)

However, this is to be done only in exceptional cases after

considering various factors including the nature of injuries,

relation between parties and the impact of crime on society, etc.

While discussing the powers of Article 142 of the Constitution

and Section 482 CrPC (in relation to High Courts) in quashing

criminal proceedings in non­compoundable offences, this Court
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in Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of M.P (2022) 14 SCC 531

observed as follows:

“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to
Section 320CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by
the compromise between the parties in respect of offences
“compoundable” within the statutory framework, the
extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under
Section 482CrPC or vested in this Court under Article
142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes
and bounds of Section 320CrPC. Nonetheless, we
reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be
exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal
proceedings, bearing in mind:

19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience
of the society;

19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the
accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after
the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other
relevant considerations.”

Considering the aforesaid factors, we have no doubt that the

present case, which we are dealing with, is a fit case to invoke

our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

7. In our case, the incident occurred on 20.05.2011 relating to

a minor issue where respondent no.2 was trying to tie bullocks to

which the appellants objected by saying that it was their land. As

is clear from the compromise, the appellants and complainant

side are close relatives and after settling their disputes, both
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sides have agreed to maintain peace and harmony in the society.

Taking all of this into account, we invoke our powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution and hereby, set aside the

conviction of appellants in the present case. Appellants, who are

already outside jail, need not surrender.

8. Accordingly, the present appeal stands disposed of along

with the pending applications, if any.

..……..………………………….J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

..……..………………………….J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

New Delhi
August 30, 2024.

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