Madhya Pradesh High Court
Suresh @ Sonu vs Commissioner Thr. on 28 August, 2024
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:14619
1 WP-3304-2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 28th OF AUGUST, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 3304 of 2017
SURESH @ SONU
Versus
COMMISSIONER M.P. HOUSING BOARD AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Upendra Kumar Shrivas, Advocate for the petitioner .
ORDER
Present petition has been filed, under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, seeking the following reliefs:-
“(a) That, the petition be allowed in the light of facts and grounds
mentioned hereinabove.
(b) A writ or Certiorari or Mandamus or any other suitable writ,
order or direction be issued to the respondents to consider a case
of the petitioner for any suitable job on compassionate ground in
place of his deceased father late shri-Ramesh and representation of
petitioner be decided reasonalabe time by the respondent
authourity.
(c) That, cost of the petition be awarded to the petitioner from the
respondents.
(d) That, any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit in
the circumstances of the case be awarded to the petitioner from the
respondents.”
2. It is the case of the petitioner that his father late Ramesh was an
employee of the respondents’ department on the post of Sweeper on regular
contingency. While in service, he passed away on 26/8/2010 on account of
prolong illness. Petitioner being son of the deceased employee submitted an
application for grant of compassionate appointment. The employee was
terminated on 28/2/2000 by the respondent Authority. He filed a case before
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:14619
2 WP-3304-2017
the Labour Court bearing Case No. 38/ID Act/2003/Ref. challenging his
illegal termination order. The Labour Court rejected the reference vide order
dated 4/10/2008, which was challenged by filing W.P. No. 4333/2010. The
same was allowed on 9/3/2011. During the pendency of the case, as the
employee had expired on 26/8/2010, therefore, Award of compensation of
Rs.1,50,000/- was passed in lieu of reinstatement of workman.
3. It is argued that after death of the sole bread earner of the family,
the entire family is facing great hardship, acute financial stringency and
virtually is on the verge of starvation. Till date case of the petitioner has not
been considered by the Authorities, therefore, this petition has been filed
seeking direction to the Authorities to consider and decide his case for grant
of compassionate appointment.
4. In the present case, death of the employee has taken place in the
year 2010. The writ petition was filed in the year 2017. There is no
explanation for delay in filing the petition as is reflected from paragraph 4 of
the petition wherein it is mentioned that there is no delay in filing the
petition. A specific question was put to the counsel that how the delay in
filing the petition is explained. The only answer which has come is that he
was continuously pursuing the matter with the Authorities. However, no
such document is placed on record.
5. For consideration of case for grant of compassionate appointment,
penury and dependency are the basic requirements, which are to be seen. The
compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is the
compassion which is being shown by the employer to the dependent of a
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:14619
3 WP-3304-2017
deceased employee to enable him to overcome the sudden hardship which
has been caused due to sudden demise of the sole bread earner of the family.
If the dependent is in a position to survive for a considerable period, then the
case for compassionate appointment cannot be considered. Petitioner has
survived for a considerable period of about 14 years from the date of death
of the employee.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Kumar Dubey
vs. State of U.P., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 481 has held as under:
“12. The request for appointment on compassionate grounds
should be reasonable and proximate to the time of the death of the
bread earner of the family, inasmuch as the very purpose of giving
such benefit is to make financial help available to the family to
overcome sudden economic crisis occurring in the family of the
deceased who has died in harness. But this, however, cannot be
another source of recruitment. This also cannot be treated as a
bonanza and also as a right to get an appointment in government
service.”
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar vs. State
of Bihar and others, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 192 has held as under:
“3… This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate
appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased
employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the
bread earner who had left the family in penury and without any
means of livelihood. In fact such a view has been expressed in the
very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education Vs.
Pushpendra Kumar. It is also significant to notice that on the date
when the first application was made by the petitioner on
02/06/1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for
appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be
reservation of a vacancy till such time as a petitioner becomes a
major after a number of years, unless there are some specific
provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see
that the family gets immediate relief.”
8. A similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Beni Lal Bamney vs. Union of India and others , reported in 2003 (1)
MPLJ 342 and in the case of Riazuddin Khan vs. State of M.P. and others ,
reported in 2005(4) MPLJ 575 and in the case of Managing Director,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:14619
4 WP-3304-2017
Madhya Pradesh Paschim Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Co. and others vs. Ashiq
Shah and another (W.A.No.10 of 2020).
9. Even otherwise, there is substantial delay in approaching this
Court, which is not explained. Therefore, on account of delay and latches
also, no relief can be extended to the petitioner. In State of Orissa vs Mamta
Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
thus :
“53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not apply in
writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based
on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable
and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of
delay and laches.
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment
in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court
within a reasonable time. (See Rup Diamonds v. Union of India
(1989) 2 SCC 356], State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotraya [(1996) 6
SCC 267 and Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana (1997) 6 SCC 538.”
10. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53 ; relying upon
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
“10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion that
appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct disentitles it to
any relief. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder
Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has observed that
discretionary relief can be provided to one who has not by his act
or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant
rather than an indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that where third
party rights are created, the High Court should not interfere.
Similarly, in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been held
that the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not
encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third partiesSignature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:146195 WP-3304-2017
crystallizes in the interregnum.”
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn.
Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows :
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR
1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC
221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in
Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service
[(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary
or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to
give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done
that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it,
or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried
upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might af ect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.””
12. It is further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311
that :-
“10. … It is time and again, stated that a party who has slept over
his right since is not entitled to the discretionary relief of the
High Court.”
13. Thus, on both the counts no relief can be extended to the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:14619
6 WP-3304-2017
petitioner, as directing for consideration of his case for grant of
compassionate appointment would frustrate the very object of compassionate
appointment policy. Under these circumstances, no relief can be extended
to the petitioner.
14. Petition sans merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
15. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA)
JUDGE
(and)
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND
SHRIVASTAVA
Signing time: 9/2/2024
11:01:37 AM