Punjab-Haryana High Court
Surinder Singh vs Registrar, Cooperative Societies, … on 12 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP No.30483 of 2024
Date of decision: 12.11.2024
Surinder Singh
....Petitioner
Versus
Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab and others
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present: Mr. Manjit Singh Sarao, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Rajesh Sehgal, Addl. A.G., Punjab.
NAMIT KUMAR J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court by filing the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari, quashing the
punishment order dated 12.04.2010 (Annexure P-1), imposing
punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect; order
dated 16.06.2011 (Annexure P-2), whereby the statutory appeal
preferred by the petitioner has been rejected and the order dated
07.09.2021 (Annexure P-3), whereby the revision petition preferred by
the petitioner has been rejected by the Revisional Authority. Further a
writ of mandamus has been sought for directing the respondents to
release the withheld increments along with arrears and grant
consequential benefits and due promotions.
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the present petition, are
that the petitioner is an employee of Punjab State Cooperative
1 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:57 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
2
Agricultural Development Bank Limited, Chandigarh and his service
conditions are governed by “Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural
Development Bank Common Cadre Rules, 1978” and “Punjab Civil
Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970”. While the petitioner
was working as Manager at Primary Cooperative Agricultural
Development Bank Limited, Baba Bakala, he was placed under
suspension vide order dated 23.08.2008, followed by issuance of a
charge-sheet dated 17.09.2008, wherein it was alleged that the petitioner
is guilty of misusing his powers and violating the loan policies and
instructions sanctioning loan in his own name and sending incomplete
information to the higher authorities. The petitioner submitted reply to
the charge-sheet, which was found to be unsatisfactory and Assistant
Registrar (Vigilance), PADB, Chandigarh was appointed as an Enquiry
Officer, who submitted the enquiry report dated 06.11.2009 (Annexure
P-5), wherein the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to
be proved. The petitioner was issued show cause notice dated
06.02.2010 (Annexure P-6), along with copy of the enquiry report,
seeking his reply as to why his next three annual increments with
cumulative effect be not stopped. The petitioner submitted reply dated
23.02.2010, to the show cause notice and the punishing authority i.e.
Managing Director of the Bank, awarded the punishment of stoppage of
two annual increments with future effect. Thereafter, the petitioner
preferred a statutory appeal, which has been rejected by the Sub-
committee constituted by the Board of Directors of the Bank in its
2 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
3
meeting held on 04.04.2011, vide Item No.3 and the same has been
conveyed to the petitioner on 16.06.2011 (Annexure P-2). Thereafter,
petitioner had submitted an application dated 31.10.2011 for review of
order of Appellate Authority, but to no avail and after a period of three
years, the petitioner again submitted a request dated 05.03.2014
(Annexure P-9), for review of the order dated 04.04.2011 and the same
was replied vide letter dated 14.03.2014 (Annexure P-10) by stating that
the review application/appeal cannot be put up before the Board of
Directors of the Bank for reconsideration, therefore, the same has been
filed. Thereafter, after a period of five years, the petitioner again
submitted application dated 31.07.2019 (Annexure P-11) for review of
the order dated 04.04.2011, passed by the Appellate Authority, and the
same was again replied by the Bank, vide letter dated 26.09.2019
(Annexure P-12), whereby it was informed that the earlier review
application dated 31.07.2019, filed by the petitioner has been filed.
Thereafter, after a period of two years, the petitioner preferred revision
petition on 09.06.2021, before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies,
Punjab, Chandigarh (Annexure P-13), which has been rejected by the
Revisional Authority, vide order dated 07.09.2021 (Annexure P-3).
Thereafter, now the petitioner has preferred the present petition,
impugning the punishment order dated 12.04.2010 (Annexure P-1),
appellate order dated 16.06.2011 (Annexure P-2) and the revisional
order dated 07.09.2021 (Annexure P-3).
3. On a pointed query raised by the Court as to how the
3 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
4
present petition is maintainable on account of huge delay, as the
impugned orders relate to year 2010, 2011 and 2021, learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that punishment of stoppage of two annual
increments with cumulative effect, gives rise to recurring cause of
action every month, therefore, there is no delay in filing the present
petition.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel, who has caused
appearance on behalf of the official respondents on the strength of
advance copy having been served upon him, has opposed the
submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. He, inter alia,
submits that besides other issues, there is an inordinate, gross and
unexplained delay in filing the present writ petition for espousing his
cause, therefore, the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
6. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner was placed
under suspension on 23.08.2008 and thereafter, he was issued charge-
sheet dated 17.09.2008 (Annexure P-4). The allegations levelled in the
charge-sheet were enquired into by the enquiry Officer and in the
enquiry report dated 06.11.2009 (Annexure P-5), the same were proved
and the petitioner was issued show cause notice dated 06.02.2010
(Annexure P-6), along with copy of the enquiry report, wherein
provisional punishment of stoppage of three annual grade increments
4 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
5
with cumulative effect was proposed. The petitioner filed reply dated
23.02.2010 to the show cause notice, which was duly considered by the
punishing authority and he was awarded the punishment of stoppage of
two increments with future effect, vide order dated 12.04.2010
(Annexure P-1), and against the said punishment order, the petitioner
preferred an appeal, which has been rejected by the Sub-Committee
constituted by the Board of Directors of the Bank, in its meeting held on
04.04.2011. Thereafter, instead of filing the statutory revision before the
Revisional Authority, the petitioner vide his letter dated 31.10.2011
(Annexure P-8), 05.03.2014 (Annexure P-9) and 31.07.2019 (Annexure
P-11), sought review of the appellate order dated 04.04.2011, which was
duly replied by the Bank vide letters dated 14.03.2014 (Annexure P-10)
and dated 26.09.2019 (Annexure P-12), respectively. Thereafter, the
petitioner preferred a revision petition dated 09.06.2021 (Annexure P-
13), before the Revisional Authority, which has been rejected by the
said authority vide order dated 07.09.2021 (Annexure P-3).
7. Perusal of the facts narrated above show that the statutory
appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the Sub-Committee constituted
by the Board of Directors of the Bank in its meeting held on 04.04.2011.
Thereafter, after a period of more than ten years from dismissal of his
appeal, the petitioner preferred statutory revision petition dated
09.06.2021 (Annexure P-13), which has been rejected by the Revisional
Authority by passing a detailed order dated 07.09.2021 (Annexure P-3)
and the relevant portion from the same, reads as under:-
5 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
6“I have perused the documents presented and heard the
arguments forwarded by both the parties. Petitioner has
admitted that he had taken a loan for the purpose of
poultry farming while working as a Manager in PADB,
Baba Bakala, which was repaid by him within 35 days. He
was charge sheeted and after conducting a regular
enquiry, punishment of stoppage of two annual increments
with cumulative effect was inflicted upon him by the
Managing director vide order dated 12.04.2010.
Afterwards, Appellate Authority rejected the appeal of
Petitioner vide order in its meeting dated 04.04.2011.
1. A plea has been taken by the Petitioner that
Poultry farming is an allied activity to agriculture
and no prior permission was required to be taken for
obtaining loan or starting poultry farming. But as
per Rule 21 of The Punjab State Cooperative
Agricultural Development Bank Service Common
Cadre Rules, 1978, service of the Petitioner is
governed by the Government Employee Conduct
Rules, 1966. As per Rule 15 of the Conduct Rules,
1966, no Government employee shall except with the
previous sanction of prescribed authority engage
directly or indirectly in any trade or business or
negotiate for or undertake any other employment.
Therefore, it is evident that previous sanction of the
prescribed authority was required to be taken before
starting the business of Poultry Farming. Another
plea taken by the Petitioner that other employees
have also been doing the business of this sort and
never took permission/sanction from the higher
authorities, cannot be sustained in this case. A
wrong precedent taken by the Petitioner does not
absolve the Petitioner of the above said charge.
Even Enquiry Officer has proved this charge as
Petitioner as himself admitted before the Enquiry
Officer that he was unaware of the fact that prior
approval/permission was required to be taken.
2. On the one hand, it has been submitted by the
Petitioner in the revision petition that first payment
of loan was utilized by him and question of utilizing
second payment did not arise as entire loan was
repaid within 35 days. On the other hand, in the
6 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
7
replication Petitioner has submitted that the project
was not started and the Petitioner was yet to apply
for starting the project, which was mid-way stopped
by the report of AGM. Statements are contradictory
to each other as first in the main revision petition, he
has admitted the utilization of one loan and in the
replication, he submitted that project was not yet
started.
3. As far as the matter of sanctioning of loan to
himself is concerned, though Enquiry Officer has not
proved the charge given the tenure of the Board of
Directors had ended and the power to sanction the
loan was given to Manager concerned. This does not
mean that the power/authorization given to the
Manager would be used by him to grant loan to
himself. He should have acted diligently and taken
the permission or asked for the sanction from the
higher authorities for the same.
4. Apart from the above said charges, other charges
with regard to irregularities in the loan case file
were levelled against the Petitioner. Petitioner has
submitted that charges which pertain to availability
of membership form and fard jamabandi in the loan
case file were not proved by the Enquiry Officer. But
it is evident from the enquiry report that other
charges were proved by the Enquiry Officer and
nothing in defence has been produced by the
Petitioner to prove his stance on other charges.
Rather, at various places in the enquiry report, he
has admitted that photographs of applicant and third
party could not be attached in the loan case file.
Similarly, signatures of Deputy Manager and
Manager could not be taken on the loan case
sanction note and order of sanction of loan could
not be signed by the Manager due to engagement in
loan waiver scheme. It clearly proves the gross
negligence on the part of Petitioner. Being a
Manager of the Bank, he was expected to work
diligently.
Besides, Managing Director, respondent has already
taken a lenient view of the matter and a punishment of
stoppage of two annual increments has been inflicted upon
7 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
8
the Petitioner against the proposed punishment of
stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect.
Thus, in view of the above said facts and circumstances
and gravity of charges levelled against the Petitioner, I do
not find any reason to interfere in the punishment orders
dated 12.04.2010 passed by the Managing Director of the
Bank and appellate order passed by the sub-committee of
Board of Directors in its meeting dated 04.04.2011.
Therefore, this revision petition is dismissed and
punishment order of Managing Director and Appellate
order of the sub-committee of Board of Directors are
upheld.
Order has been announced in the open Court.
File be consigned to the record.
Date: 07.09.2021 Vikas Garg, I.A.S.,
Registrar, Cooperative Societies,
Punjab, Chandigarh."
Even the present writ petition has been filed after more
than three years of dismissal of the revision petition preferred by the
petitioner. There is a delay at every stage on the part of the petitioner
and, therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and latches. A person who approaches the Court at
belated stage dis-entitles himself to seek discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If the petitioner wants to invoke
jurisdiction of a writ Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion
for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar vs State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others”, 2009(2) SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and
8 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
9
latches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (AIR
1970 SC 769). Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR
1969 SC 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy either because the party has, by his conduct
done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct
and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in
which it would not be reasonable to place him if the
remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of
these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded
9 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
10
upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting
to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always
important in such cases are, the length of the delay
and the nature of the acts done during the interval
which might affect either party and cause a balance
of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this
Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation
with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v.
Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 470) that no relief can be
given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is
itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it
was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court
should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions
filed after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987 SC
251) that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does
not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay
on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
10 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
11
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
9. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal and another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others, 2013(6) SLR 629, while considering the issue regarding delay
and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a
dead issue/dispute cannot be revived even if such a representation has
been decided either by the authority or by getting a direction from the
court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with
reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such
order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government servant may
deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of
the Constitution of India, in a situation of that nature, will not be
attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are
alert and vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at the right juncture
and not on expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time. An
11 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
12
order promoting a junior should normally be challenged within a period
of six months or at the most in a year of such promotion. Though it is
not a strict rule, the courts can always interfere even subsequent thereto,
but relief to a person, who allows things to happen and then approach
the court and puts forward a stale claim and try to unsettle settled
matters, can certainly be refused on account of delay and laches. Any
one who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer. An employee who
sleeps like Rip Van Winkle and got up from slumber at his own leisure,
deserves to be denied the relief on account of delay and laches. Relevant
paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the
tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another,
(2008) 10 SCC 115, a two-Judge Bench was dealing with
the concept of representations and the directions issued by
the court or tribunal to consider the representations and
the challenge to the said rejection thereafter. In that
12 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
13
context, the court has expressed thus:-
“Every representation to the Government for
relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become stale or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In
regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the
matter did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
14. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
15. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
16. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam
Dass (2) and others, (2011) 4 SCC 374, a three-Judge
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the
principle stated in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997)
6 SCC 538 and proceeded to observe that as the
respondents therein preferred to sleep over their rights and
approached the tribunal in 1997, they would not get the
benefit of the order dated 7.7.1992.
18. In State of T. N. vs. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC
137, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, testing the equality
clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to
grant of service benefit, has ruled thus:-
“… filing of representations alone would not
save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a
relevant factor for a court of law to determine the
question as to whether the claim made by an13 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
14applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or
laches on the part of a government servant may
deprive him of the benefit which had been given to
others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would
not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is
well known that law leans in favour of those who are
alert and vigilant.”
19. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
20. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
others, (2007) 9 SCC 278, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
opined that though there is no period of limitation provided
for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen
years and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay
and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.
10. In a recent judgment by the Division Bench of this Court in
“Ram Kumar vs State of Haryana and others”, 2022 (3) SCT 346,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
14 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
1501.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278, observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter
which cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein
filed a Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not
agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as
noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17
workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They
did not implead themselves as parties even in the
reference made by the State before the Industrial
Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those
employees who were employed or who were
recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the
said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore,
the Writ Petitions could not have been entertained
even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in
favour of those who approach the Court after a long
time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B.
v. Tarun K. Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347],
Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant
Singh And Anr. [2006 (12) SCALE 347] and15 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
16Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its
Chairman & Managing Director and Another v. K.
Thangappan and Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana &
Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538, it was held by the Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly
held, the delay disentitles the party to the
discretionary relief under Article 226 or 32 of the
Constitution. It is not necessary to reiterate all
catena of precedents in this behalf. Suffice it to state
that the appellant kept sleeping over their rights for
long and elected to wake up when they had the
impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s
ratios………………… Therefore, desperate attempts of
the appellants to re-do the seniority had by them in
various cadres/grades though in the same services
according to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not
amenable to judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in “Prem Nath and
others vs State of Punjab and others”, 2018(2) SCT 687, while
rejecting the claim of additional increments of acquisition of higher
qualifications has held as under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners
that they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and
had even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab16 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
17Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others.
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1
are the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards
the inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another17 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
18v. Jaswant Singh and another (2006)11 SCC 464. In such
case, certain employees raised the issue that they were not
liable to be retired at the age of 58 years but should be
permitted to continue in service till they attain the age of
60 years. Such employees were still in service when the
writ petitions were filed. The writ petitions were ultimately
allowed. Placing reliance upon such judgment, some of the
employees, who had already superannuated, filed writ
petitions seeking the same benefit. Even such petitions
were allowed by the High Court in terms of following the
earlier judgment. The judgment of the High Court was
challenged before the Apex Court and wherein while
referring to earlier judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union
of India, (1989)2 SCC 356; “Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana, (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West
Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004)1 SCC 347, it was opined
that persons who approached the Court at a belated stage
placing reliance upon the order passed in some other case
earlier, can be denied the discretionary relief on the
ground of delay and laches. The relevant observations
made by the Supreme Court are contained in Paras 5, 6
and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is
concerned, that has been settled by this court.
Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal
proposition. But the only question is grant of
relief to such other persons who were not
vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but
filed writ petitions after the judgment of this
court in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief
Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300.
Whether they are entitled to same relief or
not? Therefore, a serious question that arises
for consideration is whether the employees18 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
19who did not wake up to challenge their
retirement and accepted the same, collected
their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has
been examined by this court in a series of
decisions and laches and delay has been
considered to be an important factor in
exercise of the discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person
who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ
petition be heard after a couple of years on
the ground that same relief should be granted
to him as was granted to person similarly
situated who was vigilant about his rights and
challenged his retirement which was said to
be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has
been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions
were filed by the employees of the Nigam
before their retirement wherein their
retirement was somewhere between 30.6.2005
and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were filed
wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a
spate of writ petitions followed in which
employees who retired in the years 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file
writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after
their retirement. Whether such persons should
be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who
have not approached the court that will
unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the
Nigam will completely collapse with the
liability of payment to these persons in terms
of two years’ salary and increased benefit of
pension and other consequential benefits.
19 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
20Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the
court after their retirement. Only those
persons who have filed the writ petitions when
they were in service or who have obtained
interim order for their retirement, those
persons should be allowed to stand to benefit
and not others.”
[Emphasis supplied]
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this
Court in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314. In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has
been clearly laid down that discretionary
relief in a writ jurisdiction is available to a
party who is alive of his rights and enforces
the same in court within reasonable time. The
judgment in another case does not give a
cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such
petitions can be dismissed on account of delay
and laches. As has already been noticed above
in the present case as well, the petitioner
joined service in the year 1965 and retired in
the year 2005, but raised the issue regarding
benefit of proficiency step up in the pay scale20 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
21on completion of 23 years of service from the
due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this
court and filed the petition claiming the same
relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service
on 31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the
benefit of proficiency step up, which may be
admissible to the petitioner during his service
career, was sought to be raised more than five
years after his retirement, the claim made at
such a late stage deserves to be dismissed on
account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the
pay scales admissible to him or the last pay
drawn by him within a reasonable time after
his retirement. He cannot be permitted to
raise the same at any time on the plea that the
same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law,
as referred to above, in my opinion, the
petitioner herein is not entitled to the relief
prayed for and the petition deserves to be
dismissed merely on account of delay and
laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the
petitioners would make an attempt to overcome the
obstacle of delay by placing reliance upon a Full Bench
Judgment of this Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of
Punjab, 1998(3) SCT 664. Counsel would argue that as
per dictum laid down in Saroj Kumar’s case(supra),
matters of pay fixation involve a recurring cause of action
and as such, writ petitions for such claim cannot be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the Court
at the most, may restrict the arrears upto 38 months from
the date of filing of the petition and disallow the arrears
for the period for which even a suit had become time
barred.
21 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
22
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the
judgment in Saroj Kumar’s case, is wholly misplaced. The
observations and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar’s case,
were in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India and others, 1995(4) RSJ
502. In M.R. Gupta’s case(supra), it had been categorically
held that so long as an employee “is in service” a fresh
cause of action arises every month when he is getting his
monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made
contrary to rules. It was further held that the claim to be
awarded the correct salary on the basis of a proper pay
fixation “is a right which subsists during the entire tenure
of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners
choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is
much subsequent to their superannuation that they have
woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions
that may have been rendered in the case of similarly
situated employees.
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam’s case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches.
13. Ordered accordingly.”
12. The Division Bench of this Court in “H.S. Gill vs Union of
India and others”, 2016(2) SCT 477, has held that an employee cannot
claim the revised pay scale after retirement once he has been receiving
the pay scale granted by the employer for the last 09 years. The relevant
portion from the said judgment, reads as under:-
“14. The petitioner is also not entitled to any relief
22 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
23on account of principle of delay and laches. He has been
receiving the pay in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 right
from his transfer to CSIO, Chandigarh i.e. 2.7.2002. For
the first time, he moved the representation on 29.8.2011,
so, he kept mum for about 9 years. Thus, the claim of the
petitioner is highly belated and stale.”
13. The contention of the petitioner that stoppage of
increments with cumulative effect is a recurring cause of action, cannot
be accepted as in “Gurbax Singh vs Pepsu Board Transport
Corporation and others”, 2014 SCC Online (P&H) 8063, it has been
held by this Court that punishment of stoppage of increments is not a
recurring cause of action and the punishment order of stoppage of
increments has to be challenged before the Civil Court within 03 years
and the suit filed after 03 years is barred by limitation. The operative
part of the said judgment, reads as under:-
“Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that
the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect has a
recurring cause of action affecting pay and allowance
payable to him and therefore, the suit cannot be said to be
barred by limitation. Reliance is placed upon judgment of
this Court in Malkiat Singh v. State of Haryana, 2008 (2)
SLR 192 and Yog Raj Mittal, since deceased through is
legal representatives v. State of Punjab, 2008 (4) SLR
169.
The question of law as to whether, the punishment of
stoppage of increments has the recurring cause of action
or that suit is to be instituted within three years of the
passing of the order was considered by the Division Bench
is RSA No. 1927 of 1994 titled ‘Amar Singh v. State of23 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
24Punjab’ decided on 03.05.2006. In the aforesaid case, the
challenge was to 12 orders in respect of stoppage of
increments with or without cumulative effect. Such suit was
filed after three years of passing of the last of such order as
well. The learned Division Bench relied upon an earlier
judgment of the Division Bench in Randhir Singh v. State
of Haryana 1994 (3) RSJ 110 to hold that the suit
instituted on 12.04.1990 against the 12 order passed on
23.07.1984 is clearly barred by limitation and had been
rightly dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. While
dismissing the appeals filed by the plaintiff, the Bench also
placed reliance on two judgments of the Supreme Court in
Punjab State v. Darshan Kumar 1995 Supp (4) SCC 220
and State of Punjab v. Rajinder Singh, Conductor 1999
SCC (L&S) 664.
It has been held that the suit for declaration challenging
the order of punishment of the stoppage of increments has
to be disputed before the civil court within three years. The
suit filed after three years is barred by limitation.”
14. To the same effect is the judgment passed in “Guru Dutt
vs Pepsu Road Transport Corporation”, 2001(3) SCT 1066, wherein it
has been held as under:-
“2. The plaintiff has been non-suited by the first
appellate Court for the following reasons given in para
Nos. 8 to 11 of the impugned judgment :-
“In the instant appeal, the only point for
determination is whether the suit filed by the
appellant was within limitation. On this point Shri
S.K. Sharma, ld. counsel for appellant has mainly
argued that the suit filed by the appellant was within
limitation because right of increment is recurring24 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265CWP No.30483 of 2024
25right. He has cited ruling State of Punjab v. Gurdev
Singh, Ashok Kumar, 1991(3) SCT 93 (SC) : AIR
1991 Supreme Court 2219, that the limitation for
challenging the impugned orders is three years. If
the party approaches the Court after the expiry of
statutory period, the Court cannot give the
declaration sought for. In the supra ruling it has
been held as under:-
“A suit for declaration that an order of
dismissal or termination from service passed
against the plaintiff dismissed employee is
wrongful, illegal or ultra vires is governed by
Article 113. It cannot be said that there is no
limitation for instituting the suit for
declaration by a dismissed or discharged
employee on the ground that the dismissal or
discharge was void or inoperative. If a suit is
not covered by any of the specific articles
prescribing a period of limitation, it must fall
within the residuary article. The purpose of
the residuary article it is to provide for cases
which would not be covered by any other
provision in the Limitation Act. The party
aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to
approach the Court for relief of declaration
that the order against him is inoperative and
not binding upon him. He must approach the
Court within the prescribed period of
limitation. If the statutory time limit expires
the Court cannot give the declaration sought
for”.
Similar view was held by our own Hon’ble
High Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Kaur,
1996(3) Punjab Law Reporter 795 in which the
penalty of withholding one increment with
cumulative effect was imposed and it was held that
the period of limitation to challenge the said order
25 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
26
was three years as provided under Article 113 of the
Limitation Act (36 of 1963). In para No. 9, it was
held that :
“………The order of penalty, may be illegal or
otherwise, can only be set aside within a
period of three years from the date of cause of
action accrued to the Government employee.
In the present case cause of action accrued to
the plaintiff, when the order of penalty was
initially passed on 30.8.1993 and later on
8.5.1986 when the order of penalty was
modified. Therefore, the suit to get these
orders declared as illegal and void ought to
have been filed within a period of three years
from the latter dated viz 8.5.1986 as by virtue
of this order right to revise salary by the
employee on expiry of the month was put to an
end. The order of penalty still stands, it
having not been set aside within the period of
limitation. Once that is so, it was not open to
the Courts below to grant relief as has been
granted in the present case.”
To the similar effect are rulings Punjab State
v. Hardev Singh, 1997(2) SCT 101 (P&H) : 1997(1)
PLR 669, State of Punjab v. Babu Singh, 1996(2)
SCT 91 (P&H) : 1996 PLR 482 and the Punjab
State v. Kulwinder Singh, 1995(2) PLR 718.
9. On the other hand, ruling 1996(2) AIJ 652 (supra)
cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not
apply to the facts of the present case and is quite
distinguishable. In the said ruling the delinquent
official has claimed arrears of increment and it was
held by their Lordships that no doubt the right to
increment is a recurring right and the petitioner is
entitled to the same, but in view of the laches on the
part of the (petitioner) payment of any arrears of the
increments prior to 1990 was declined. Similarly, the
other rulings State of Punjab v. Sandhu Singh,
1993(2) Recent Services Judgments 766, Punjab
26 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
27
State v. Paramjit Singh, 1992(1) Punjab Law
Reporter 417 and State of Punjab v. Parkash
Singh, 1993(3) SCT 394 (P&H) : 1992(8) SLR 689
are also quite distinguishable and do not apply to
the facts of the present case.
10. As far as the ruling State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Syed Qamarali, 1967 Services Law Reporter 228
cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is
concerned, the same is also not applicable to the
facts of the present case in view of ruling AIR 1991
Supreme Court 2219 (supra) cited by the learned
counsel for the respondents.
11. Thus, relying upon the supra authorities, I hold
that the period of limitation for challenging the
impugned orders was within three years. The
appellant has failed to file the suit within three years
and as such his suit has been rightly dismissed by
the learned trial Court being time barred. The
learned trial Court has, therefore, rightly
appreciated the evidence while dismissing the suit
being time barred and thus, I affirm the same”.
3. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that both the Courts below fell in error
by holding that the suit of the plaintiff was beyond
limitation. He submitted that the case pertains to the
arrears of salary of the plaintiff and in these circumstances
there will be no limitation. In support of his contention, the
learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon 1996(1)
SCT 8, M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others. I do not
subscribe to the argument of the learned counsel for the
appellant. The cited judgment is distinguishable on facts.
In fact the plaintiff was challenging the order dated
18.11.1971 and other orders dated 7.4.1972, 18.7.1975
and 17.2.1977 vide which his two annual increments with
cumulative effect were stopped and the period with effect
from 9.1.1977 to 21.1.1977 was treated as leave without
pay. The cause of action arose to the plaintiff on the date of
27 of 28
::: Downloaded on – 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:148265
CWP No.30483 of 2024
28
the passing of these orders. Resultantly, the suit ought to
have been filed by the plaintiff within three years. The
present suit was filed in the year 1991 which was
hopelessly barred by limitation. There is no error of law on
the part of the Courts below.
No merit. Dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.”
15. In view of the foregoing discussion and abovesaid
authoritative enunciation of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this
Court, the aforesaid issue as raised in the present writ petition cannot be
allowed to be agitated at this belated stage accordingly, the present
petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
JUDGE
12.11.2024
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
28 of 28
::: Downloaded on - 23-11-2024 07:51:58 :::