Himachal Pradesh High Court
Umardeep Singh & Others vs State Of H.P. & Ors on 30 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1098 of 2023
Reserved on: 21.08.2024
.
Date of Decision: 30.09. 2024.
Umardeep Singh & others
….Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & Ors.
….Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the petitioners : Mr. Anuj Nag, Advocate.
For the respondents : Ms. Ayushi Negi, Deputy Advocate,
for respondents No.1 to 3/State.
: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate, for
respondent No.4.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of F.I.R. No.19 of 2023, dated
15.07.2023, registered for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 504 of Indian Penal Code
_______________
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
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(IPC) at Women Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra,
H.P. and consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police
asserting that the informant got married to petitioner No.1-
Umandeep Singh as per Sikh religious rites at Victoria Resorts
Batala, District Gurdaspur, Punjab. Her parents spent huge
money on the marriage. The petitioner started making certain
demands soon after the marriage. The victim’s parents paid
₹3,00,000/- to her parents-in-law for the purchase of furniture
as a gift. After a few months of the marriage, the victim’s
mother-in-law and sister-in-law demanded gold items,
clothing and jewellery for themselves as well as for victim’s
father-in-law, brother-in-law and her husband. These
demands were satisfied; however, the demands continued to
grow. The victim’s husband, his parents and his sister gave
beatings to the victim several times during her stay at her
matrimonial home. The victim’s parents-in-law, sister-in-law
and brother-in-law demanded heavy amounts and articles of
dowry. They demanded ₹20-25 lacs and other expensive items
like a car and bike from the victim and her parents. The victim’s
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parents were unable to meet these demands. The petitioners
started treating her like a housemaid. She was not given any
.
allowance for her basic and daily necessities. Her demand for
money was turned down. She was asked to get the money from
her parents. She was told in the presence of everyone that she
was not good enough and was only a burden on her husband and
her in-laws. She was coerced repeatedly to meet the demand for
dowry. She was harassed in the presence of guests. Her sister-
in-law taunted her by saying that her brother and her family
members were far superior to her (the victim) and her family.
Her mother-in-law said that it was bad luck for the family that
the victim was married to her son. They stated that they had
many expectations of getting gifts items/articles and cash in
marriage but nothing was given to them. They told the victim
that they had married her only for money and since money and
gifts were not paid to her; therefore, she was of no use to her
husband and her in-laws. The victim’s husband hurled abuses
at her. He misbehaved with her and her brother during Bhai Dooj
in the year 2021. The acts of the petitioners were likely to drive
her to commit suicide. She was treated like a slave by her
husband in her in-laws. She was asked to commit suicide. She
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got pregnant but she was told to get rid of the baby. She was told
that she and her child would be killed in case of non-abortion.
.
She was told to pay ₹20-25 lakhs if she wanted to keep the child.
Her sister-in-law slapped her and hit her on the stomach at
Amritsar. She did not feel well in the last week of April 2023 and
asked her husband to take her to a doctor or hospital but her
husband refused to do so. When she asked for money for her
medical check-up, her in-laws refused by saying that they did
not want to keep her. Her condition deteriorated on 01.05.2023
and she begged her husband to take her to the doctor for her
medical checkup but he refused by saying that she should take
her life or go away for good. She went to Randhawa Hospital
alone where her medical tests were conducted and she was
advised for admission but her husband telephonically refused.
Her parents-in-law asked her to clear the dues of the hospital.
She suffered a miscarriage on 02.05.2023. She was advised to
rest for 30 days after the miscarriage. The petitioners celebrated
her miscarriage by saying that their burden had been reduced.
She was turned out of her matrimonial home on 06.05.2023. She
was beaten and abused. Her jewellery and other items were kept
by the petitioners. Hence, a complaint was filed before the
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Police and the Police registered the F.I.R. based on the
complaint.
.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R. the
present petition has been filed for quashing of the same by
asserting that the parties resided together at Taran Taaran. The
Police at Dharamshala did not have any territorial jurisdiction to
register the FIR. The F.I.R. does not disclose any acts of the
petitioners or their participation in the crime. Copy of the
discharge slip falsifies the allegations made against petitioner
No.1 and his sister that they had slapped the victim and hit her
on her stomach when she was pregnant. The proceedings were
initiated with an ulterior purpose for wreaking vengeance. The
allegations in the F.I.R. even if accepted at their face value do not
constitute any offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be quashed.
4. The petition was opposed by filing a status report
reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. It was asserted that the
police conducted the investigation and recorded the statements
of witnesses as per their version. It was found after the
investigation that the petitioners had harassed the victim
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mentally and physically. The victim became pregnant and she
was deprived of the necessities. The victim delivered a dead
.
child on 02.05.2023. She remained admitted to the hospital from
02.05.2023 till 05.05.2023. Efforts were made to settle the
matter but the petitioners continuously harassed the victim.
The victim is residing with her brother at Dharamshala.
Petitioner No.1 had filed a divorce case at Taran Taaran. The
r to
victim wanted to settle the matter with the petitioners but they
did not agree. The police found sufficient material against the
petitioners and filed a charge sheet against them. Learned Trial
Court is seized of the matter.
5. I have heard Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Ms Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General
for respondents No. 1 to 3/State and Mr Arvind Sharma, learned
counsel for victim/respondent No.4.
6. Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely
implicated. Vague and general allegations have been made
against the petitioners, which are not sufficient to constitute the
commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, he prayed
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that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R. be ordered to be
quashed. He relied upon a judgment of the Chhatisgarh High
.
Court in Rajesh Kumar Mishra & Ors. Vs State of Chattisgarh 2023
1 Crimes (HC) 146 in support of his submission.
7. Ms. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General
for respondents No.1 to 3/State submitted that specific
allegations have been made by the victim against the
petitioners. The charge sheet has been filed before the
competent Court, which is pending adjudication. This Court
should not exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8. Mr. Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the
victim/respondent No.4 supported the submissions of Ms.
Ayushi Negi learned Deputy Advocate General and submitted
that petitioners had repeatedly harassed the victim. The victim
is residing with her brother at Dharamshala and Courts at
Dharamshala have jurisdiction to hear and entertain the matter,
therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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10. The law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme
.
Court in A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it
was observed: –
“9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and
criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by
this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPCIndia Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 4521 after
considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to
refer to the following observations of this Court in the said
case, which read thus:
“12. The principles relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to quash complaints and criminal
proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this
Court in several decisions. To mention a few–
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)
234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri)1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro
Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri)
1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of
Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl
Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000)
3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri)
786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002
SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose
are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they are.
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out the case alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be
examined as a whole, but without examining the
merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material
nor an assessment of the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is
warranted while examining prayer for quashing a
complaint.
r(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as when
the criminal proceeding is found to have been
initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution.
The power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid
in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the
complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are necessary for making out the offence.
(v.) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a
civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c)
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a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual dispute,
apart from furnishing a cause of action for
seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a
.
criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil
proceeding are different from a criminal
proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or
has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash
the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal
offence or not.”
11. Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of
U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: –
“12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations
of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exerciseof the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code whichwe have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustrationwherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
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(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute.
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or
the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
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there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect
that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be
justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
r reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint
and that the extraordinary or inherent powers
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the
court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
12. The present petition has to be considered as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13. It was submitted that the Courts at Dharamshala do
not have any jurisdiction and F.I.R. was wrongly lodged at
Dharamshala. This submission is not acceptable. The victim
specifically stated in the F.I.R. that she was residing with her
brother. This fact was found to be correct during the
investigation. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 558
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that the place where the victim is residing will have jurisdiction
to hear and entertain complaint regarding her harassment. It
.
was observed at page 389-90:
“14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under
Section 498-A IPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to
mean ‘The intentional and malicious infliction of mental
or physical suffering on a living creature, esp. a human;
abusive treatment; outrage (abuse, inhuman treatment,
indignity)’. Cruelty can be both physical or mental
cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the wife by
overt acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the
mental stress and trauma of being driven away from the
matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the
same home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that
cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning of
the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section 498-A of
the Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychological
effect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to
continue to traumatise the wife even after she leaves the
matrimonial home and takes shelter at the parental
home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in
the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do
not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that
the mental trauma and the psychological distress caused
by the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if
any, that had compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial
home and take shelter with her parents would continue to
persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of
physical cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal
exchanges would continue in the parental home even
though there may not be any overt act of physical cruelty
at such a place.
15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
as the object behind its enactment would indicate, is to
provide a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence as
against the remedy in criminal law which is what is
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provided under Section 498-A of the Penal Code. The
definition of “domestic violence” in the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates
harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety, life,
.
limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as
emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly, for
reasons stated above, have a close connection with
Explanations (a) & (b) to Section 498-A of the Penal Code
which defines cruelty. The provisions contained in
Section 498-A of the Penal Code, undoubtedly,
encompass both mental as well as the physical well-being
of the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an
underlying element of emotional distress and mental
agony. Her sufferings at the parental home though may
be directly attributable to the commission of acts of
cruelty by the husband at the matrimonial home would,
undoubtedly, be the consequences of the acts committed
at the matrimonial home. Such consequences, by itself,
would amount to distinct offences committed at the
parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse
effects on the mental health in the parental home though
on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial
home would, in our considered view, amount to the
commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section
498-A at the parental home. The consequences of the
cruelty committed at the matrimonial home result in
repeated offences being committed at the parental home.
This is the kind of offence contemplated under Section
179 CrPC which would squarely be applicable to the
present case as an answer to the question raised.
16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where
the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from
the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty
committed by the husband or his relatives, would,
dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction
to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offences
under Section 498-A of the Penal Code.”
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14. This judgment was followed in Nitika v. Yadwinder
Singh, (2020) 17 SCC 484: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 265: 2019 SCC OnLine
.
SC 1406 wherein it was observed at page 487:
“7. What this Court has laid down in para 16 above
clinches the issues. It was held by this Court that at theplace where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven
away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of
cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would,
dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction
to entertain a complaint alleging commission of offencesunder Section 498-A of the Penal Code.”
15. Hence, the submission that the police had no
territorial jurisdiction to register the FIR cannot be accepted. In
any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728
that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable
offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground
of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:-
“8. In our view, the submission made by the learned
counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. Thelimited question is whether the High Court was
justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that the
Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction
to investigate the offence. From the discussion made
by the learned Judge, it appears that the learned Judge
has considered the provisions applicable to criminal
trials. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by
appreciating the allegations made by the parties that
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and
investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the
alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent
at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the.
offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at
Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High
Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous
because:
(1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section
156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to
investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR
is lodged.
(2) At the stage of investigation, there is no
question of interference under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that
the investigating officer has no territorial
r jurisdiction.
(3) After the investigation is over, if the
investigating officer arrives at the conclusion
that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has
not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction,
then he is required to submit a report
accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and to forward the case to the
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the
offence.
9. This would be clear from the following
discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure
Code empowers the police officer to investigate any
cognizable offence. It reads as under:
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate
cognizable case.–(1) Any officer in charge of a
police station may, without the order of a
Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case
which a court having jurisdiction over the local
area within the limits of such station would have
power to enquire into or try under the provisions
of Chapter XIII.
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(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such
case shall at any stage be called in question on
the ground that the case was one which such
officer was not empowered under this section to.
investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section
190 may order such an investigation as above-
mentioned.”
10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is
prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the
officer can investigate any cognizable case which a
court having jurisdiction over the local area within the
limits of such police station would have power to
enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter
XIII. However, sub-section (2) makes the position
clear by providing that no proceeding of a police
officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into
question on the ground that the case was one which
such officer was not empowered to investigate. After
the investigation is completed, the result of such
investigation is required to be submitted as provided
under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170
specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it
appears to the officer in charge of the police station
that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground
of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to
a Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused
under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to
try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the
investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the
crime was not committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR can be
forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction
over the area in which the crime is committed. But this
would not mean that in a case which requires
investigation, the police officer can refuse to record
the FIR and/or investigate it.
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11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction
of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. It is to
be stated that under the said chapter there are various
provisions which empower the court for enquiry or
.
trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute
prohibition that the offence committed beyond the
local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated,
enquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to
Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to
refer only to Sections 177 and 178 which are as under:
“177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.–Every
offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and triedby a court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed.
178. Place of enquiry or trial.–(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local areas an offencewas committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one
local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local areas thanone, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas,it may be enquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas.”
12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it
clear that Section 177 provides for an “ordinary” place
of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for
place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which
of several local areas an offence was committed or
where the offence was committed partly in one local
area and partly in another and where it consisted of
several acts done in different local areas, it could be
enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction
over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of
investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not
have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime.
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13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC
447 : (1963) 2 SCR 52] dealt with a similar contention
wherein the High Court had held that the statutory
powers of investigation given to the police under
.
Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence
triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law
Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the
investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the
said finding, it was held thus:
“The powers of investigation into cognizable
offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which isin that chapter deals with information in
cognizable offences and Section 156 with the
investigation into such offences and under these
sections the police have the statutory right to
r investigate into the circumstances of any allegedcognizable offence without authority from a
Magistrate and this statutory power of the police
to investigate cannot be interfered with by the
exercise of power under Section 439 or theinherent power of the court under Section 561-A
of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers
of the judiciary in regard to the statutory right of
the police to investigate, the Privy Councilin King Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71
IA 203, 212: AIR 1945 PC 18] (IA at p. 212) observedas follows–
‘The functions of the judiciary and the
police are complementary, not
overlapping and the combination of
individual liberty with a due observance of
law and order is only to be obtained by
leaving each to exercise its own function,
always, of course, subject to the right of
the court to intervene in an appropriate
case when moved under Section 491 of the
Criminal Procedure Code to give directions
in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a::: Downloaded on – 30/09/2024 20:32:49 :::CIS
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )case as the present, however, the court’s
functions begin when a charge is preferred
before it, and not until then. It has
sometimes been thought that Section 561-.
A has given increased powers to the court
which it did not possess before that
section was enacted. But this is not so. The
section gives no new powers, it onlyprovides that those which the court
already inherently possesses shall be
preserved and is inserted, as their
Lordships think, lest it should beconsidered that the only powers possessed
by the court are those expressly conferred
by the Criminal Procedure Code and that
no inherent power had survived the
r passing of that Act.’With this interpretation, which has been put on the
statutory duties and powers of the police and of the
powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court
was in error therefore in interfering with the powers ofthe police in investigating into the offence which was
alleged in the information sent to the officer in charge
of the police station.”
14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an
offence is disclosed the court will not normally
interfere with an investigation into the case and will
permit an investigation into the offence alleged to be
completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the
commission of an offence, the court does not normally
stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench
upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into
cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar
Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also
settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that
for the purpose of exercising its power under Section
482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High
Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of
the allegations made in the complaint or the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
documents accompanying the same per se; it has no
jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of
the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2
SCC 370, 395: 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]
.
15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court
committed a grave error in accepting the contention of
the respondent that the investigating officer had no
jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged
ground that no part of the offence was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station
at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the
function of the courts when seized of the matter. At
the stage of the investigation, the material collected by
an investigating officer cannot be judicially
scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police
station officer of a particular police station would not
have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be
stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the
several local areas an offence was committed, or where
it consists of several acts done in different local areas,
the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court
having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that
the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi did
not have territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it,
illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2)
contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police
officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has
no territorial power to investigate. The High Court
completely overlooked the said embargo when it
entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the
ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
16. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1 that once an investigation is
commenced under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
the ground that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was
observed: –
.
24. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear that
a police officer in charge of a police station can,
without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any
cognizable offence which a court having jurisdictionover such police station can inquire into or try under
Chapter III of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 156
ensures that once an investigation is commenced
under sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted onthe ground that the police officer was not empowered
under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a
“savings clause” in respect of investigations
undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. Inaddition to the powers vested in a Magistrate
empowered under Section 190 CrPC to order an
investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202
CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers
such Magistrate to order an investigation on acomplaint filed before him.
26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under
Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior totaking cognizance of the complaint filed by the Bank,
the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,Ahmedabad had directed an inquiry under Section
156(3) CrPC and as it appears, a final report was
submitted by the investigating agency entrusted withthe investigation stating that since the alleged
transactions had taken place within the territorial
limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had
arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the
investigation should be transferred to the police
agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that
the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which
had been entrusted with the investigation, had upon::: Downloaded on – 30/09/2024 20:32:49 :::CIS
23
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )initial inquiries recommended that the investigation
be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai.
27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the
Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the.
provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not
within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to
refrain itself from holding a proper and complete
investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion
that the offences had been committed beyond its
territorial jurisdiction.
28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate
would indicate that the major part of the loan
transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of
Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of
sub-section (2) of Section 156 CrPC, the proceedings of
the investigation could not be questioned on the
ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such
investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to
direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC
without taking cognizance of the complaint and where
an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the
Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub-
section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific
and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an
investigation even if he was of the view that he did not
have jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are
unable to accept Mr Syed’s submissions that the High
Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned
trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of
the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of
Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission
that it was for the investigating officer in the course of
the investigation to decide whether a particular court
had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not.
30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a
criminal case follows the place where the cause arises,
but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
that the stage of taking cognizance was yet to arrive.
The investigating agency was required to place the
facts elicited during the investigation before the court
in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as
.
to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint or not. Without conducting such an
investigation, it was improper on the part of the
investigating agency to forward its report with the
observation that since the entire cause of action for the
alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of
Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the
investigation should be transferred to the police
station concerned in Mumbai.
31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the
learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the
process should issue on the facts disclosed in the
complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the
Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this
case, there are materials to show that the appellant
had filed his application for a loan with the Head Office
of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and
the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad
which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause
of action for the complaints arose within the
jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the
part of the investigating agency to make an
observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction
to proceed with the investigation, which was required
to be transferred to the police station having
jurisdiction to do so.
32. On the materials before him the learned Magistrate
was fully justified in rejecting the final report
submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID
(Crime) and to order a fresh investigation into the
allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High
Court, therefore, did not commit any error in
upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As
mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
with the court’s powers to inquire into or try an
offence of criminal misappropriation or a criminal
breach of trust if the same has been committed or any
part of the property, which is the subject of the
.
offence, is received or retained within the local
jurisdiction of the said court.
33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in
particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8
SCC 728: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into
the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted
position that the investigating officer was entitled to
transfer an investigation to a police station having
jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is
not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore,
we are only required to consider whether the
investigating officer in respect of an investigation
undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file a report
stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into
the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen
outside his jurisdiction despite there being material
available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in
negative and we are of the firm view that the powers
vested in the investigating authorities, under Section
156(1) CrPC, did not restrict the jurisdiction of the
investigating agency to investigate into a complaint
even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so.
Unlike as in other cases, it was for the court to decide
whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint
as and when the entire facts were placed before it.”
17. Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the
proceedings at this stage simply on the ground that the police
did not have territorial jurisdiction to carry out the
investigation.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
18. Reference was made to the various documents
annexed with the petition to submit that the allegations in the
.
F.I.R. are not correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri)
115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the
complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is
constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It
was observed:
“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed
only if on the face of the complaint or the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In
other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the
complaint as they are, without adding or subtractinganything, if no offence is made out then the High Court
will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of
its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
19. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that
the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the
proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be
allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri
Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated
28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to
which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh
evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The::: Downloaded on – 30/09/2024 20:32:49 :::CIS
27
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing
additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482,
Cr.P.C.”
20. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view
.
in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G.
K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it and the sworn statements
of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging thecorrectness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the
documents, which are not filed before the lower Court.
Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh
documents, in view of the principles laid down by theSupreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa
and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of
the said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations, inthe light of the statement made on oath of the
complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
offences are disclosed and there is no material toshow that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be nojustification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Station
and an offence is registered, then the mala fides ofthe informant would be of secondary importance. It
is the material collected during the investigation
and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the
proceedings”.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
21. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was
.
observed at page 142:
“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, without adding or detractingfrom the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients
of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court
cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that
matter can it proceed in the manner that a judgeconducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected
during the course of the trial.”
22. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was
held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial
but the same are not material at the stage of deciding
whether quashing as prayed for by her before the HighCourt was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason
to place any reliance on these three documents.
23. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2
SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein
it was observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case
where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused
to have not been committed based on any of the::: Downloaded on – 30/09/2024 20:32:49 :::CIS
29
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law
seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no
further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks
to rely on materials which were not there before the.
Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We
may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’
powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are alwaysavailable to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real
and substantial justice for the administration of which
alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down
for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising froma police report by the High Courts in the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being
substantially different from the tests laid down for
quashing a process issued under Section 204 read withSection 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading ofthe complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to anabuse of the legal process. This too, would be
impermissible if the justice of a given case does not
overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied)
24. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the
material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court
has to rely upon the material brought upon the record during
investigation.
25. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
false. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by
the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This
.
position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024
SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stageof quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At thecost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value,
do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out
a case against the accused. We are of the considered view
that the present case would fall under Category-3 of thecategories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 thatonce the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj
A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC
59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding
the question of whether the High Court could::: Downloaded on – 30/09/2024 20:32:49 :::CIS
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of
FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police
during the pendency of the Section 482 petition,
observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16).
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant
is being charged and is to be prosecuted
would show that the same are not made outeven prima facie from the complainant’s
FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed,
the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by
the appellant were prima facie made out
from the complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet,
r documents, etc. or not.”
26. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into
the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
27. It was submitted that vague and general allegations
have been made against the petitioners. This is not correct. The
victim has given specific details of the role played by each of the
petitioners. She has mentioned the facts regarding her
harassment and how she was compelled to commit suicide. Her
child died in the womb due to the beatings given by her husband
and her sister-in-law. Thus, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the
ground that the allegations are general and vague and the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
judgment of Chhattisgarh High Court in Rajesh Kumar Mishra
(supra) does not apply to the present case.
.
28. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The
learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC
734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been
filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It
was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants shouldprefer a discharge application before the trial court
under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(CrPC). We say so because even according to the State,the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to
be filed before the competent court. In suchcircumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look
into the materials which the investigating officer might
have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If anysuch discharge application is filed, the trial court shall
look into the materials and take a call whether any
discharge case is made out or not.”
29. Therefore, the present petition discloses the
commission of offences and the same cannot be quashed while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:9332 )
30. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is
dismissed.
.
31. The observation made here-in-above shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
30th September, 2024
(ravinder) r to
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