Supreme Court of India
Vijay @ Vijayakumar vs State Represented By Inspector Of … on 16 January, 2025
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REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 90
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No.1049/2021
VIJAY @ VIJAYAKUMAR Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. This appeal arises from the Judgment and Order passed by the
High Court of Madras dated 27-6-2019 in Criminal Appeal No.194/2012
by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant
– herein and thereby affirmed the Judgment and Order passed by the
Trial Court, i.e., Sessions Judge, Nagapattinam holding the
appellant – herein guilty of the offence punishable under Section
304 Part 1 of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter, referred to as
“IPC”) and sentencing him to undergo 5 years of rigorous
imprisonment. It appears that the appellant was also held guilty of
the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC and was sentenced
to undergo 2 years of rigorous imprisonment.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under:-
3. The appellant – herein along with his friends including
Signature Not Verified
`PW 11’ and `PW 12’ had gone to watch a movie on 5-11-2007. They
Digitally signed by
VISHAL ANAND
Date: 2025.01.21
20:00:45 IST
Reason:
were returning home in the mid night hours after watching the
movie. While they were sleeping beneath a bridge, they found the
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deceased over there to be in an inebriated condition. It seems that
the deceased was heavily drunk. The deceased picked up an
altercation with the appellant – herein and his friends. According
to the prosecution, at that point of time, the appellant picked up
a cement brick which was lying at the place of occurrence and hit
the deceased on his head. The deceased succumbed to the head
injuries.
4. It is also the case of the prosecution that thereafter with a
view to destroy the evidence, the appellant – herein set the
dead-body of the deceased on fire.
5. The `PW 1’ in his capacity as the Village Administrative
Officer lodged a First Information Report in this regard at the
concerned Police Station.
6. The inquest panchnama of the dead-body was carried out.
Thereafter, the dead-body was sent for postmortem. The Postmortem
Report reveals that the cause of death was due to head injuries.
7. At the end of the investigation, the Police filed
charge-sheet. The case came to be committed to the Court of
Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereafter, referred to as “Code”).
8. The Trial Court framed charge against the appellant – herein
for the offence enumerated above to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
9. In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined the
following witnesses:-
P.W.1. Thiru Mohan, Village Administrative Officer
P.W.2 Tmt Rani
3P.W.3 Tmt Vanitha
P.W.4 Tmt Kavitha
P.W.5 Dr M.S. Kadar
P.W.6 Tmt Gayathri, Scientific Assistant
P.W.7 Thiru Mohandoss
P.W.8 Thiru Srinivasan
P.W.9 Thiru Samarasapandiyan, Head Constable
P.W.10 Thiru Rajasekar, Inspector of Police
P.W.11 Thiru Ramu
P.W.12 Tmt Raji
10. The prosecution also relied upon the following pieces of
documentary evidence:-
Ex.P.1 06.11.2007 Complaint given by Village Administrative
Officer.
Ex.P.2 12.11.2007 Signature of P.W.1 in Statement of Accused.
Ex.P.3 12.11.2007 Signature of report by Village
Administrative Officer.
Ex.P.4 28.11.2007 Viscera Report.
Ex.P.5 06.11.2007 Post Mortem Certificate.
Ex.P.6 06.11.2007 Signature of P.W.7 in Observation Mahazar.
Ex.P.7 06.11.2007 Signature of P.W.7 in Mahazar.
Ex.P.8 06.11.2007 Signature of P.W.8 in Observation Mahazar.
Ex.P.9 06.11.2007 Signature of P.W.9 in Mahazar.
Ex.P.10 06.11.2007 Printed F.I.R.
Ex.P.11 06.11.2007 Observation Mahazar
Ex.P.12 06.11.2007 Rough Sketch.
ΕX.Ρ.13 06.11.2007 Mahazar.
Ex.P.14 06.11.2007 Inquest Report.
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EX.P.15 06.11.2007 Special report for recovery of M.0.8.
Ex.P.16 12.11.2007 Accused Statement by Village
AdministrativeEx.P.17 12.11.2007 V.A.O. report.
Ex. P.18 12.11.2007 Admissible Portion in Confession
StatementEx.P.19 12.11.2007 Mahazar for recovery of M.O.1,2 and 9.
Ex.P.20 12.11.2007 Alteration Report.
Ex.P.21 13.11.2007 Requisition for Chemical Examination
Ex.P.22 14.11.2007 Court Letter for Chemical Examination.
Ex.P.23 28.11.2007 Biology Report.
Ex.P.24 28.02.2008 Serology Report
11. On conclusion of the recording of the oral evidence, the
further statement of the appellant – herein was recorded by the
Magistrate under Section 313 of the Code, in which the appellant
claimed himself to be innocent.
12. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence,
the Trial Court took the view that the case is one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. The Trial Court thought fit to
give to the appellant herein the benefit of Exception 1 of the
Section 300 IPC on the ground that the case was one of grave and
sudden provocation and, accordingly, held the appellant – herein
guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part 1) of
IPC and sentenced him to undergo 5 years of R.I. and fine.
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13. The appellant went in appeal before the High Court. His appeal
failed before the High Court. The High Court affirmed the Judgment
and Order of conviction passed by the Trial Court.
14. In such circumstances, the appellant is here before this Court
with the present appeal.
15. We have heard Mr. Shreyas Kaushal, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. D. Kumanan, the learned counsel
appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu.
16. We take notice of the fact that the appellant – herein has
undergone 4 years of imprisonment. The incident is of the year
2007.
17. We have our own views in so far as applicability of
Exception 1 of Section 300 IPC is concerned. However, the State is
not in appeal before us.
18. Exception one of Section 300 states that a culpable homicide
is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of
self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes death of the
person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other
person by mistake or accident.
19. It is well established that Exception 1 to Section 300 can
apply when the accused is shown to have deprived of power of
self- control by grave and sudden provocation which is caused by
the person whose death has been caused.
20. It is not each and every provocation that will reduce the
crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The
provocation must be both grave and sudden. In order to invoke the
benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act
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committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as
well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-
control. If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused
cannot get the benefit of this exception. Likewise, he cannot
invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not
grave.
21. In Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions reported in 1942
A.C. 1, Viscount Simon observed:
“It is not all provocation that will reduce the
crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation, to
have that result, must be such as temporarily
deprives the person provoked of the power of self
control, as the result of which he commits the
unlawful act which causes death. “In deciding the
question whether this was or was not the case,
regard must be had to the nature of the act by which
the offender causes death, to the time which elapsed
between the provocation and the act which caused
death, to the offender’s conduct during that
interval, and to all other circumstances tending to
show the state of his mind”: Stephen’s Digest of the
Criminal Law, art. 317. The test to be applied is
that of the effect of the provocation on a
reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini 7, so that an
unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not
entitled to rely on provocation which would not have
led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying
the test, it is of particular importance (a) to
consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed
since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time
to cool, and (b) to take into account the instrument
with which the homicide was effected, for to retort,
in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a
simple blow, is a very different thing from making
use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger.
In short, the mode of resentment must bear a
reasonable relationship to the provocation if the
offence is to be reduced to manslaughter”
22. In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following
conditions must be complied with:
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(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the
accused;
(ii) The provocation must be grave; (iii) The provocation must be sudden; (iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall
have been deprived of his power of self-control;
(v) He should have killed the deceased during the
continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-
control; and
(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person
who gave the provocation or that of any other person
by mistake or accident.
23. In other words, before Exception 1 can be invoke, the accused
must establish the following circumstances:
(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and
sudden;
(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power
of self-control; and
(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of
self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.
24. In order to bring his case under Exception 1 to Section 300
IPC the following ingredients:
(i) The provocation was sudden; (ii) the provocation was grave;
and (iii) loss of self-control. These three ingredients may be
considered one by one:
(i) Whether the provocation was sudden or not does not
present much difficulty. The word ‘sudden’ involves two
8elements. First, the provocation must be unexpected. If an
accused plans in advance to receive a provocation in order to
justify the subsequent homicide, the provocation cannot be
said to be sudden. Secondly, the interval between the
provocation and the homicide should be brief. If the man
giving the provocation is killed within a minute after the
provocation, it is a case of sudden provocation. If the man is
killed six hours after the provocation, it is not a case of
sudden provocation.
(ii) the main difficulty lies in deciding whether a certain
provocation was grave or not. A bare statement by the accused
that he regarded the provocation as grave will not be accepted
by the court. The court has to apply an objective test for
deciding whether the provocation was grave or not. A good test
for deciding whether a certain provocation was grave or not is
this: “Is a reasonable man likely to lose self-control as a
result of such provocation?” If the answer is in the
affirmative, the provocation will be classed as grave. If the
answer is in the negative, the provocation is not grave. In
this context, the expression ‘reasonable man’ means a normal
or an average person. A reasonable man is not the ideal man or
the perfect being. A normal man sometimes loses temper. There
is, therefore no inconsistency in saying that, a reasonable
man may lose self-control as a result of grave provocation. A
reasonable or normal or average man is a legal fiction. The
reasonable man will vary from society to society. A Judge
should not impose his personal standards in this matter. By
9training, a Judge is a patient man. But the reasonable man or
the normal man need not have the same standard of behaviour as
the judge himself. The reasonable man under consideration is a
member of the society, in which the accused was living. So,
education and social conditions of the accused are relevant
factors. An ordinary exchange of abuse is a matter of common
occurrence. A reasonable man does not lose self-control merely
on account of an ordinary exchange of abuses. So, courts do
not treat an ordinary exchange of abuses as a basis for grave
provocation. On the other hand, in most societies, adultery is
looked upon as a very serious matter. So, quotes are prepared
to treat adultery as a basis for grave provocation.
(iii) the question of loss of self-control comes up indirectly
in deciding whether a particular provocation was grave or not.
So, if it is proved that the accused did receive grave and
sudden provocation, the court is generally prepared to assume
that homicide was committed while the accused was deprived of
the power of self-control. In some cases, it may be possible
for the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the
murder with a cool head in spite of grave provocation. But
such cases will be rare. So, when the accused has established
grave and sudden provocation, the court will generally hold
that he has discharged the burden that lay upon him under
Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.
25. What should be the approach of the court? The provocation must
be such as will upset not merely a hasty and hot-tempered or
hypersensitive person, but one of ordinary sense and calmness. The
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Court has to consider whether a reasonable person placed in the
same position as accused would have behaved in the manner in which
the accused behaved on receiving the same provocation. If it
appears that the action of the accused was out of all proportion
to the gravity or magnitude of the provocation offered, the case
will not fall under the exception. The case can only fall under
the exception when the court is able to hold that provided the
alleged provocation is given, every normal person would behave or
act in the same way as the accused in the circumstances in which
the accused was placed, acted.
26. In the words of Viscount Simon: “The whole doctrine relating
to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may cause, a
sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which
is the formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous
bodily harm, is negatived. Consequently, where the provocation
inspires and actual intention to kill, or to inflict grievous
bodily harm the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to
manslaughter seldom applies”.
27. Section 105 of the India Evidence Act, 1872 casts burden of
proof on the accused. Being an exception, the burden of proving
the circumstances covered by Exception 1 is on the accused. Where
the prosecution prima facie proves that the act was committed by
the accused which had resulted in the death of the deceased and
the accused pleads that the case falls within one of the
exceptions, it is for him to prove that.
28. It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his
crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the
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provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed
sufficient to deprive him of self- control, and that the act of
killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence
and may fairly be attributed to it. (Ref.:Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s
Law of Crimes, 24th Edition)
29. If at all, the Trial Court and the High Court wanted to bring
the case within the ambit of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, then it could have invoked exception 4 of Section 300 of
the IPC. We say so because the incident was not pre-planned or
pre-meditated. The appellant and his friends had gone to watch a
movie. They were returning back home in the late night hours. It
appears that after the movie was over and while returning, they
decided to take some rest beneath the bridge. The deceased also
happened to be sleeping beneath the bridge. However, it is the case
of the prosecution that the deceased was in a drunken condition. In
fact, there is nothing to indicate that the deceased was drunk.
However, the eye-witnesses to the incident and that too none other
then the friends of the appellant who were examined by the
prosecution deposed that the deceased was in a drunken condition.
30. The deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it
appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant
herein. However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the
case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation.
31. The incident occurred at a spur of a moment. The act was not
pre-planned or pre-meditated. What is important to note is that
the appellant had no weapon in his hands. He picked up a cement
stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the
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head of the deceased. Therefore, it could be said that the
appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.
32. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to disturb the
conviction of the appellant – herein.
33. We are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if
the sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court is reduced to the period already undergone.
34. The appeal stands partly allowed. While upholding the
conviction, we reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.
35. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI
16TH JANUARY, 2025.