Vinod vs State Of Haryana on 6 September, 2024

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Vinod vs State Of Haryana on 6 September, 2024

Author: Sandeep Moudgil

Bench: Sandeep Moudgil

                                   Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:116922


CRM-M-37504-2024
                                                                  1

      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                     CHANDIGARH

203                         CRM-M-37504-2024 (O&M)
                           DATE OF DECISION: 06.09.2024

VINOD                                      ...PETITIONER

                      Versus

STATE OF HARYANA                           ... RESPONDENT

CORAM:       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present:     Mr. Ashit Malik, Advocate for the petitioner(s).
             Mr. B.S.Virk, Sr. DAG, Haryana.

        ***
SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J (ORAL)

CRM-30927-2024

This application under Section 528 BNSS has been filed for

exemption from filing certified copies of FIR No.499 dated 19.11.2022,

under Sections 148, 149, 323, 307 IPC, 1860 and under Section 25 of

Arms Act, 1959, Police Station Sadar Sonepat, District Sonepat.

Subsequently during the investigation sections 148, 149 and 307 IPC

were deleted and Sections 302, 34 IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act

were added, impugned order dated 17.7.2024 and Annexures P-1 to P-3 as

well as exemption from filing true typed copies of impugned order dated

17.7.2024 and Annexures P-1 to P-3.

For the reasons recorded in the application, the same is

allowed and he is exempted from filing the above-said copies of the

documents.

Main case

1. Relief Sought

The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 483 of BNSS has

been invoked seeking the concession of regular bail for the petitioner in

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FIR No.499 dated 19.11.2022, under Sections 148, 149, 323, 307 of the

IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 registered at Police Station

Sadar Sonepat, District Sonepat, subsequently during the investigation

Sections 148, 149 and 307 IPC were deleted and Sections 302 and 34 of

the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act was added.

2. Prosecution story set up in the present case as per the version

in the FIR read as under :-

‘To, the SHO, Police Station Sadar Sonepat. Sir, It is
submitted that I, Parveen son of Hukam Singh, am a resident of
village Harsana Kalan. Today i.e. on 19.11.2022 we had built the
‘baar’ of our fields in the morning and when in the evening at 4.00
P.M. I and my wife Meenu reached our fields we found the ‘baar’
removed. When we started rebuilding our ‘baar’ then Naresh son of
Mahabir started abusing us from the roof of his house and came
down and again started removing the ‘baar’. Then my brother Jai
Kishan son of Hukam Singh reached the spot and tried to make
Naresh understand. In the meantime family members of Naresh i.e.
Vinod and Dinesh sons of Mahabir and wives of Naresh and Vinod
came there and started fighting. At that time Naresh son of
Mahabir fired at my brother Jai Kishan with the intention to kill
him which hit in his stomach. Vinod son of Mahabir gave a lathi
blow on my head which resulted in a deep injury on my head. In
the meanwhile my brother Hari Kishan son of Hukam Singh
reached there who took us both to the hospital. Strict legal action
be taken against the above mentioned accused…”

3. Contentions

On behalf of the petitioner

Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the

petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case. He refers to the

Medico Legal Report dated 30.11.2022 (Annexure P-2) which was

conducted after 11 days of the occurrence to show that the injury on the

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head attributed to the petitioner is declared to be simple in nature,

therefore, offence under Section 307 cannot be attracted qua him and no

other role has been attributed to him of any nature. He has further argued

that the antecedents of the petitioner are clean. He also submits that no

fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars

as conclusion of trial would take long time as out of total 39 Prosecution

Witnesses, only six have been examined yet.

On behalf of the State

On the other hand, learned State Counsel appearing on

advance notice, accepts notice on behalf of respondent-State and has filed

the custody certificate of the petitioner, which is taken on record.

According to which, the petitioner is behind bars for 1 year, 7 months and

18 days.

Learned State Counsel on instructions from the Investigating

Officer opposes the prayer for grant of regular bail on the ground that the

petitioner gave an injury on the head of the injured person but is not in a

position to controvert the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner.

He informs the Court that in the present FIR challan stands presented on

16.02.2023 and charges stand framed on 22.03.2023.

4. Analysis

From the above-mentioned, it can be culled out that the

petitioner has already suffered sufficient period in custody i.e. 1 year, 7

months and 18 days; antecedents of the petitioner are clean, meaning

thereby he is not a habitual offender and injury attributed to the petitioner

has been declared simple in nature also no other role has been attributed

to him. Further, as per the principle of the criminal jurisprudence, no one

should be considered guilty, till the guilt is proved beyond reasonable

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doubt, whereas in the instant case, challan stands presented on 16.02.2023

charges stand framed on 22.03.2023 out of 39 prosecution witnesses,

only six have been examined yet which is sufficient for this Court to infer

that the conclusion of trial is likely to take considerable time and

detaining the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period would

solve no purpose.

Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court

rendered in “Dataram versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another”,

2018(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 131, wherein it has been held that the grant of

bail is a general rule and putting persons in jail or in prison or in

correction home is an exception. Relevant paras of the said judgment is

reproduced as under:-

“2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is the
presumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is
believed to be innocent until found guilty. However, there are
instances in our criminal law where a reverse onus has been
placed on an accused with regard to some specific offences but
that is another matter and does not detract from the fundamental
postulate in respect of other offences. Yet another important facet
of our criminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general
rule and putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction
home (whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception.
Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have been
lost sight of with the result that more and more persons are being
incarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good to
our criminal jurisprudence or to our society.

3. There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the
discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise
of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of
decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the
country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether

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denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the
facts and in the circumstances of a case.

4. While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be
considered is whether the accused was arrested during
investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity
to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the
investigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused
person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for
placing that person in judicial custody after a charge sheet is filed.
Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was
participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the
investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing
when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is
not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some
genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a
factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case.
It is also necessary for the judge to consider whether the accused
is a first-time offender or has been accused of other offences and if
so, the nature of such offences and his or her general conduct. The
poverty or the deemed indigent status of an accused is also an
extremely important factor and even Parliament has taken notice
of it by incorporating an Explanation to section 436 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. An equally soft approach to
incarceration has been taken by Parliament by inserting section
436A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

5. To put it shortly, a humane attitude is required to be adopted by
a judge, while dealing with an application for remanding a suspect
or an accused person to police custody or judicial custody. There
are several reasons for this including maintaining the dignity of an
accused person, howsoever poor that person might be, the
requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that
there is enormous overcrowding in prisons, leading to social and
other problems as noticed by this Court in In Re-Inhuman
Conditions in 1382 Prisons, 2017(4) RCR (Criminal) 416: 2017(5)
Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 408 : (2017) 10 SCC 658

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6. The historical background of the provision for bail has been
elaborately and lucidly explained in a recent decision delivered in
Nikesh Tara chand Shah v. Union of India, 2017 (13) SCALE 609
going back to the days of the Magna Carta. In that decision,
reference was made to Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 565 in which it is observed that it was held way back
in Nagendra v. King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476 that bail is
not to be withheld as a punishment. Reference was also made to
Emperor v. Hutchinson, AIR 1931 Allahabad 356 wherein it was
observed that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
The provision for bail is therefore age-old and the liberal
interpretation to the provision for bail is almost a century old,
going back to colonial days.

7. However, we should not be understood to mean that bail should
be granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirely
within the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and though
that discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in
a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for the
grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of
compliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”

Therefore, to elucidate further, this Court is conscious of the

fundamental principle of law that right to speedy trial is a part of

reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. This constitutional right cannot be denied to the

accused as is the mandate of the Apex court in “Hussainara Khatoon

and ors (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna”, (1980) 1 SCC

98. Besides this, reference can be drawn upon that pre-conviction period

of the under-trials should be as short as possible keeping in view the

nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction

and the nature of supporting evidence, reasonable apprehension of

tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

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5. Decision:

In view of the aforesaid discussions made hereinabove, the

petitioner is directed to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail

and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court/Duty Magistrate,

concerned.

However, it is made clear that anything stated hereinabove

shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the

case.

The petition in the aforesaid terms stands allowed.

(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)
JUDGE

06.09.2024
anuradha

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

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