Legally Bharat

Gauhati High Court

WP(C)/1076/2024 on 31 August, 2024

Author: Soumitra Saikia

Bench: Soumitra Saikia

                    GAHC010021402024




                                            IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
                          (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
                                                         PRINCIPAL SEAT
                                                      W.P(C) NO. 1076/2024

                               1. Union of India, represented by the General Manager, NF
                               Railway, Maligaon, Guwahati-781011, District-Kamrup (M),
                               Assam

                               2. The Chief Engineer, Construction-2, N.F. Railway,
                               Maligaon, Guwahati-781011, District- Kamrup (M), Assam

                               3. The Deputy Chief Engineer/Construction-8, N.F.
                               Railway, Maligaon, Guwahati-781011, District-Kamrup(M),
                               Assam


                                                              -Versus-

                               M/s GSR Ventures Private Limited, A Company having its
                               registered office at 103, Srinivasa, 6-3-1187, Begumpet,
                               Hyderabad-500016, Andhra Pradesh, Represented by its
                               authorized signatory K. Mohammed Rafi, S/o K.C Imam
                               Saheb, F.No. 519, Block A May Flyover Heights, Mallapur,
                               Mallapur Uppal, K.V. Reddy, Rangareddy, Telangana-
                               560076

                                                    -BEFORE-
                                         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA

                        Advocate for the petitioners          : Mr. H. Gupta, CGC
                        Advocate for the respondent           : Mr. A.K. Saraf, Senior Advocate assisted by

Ms. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate
Dates of Hearing : 18.07.2024
Date of Judgment & Order : 31.08.2024

W.P(C) No. 1076/2024 [Union of India & Ors Vs. M/S GSR Ventures Pvt. Ltd] Page 1 of 38
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)

This writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution

of India by the Union of India as the writ petitioners. By the instant writ

proceedings, the Union of India as the writ petitioners is put into

challenge the orders dated 11.11.2023 passed by the learned Arbitrator

in Arbitration Proceeding No. AH-02/2022 and the arbitration

proceeding No. AH-03/2022.

2. The respondent was allotted two contracts relating to Earthwork

Filling to Form Embankment/Sub-Bank and construction of Minor

Bridges, Retaining Wall, Pucca Approach Road, Alignment and other

Ancillary Works in connection with Construction of the New BG Railway

line from Bairabi to Sairang (Miroram) under contract Agreement

bearing No. CON/B-S/1917 dated 02.03.2015 and Contract Agreement

No. CON/B-S/2079 dated 24.11.2015. The said works were terminated

by the writ petitioners/Railways leading to the disputes arising between

the petitioners/Railways and the respondent. The respondent issued a

notice for arbitration as per clause 64 (1)(i) of the Arbitration Clause.

The said notice was replied to by the Railway authorities rejecting the

demand for arbitration on the ground that Clause 47 of the Contract

Agreement bars claims for arbitration beyond 20% of the SCA. Similar

reply was issued by the Railways in respect of both the contracts.

Thereafter, the respondent submitted a second notice demanding

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arbitration purportedly under arbitration Clause 48 & 49 of the

Agreement treating the same to be additional special conditions or

contract. The second notice however was issued only in respect of one

contract work namely, CON/B-S/1917 dated 02.03.2015. Since the

Railways declined to refer the matter to the arbitration, the respondent

approached this Court by filing Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021;

Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021 and Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021 in

respect of each of the contract. The petitions were filed under Section

11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and accordingly the matter

was urged before the Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator in

respect both the arbitrations relating to both the contract works. While

opposing the maintainability of the petitions filed under Section 11(6) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the respondent, it was

urged by the Railways before the Co-ordinate Bench, the arbitration

proceedings sought for is not maintainable in view of the specific clause

No. 47 of the agreement which bars arbitration. It was submitted that

as per Clause 47 of the agreement, settlement of claims of dispute

between the parties by ways of arbitration is permissible only where the

value is less than or equal to 20% of the value of the contract and

when the claims of dispute are of value more than 20% of the value of

the contract, provisions of Clause 63 & 64 and other relevant clauses of

the general conditions of the contract will not be applicable and

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arbitration will not be a remedy for settlement of such disputes. It was

submitted that since the dispute itself is not open to arbitration in terms

of the specific provisions contained in the agreement, there was no

question for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Accordingly, it was submitted by

the Railways before the Co-ordinate Bench that the petitions filed by

the respondent under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 are not maintainable and the same should therefore be

dismissed.

3. The Co-ordinate Bench by the order dated 18.11.2022 disposed of

these three applications. The Co-ordinate Bench by order dated

18.11.2022 came to the conclusion that where the contentious issued

have arisen because of incorrect use of clauses which are admitted by

the Railway authorities himself, Court was of the view that it would be

best left to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal and as to whether the

claim raised before is arbitrable or not and not by this Court at the

referral stage. The Co-ordinate Bench held that as per the terms of the

contract between the parties, two views are possible. In view of the

contentions raised before the Court by the respondent that Clause 47

will not operate as a bar as individual items of work where disputes

arise are required to be considered independently by referring the same

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to arbitration and the bar of 20% of the value of contract is not to

operate on the aggregate value of all the items but it has to be decided

individually item-wise, the Co-ordinate Bench by referring to several

Judgments of the Apex Court held that the question of arbitrability can

be decided by the Court only where the facts are very clear and glaring.

The Co-ordinate Bench concluded that in the proceedings before it, the

facts are not clear and glaring so as to warrant intervention by the

Court at the referral stage and accordingly, the Court proceeded to

appoint Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Anima Hazarika (Retired), Former Judge of

this Court to act as a sole arbitrator to decide the disputes including the

issue of arbitrability in respect of Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021;

Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021 and Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021

subject to her willingness and disclosure and/or absence of any

impediment as contemplated under Section 12 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

4. Pursuant to the orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench in

Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021; Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021 and

Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021, the Arbitral Tribunal assumed its

jurisdiction and by a detailed order dated 11.11.2023 passed in

Arbitration proceeding No. AH-02/2022 (arising out of Arbitration

Petition No. 20/2021) and Arbitration Proceeding No. AH-03/2022

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(arising out of Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021) upheld the contentions

on the respondents. It was held that the disputes in both the

proceedings namely AH-02/2022 (arising out of Arbitration Petition No.

20/2021) and Arbitration Proceeding No. AH-03/2022 (arising out of

Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021) to be arbitrable. These orders passed

by the Arbitral Tribunal are presently being assailed by the petitioner by

filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that as per the Clause 47

of the Contract Agreement, the disputes raised by the respondent are

not arbitrable as the exceed more than 20% of the contract value.

There being a clear provision under the contract agreement entered by

and between the writ petitioner and the respondents, it is clear that the

disputes raised by the respondent are not arbitrable. As such the

Arbitral Tribunal committed grave error of law and on facts in coming to

a conclusion that the disputes raised by the respondents are arbitrable

and had thereby proceeded to exercise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

to decide upon the dispute urged by the respondents. It is submitted

that before the Arbitral Tribunal, it was urged that Contract Agreement

containing Arbitration Clause is binding on both the parties. In view of

the fact that the claim amount is more than 20% of the value of the

contract, as per Clause 64.7 (Clause 47, 48 & 49) of the Contract

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Agreement, the disputes raised are not arbitrable. Clause 16.2 and

Clause 16.3 and 16.4 are altogether different clauses not relating to

Arbitration. Railway authorities has stated before High Court that due to

over-sight in the contents of Clauses 48 and 49 of the present contract,

reference had been made to Clauses 16.2 and 16.3 instead of referring

to Clauses 47 and 48. But in any view of the matter making reference

of Clause 48 for arbitration is prima facie a wrong interpretation. It is

submitted on behalf of the Railway Department that the interpretation

of Clauses 48 & 49 with reference to Clause 16.2 & 16.3 would only

mean that Special Conditions stated in Clause 16.2 and 16.3 has to be

fulfilled before invoking arbitration and the scope of the arbitration

would be confined to the Schedule of Programme and Detailed

Programme submitted by the Contractor for completion of the Contract

which was admittedly not adhered to in the present case as the

Arbitration was invoked before the completion of the Contract Work.

The Contractor has admittedly not completed the Works and hence

could not have resorted to arbitrate any dispute before the completion

of the work. However, the Tribunal went on to hold that the relevant

clauses of arbitration are Clauses 63 and 64 of the General Conditions

of the Contract but a slight misunderstanding has been created in the

contract agreement itself when it sought to incorporate some of the

modified clauses of General conditions of contract into the Additional

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Special Condition of Contract forming parts of the Contract Agreement.

The Tribunal further held that in simple words, the claimants are using

two alternative avenues to claim that the dispute is arbitrable, one, by

means of invoking Clause 64(1)(i) of the General Conditions of Contract

which the respondents have rejected citing Clause 47 of the Additional

Special Conditions of Contract and, another, by invoking Clause 48 & 49

of the same Additional Special Conditions of Contract. The Tribunal

continued to hold that essentially this dispute regarding arbitrability

turns on whether the claimant has a right to invoke Clause 64(1)(i) of

the General Conditions of Contract, failing which, the claimant has a

right to invoke Clause 48 & 49 of the same Additional Special Conditions

of Contract.

6. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the view adopted

by the Tribunal is erroneous on a plain reading of the provisions of the

agreement. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that as per Clause

45.0, the opening paragraph clearly states that Arbitration and

Settlement of disputes shall be governed vide clause 63 & 64 of the

General Conditions of Contract, N.F. Railway, 1998 edition which are

reproduced below subject to any correction made prior to the opening

of this tender. There is no term “Additional Special Condition of

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Contract” in the Arbitration Clause forming part of the Contract

Agreement.

7. It is further submitted that there is no Additional Special Conditions

of Contract. In fact, Clause 47, 48 and 48 are under Clause 64.7 and it

has to be read together while giving interpreting Clauses 47, 48 and 49.

Clauses 47, 48 and 49 if read together, prima facie makes the dispute

non-arbitrable. Rejection of the plea of non-arbitrability of dispute

cannot be agitated again under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. Decision of the arbitrability of the dispute goes

to root of the subject matter of arbitration which is different from the

jurisdiction of the tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

8. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Tribunal

upheld the rejection of the demand for arbitration as invoked by the

Contractor under Clause 64(1)(i) of the GCC on the ground that Clause

47 of the GCC provides that provisions of Clause 64 of the GCC will be

applicable only in settlement of claims or disputes for value less than or

equal to 20% of the value of the contract and when the claims of the

disputes are of value more than 20% of the value of contract,

provisions of Clauses 63 & 64 and other relevant clause of the GCC will

not be applicable and arbitration will not be a remedy for settlement of

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such dispute. However, surprisingly on the other hand it went on to

examine in Paragraph 19 at page 134 of the impugned Judgment, right

of the claimant to seek arbitration under Clause 48 and 49 of the

Additional Special Conditions of Contract.

9. It is strenuously submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Clause

47 of the GCC provides that provisions of Clause 64 of the GCC will be

applicable only in settlement of claims or disputes for value less than or

equal to 20% of the value of the contract and when the claims of the

disputes are of value more than 20% of the value of contract,

provisions of Clauses 63 & 64 and other relevant clause of the GCC will

not be applicable and arbitration will not be a remedy for settlement of

such dispute. The Tribunal on the other hand, while interpreting Clause

48 of the same Clause 64.7 held that dispute is arbitrable under Clause

48. Such interpretation, would be conflicting to the decision already

reached by the Tribunal in the forgoing paragraphs of the impugned

orders holding the disputes to be non-arbitrable in view of the Clause

47. Further, the Arbitration Clauses have to be read together to form an

interpretation consistent with each other. The interpretation of an

arbitration clause, as indeed of all contractual provisions, must be

predicted upon a construction of the contract as a whole, and no

particular word or phrase should be unduly emphasized to negate the

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clause of its true meaning. If the dispute is held to be arbitrable under

64.7- Clause 48 of the Contract Agreement, 64.7-Clause 47 of the

Contract Agreement would become meaningless and redundant.

10. The final limb of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is

that since under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,

there is no specific provision for filing an appeal against such orders

deciding the arbitrability of the matter by then arbitrator, the petitioner

has approached this Court under Article 227 in the absence of any other

appropriate statutory remedy available. It is submitted that since on a

plain reading of the agreement, it is apparent that the disputes are not

arbitrable and/or that the disputes are completely barred and that the

purported disputes cannot be referred to arbitration under the clauses

of the agreement entered by and between the petitioners and the

respondent, the impugned orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal are

required to be interfered with, set aside and quashed and this Court be

pleased to hold that the disputes referred for arbitration are not

arbitrable in view of the specific terms and conditions of the agreement.

11. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the

petitioner relies upon the following Judgments:

“1. ATW (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in (2024)
SCC Online Gau 260

W.P(C) No. 1076/2024 [Union of India & Ors Vs. M/S GSR Ventures Pvt. Ltd] Page 11 of 38

2. NTPC Limited Vs. SPML Infra Limited, reported in (2023) 9
SCC 385;

3. M.D. Creations & Others Vs. Ashok Kumar Gupta, C.O
2545/2022;

4. Bhaven Consruction Vs. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar
Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 75;

5. Deep Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Limited and Anr., reported in (2020) 15 SCC 706;

6. United India Insurance Company Limited and Anr Vs. Hyundai
Engineering and Construction Company Limited and Ors,
reported in (2018) 17 SCC 607;

7. Panasonic India Private Limited Vs. Shah Aircon through its
Proprietorship Shadab Raza, reported in (2022) SCC Online Del
3288; and

8. Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Niarbheram Power
and Steel Private Limited, reported in (2018) 6 SCC 534″.

11. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent on the other

hand strongly objects the submissions made by the writ petitioners. It

is submitted that Co-ordinate Bench by Judgment and Order dated

18.11.2022 by Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021; Arbitration Petition No.

22/2021 and Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021 has elaborately discussed

on the issues including the interpretation of the Clauses and did not

come to a finding that on a plain reading of the terms and conditions of

the agreement, it can be held conclusively held that the matters cannot

be referred for arbitration. It is submitted that the Co-ordinate Bench

upon careful perusal of all the records and upon due consideration of

the submissions made by both the parties passed an order appointing

the learned sole Arbitrator in exercise of its power under Section 11(6)

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of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is submitted that the

order dated 18.11.2022 by the learned Co-ordinate Bench has attained

finality and the said appointment of the Arbitrator was never assailed

by the present writ petitioners before the Apex Court. It is further

submitted that pursuant to the learned sole Arbitrator being appointed

and the Arbitrator having assumed jurisdiction, the writ petitioners have

filed their written statement of defence. No objection was raised by the

writ petitioners regarding the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator. It is

submitted that when the petitioners have accepted the jurisdiction of

the Arbitral Tribunal and have filed its written statement of defence, it

is now not open to the writ petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal by filing the instant writ petition. It is further submitted that in

terms of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, there is a clear provision

prescribed under the Statute for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on its

own jurisdiction. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the

respondent submits that the Act clearly empowers the Arbitral Tribunal

to rule on its jurisdiction and that having been done by the Arbitral

Tribunal by order dated 11.11.2023 passed in Arbitral Proceedings No.

AH-02/2022 (arising out of Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021) and

Arbitration Proceedings No. AH-03/2022 (arising out of Arbitration

Petition No. 22/2021), the only remedy for the writ petitioner is to

prefer an appeal against the award under Section 34 of the Act.

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12. It is argued that the grounds which are urged by the writ petitioner

before this Court were already urged before the Co-ordinate Bench

during the proceedings initiated by the respondent seeking appointment

of Arbitrator under Section 11(6). The Co-ordinate Bench upon due

consideration of all the materials placed before it as well as the

submissions made came to the conclusion that question of arbitrability

of the issue can be decided by the Court at the time of appointment of

an Arbitrator only where the facts are clear and distinct. The Co-

ordinate Bench held that since the facts are not clear and glaring, the

Co-ordinate Bench correctly exercised its jurisdiction and appointed the

sole Arbitrator and further directed the sole Arbitrator to decide on the

question of arbitrability. This order having not been further challenged

by the writ petitioners, the same has attained finality. Consequently,

the present writ petition filed under Article 227 ought not to be

entertained as the same would amount to seeking a review of the

directions of the Co-ordinate Bench vide Judgment and Order dated

18.11.2022 appointing the Arbitrator.

13. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent strenuously submits

that the law laid down by the Apex Court in this regard is very clear

that it is impermissible for Courts to exercise jurisdiction under Article

226 or 227 of the Constitution on questions with respect to the

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jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunal. The only remedy

available in such a case would be the statutory remedy provided under

Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In support of

his contentions, he relies on the following Judgments:

1. GTPL Hathway Vs. Strategic Marketing Pvt. Ltd, reported in AIR
2021 (NOC) 376 (GUJ) [Paragraph-16];

2. SBP Patel & Co. Vs. M/S Patel Engineering Ltd & Anr., reported in
2009 AIR SCW 6659 [Paragraph -47(vi) & (vii)];

3. Bhaven Construction Vs. Exe Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada,
reported in AIR Online 2021 SC 6 [Paragraph-22];

4. Deep Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Limited & Anr, reported in (2020) 15 SCC 706 [Paragraph-8];

5. Intercontinental Hotels Groups (India) Pvt. Ltd & Anr Vs.
Waterline Hotels Private Ltd., reported in (2022) 7 SCC 662 [Paragraph
19 & 20];

6. State of West Bengal Vs. Sarkar and Sarkar, reported in (2018) 12
SCC 736 [Paragraph 11].

14. Pressing the above Judgments in support of his submissions, the

learned Senior counsel for the respondent sums up his arguments as

under:

a) that the petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable as

they have not shown any bad faith, malafide, or patent lack of

inherent jurisdiction in the present case;

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b) that the order passed under Section 11(6) had attained finality

and thereby subsequent orders passed by the Arbitral tribunal are

beyond the scope of challenge under Articles 226 & 227;

c) that the Arbitration Act itself provides various mechanisms to

address grievances towards any injustice and the sections are

incorporated in a fair and just manner. In the present case, the

Arbitration Act and its salutary provisions under Sections 34 and

37 should be respected and not bypassed on vague contentions

by the petitioners;

d) that the Judgments relied upon by the petitioners have also

been discussed in a comprehensive during consideration of the

Section 11(6) petition i.e. Globe India Pvt Ltd etc. and thereby

any subsequent rulings as seen in case of ATW India Pvt Ltd. will

not have a retrospective effect on the order passed by this

Hon’ble Court on 18.11.2022 also no reference is being made to

the other clauses which are relevant in the present case and

thereby the factual aspects differ in the present case. The other

judgments do not have any relevance and interpretation of

clauses have been distinctively and in great details been discussed

by this Hon’ble court with regard to the interpretation of contract.

Reviewing the same is questionable and cannot be done by this

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court under Articles 226 and 227. The arguments by the

petitioners are untenable and the same is thereby not

maintainable;

e) that, the writ petition should therefore be dismissed with

exemplary costs as the petitioners have not shown bad faith, or

malafide in the order they have not challenged the Sec 11(6)

order nor raised jurisdictional issues under Sec 16 of the

Arbitration Act before the Arbitrator. It is submitted that any

issues with regard to jurisdiction the same should have been

raised before the appropriate forum. The petitioners have raised

questions again about the interpretation of the contract which

was an intricate issue at this stage under Articles 226 and 227

and the same was that has already been discussed and

adjudicated upon by this Hon’ble Court. Thus, they should refrain

from raising it again especially when the same can only be

challenged under Article 136 of the Constitution. During the

pendency of arbitral proceedings, the order cannot be challenged

under 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as held by the

Hon’ble courts in various aforesaid Judgments.

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15. The rival submissions have been duly considered. The case laws

referred to by the contesting parties have also been carefully taken

note of.

16. Since the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 11.11.2023 in

Arbitration Proceeding No.AH-02/2022 and the Arbitration Proceeding

No. AH-03/2022 are being assailed in the present proceeding requiring

this Court to examine whether any interference is called for under

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of

India, it will be apposite to examine the law requiring invocation of the

powers of the High Court under such circumstances.

17. The case projected on behalf of the petitioners is that in view of

the plain reading of the terms of the contract and/or the agreement, it

is apparent that the dispute raised by the respondent could not have

been entered upon for arbitration by the Tribunal. As such, the Arbitral

Tribunal having failed to take note of the provisions of the terms of the

arbitration agreement and there being no statutory alternative remedy

at this stage, the petitioners have come before this Court seeking

issuance of a writ for interference of the impugned order dated

11.11.2023 passed by the learned Arbitrator in Arbitration Proceeding

No. AH-02/2022 and the arbitration proceeding No. AH-03/2022

respectively. The petitioners have urged before this Court that where

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the need arises, a writ Court is not denuded of its constitutional powers

passed effective orders interfering with orders passed by the Arbitral

Tribunal contrary to the provisions of the Arbitration Act.

18. The respondent on the other hand contends that once the Arbitral

Tribunal has invoked its jurisdiction, there is no occasion for a writ

Court to interference in any such orders as may be passed. In view of

the statutory remedy of appeal available under Section 34 and 37 as

the case may be in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The

question before this Court therefore is whether during the pendency of

the arbitration proceedings whether a writ Court can interfere with such

orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.

19. In this context, the law governing the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act needs to be referred to examine the extent of interference that may

be called for by a writ Court in orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal or

proceedings before it. The Apex Court in a Constitution Bench

comprising of seven (7) Hon’ble Judges in a very recent Judgment while

answering a reference pertaining to the validity of an Arbitration

agreement which was insufficiently stamped or under stamped and the

consequences thereof, had authoritatively answered the reference by

examining several earlier precedents of the Supreme Court of India as

well as other Courts across the globe. In Re: Interplay Between

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Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 and the Indian

Stamp Act, 1899, reported in (2024) 6 SCC 1, the Apex Court was

called upon to resolve an issue which arose in the context of three

statutes- the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; the Stamp Act,

1899 and the Contract Act, 1872. The reference arose in the context of

the facts involved that when an application is made for appointment of

an Arbitrator, an objection was raised on the ground that the arbitration

agreement is inadmissible because it is an instrument which is

unstamped or inadequately stamped. The primary issue that arose for

consideration of the Apex Court is whether such arbitration agreement

would be non-existent, unenforceable or invalid if the underlying

contract is not stamped. Although in the facts of the present

proceedings, there is no dispute or objection raised that the underlying

agreement containing the arbitration clause/agreement is unstamped or

inadequately stamped, a reference to this Judgment is felt necessary by

this Court in view of the exhaustive references made tracing the history

of Arbitration Law in India and across the globe and in that context

examined the extent of Court interferences in matters where the parties

have agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration. The Apex

Court upon examination of the earlier precedents arrived at a finding

that in the event of shortfall of stamp duty on an agreement or in the

underlying contract containing an Arbitration Agreement although the

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same would not be admissible in evidence but the said document is not

rendered invalid or void ab-initio because the failure to stamp and

instrument is a curable defect. After discussing several precedents on

the subject, the Apex Court held that an Arbitration Agreement is

separate from the underlying contract. The separability of their

arbitration agreement from the underlying contract is based on four

factors;- (i) the intention of the parties to require arbitration of any

dispute; (ii) preventing any unwilling party from avoiding its earlier

commitments; (iii) the underlying contract if insufficiency stamped

would not result in invalidating of the arbitration agreement; and (iv) if

the separability presumption is discarded, the Courts will have to rule

on the merits of the disputes instead of the Arbitral Tribunals.

20. The Apex Court held that the separability presumption

ensures that an arbitration agreement survives a termination/

repudiation or frustration of a contract to give effect to the true

intention of the parties and ensure sanctity of the arbitral proceedings.

It was held that under the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz

empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on all substantive issues

including the existence of an arbitration agreement as well as the

arbitrability of the issues raised. This doctrine empowers the Arbitral

Tribunal to decide whether there is a valid agreement, whether the

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Tribunal is properly constituted, whether the matters which have been

submitted to arbitration is in accordance with the arbitration agreement.

All these issues are capable of being decided by the Arbitral Tribunal

constituted in terms of the doctrine of kompentz-kompetenz. The

consistent view by the Apex Court and Courts of India as well as across

the world is that where the parties have agreed to resolve their

disputes through arbitration and an Arbitral Tribunal is properly

constituted, there should be minimal interference by Courts except as

otherwise provided under the statute. Unless there is a claim that the

Arbitration Agreement or the underlying contract where the arbitration

clause is present was obtained by fraud perhaps the interference by

Courts in respect of the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal should

be the minimum and only as per the provisions prescribed under the

statute.

21. In SBP Patel & Co. Vs. M/S Patel Engineering Ltd & Anr, reported in

2009 AIR SCW 6659, it was held that once the matter reaches the

Arbitral Tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not

interfere with the orders passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral

Tribunal during the course of arbitration proceedings and the parties

could approach the Court only in terms of section 37 of the act or in

terms with section 34 of the act. In this Judgment also, the Apex Court

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did not warrant orders of the Arbitral Tribunal to be assailed in 226/227

proceedings in view of the statutory provisions under Sections 34 & 37

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Apex Court held that the

aggrieved party has to wait until the award by the Arbitral Tribunal

before it can go for an appeal under Sections 34 & 37.

22. In Bhaven Construction Vs. Exec Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada,

reported in (2022) 1 SCC 7, the Apex Court held as under:

19. In this context we may observe Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC [Deep
Industries Ltd. v. ONGC, (2020) 15 SCC 706] , wherein interplay of Section 5
of the Arbitration Act and Article 227 of the Constitution was analysed as
under : (SCC p. 714, paras 16-17)
“16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in
Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no
judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.

Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain
judgments and orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also
provides for one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being
filed [see Section 37(2) of the Act].

17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions
were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders
passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be
derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time,
we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which
remains untouched by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In
these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can
be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first
appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be
extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the

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statutory policy as adumbrated by us hereinabove so that interference is
restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. In Deep Industries Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation

Limited and Anr, reported in (2020) 15 SCC 706, the Apex Court held as

under:

“16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause contained in Section
5 which states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,
in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. Section 37
grants a constricted right of first appeal against certain judgments and
orders and no others. Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one
bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed [see Section
37(2) of the Act].

17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if petitions
were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders
passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be
derailed and would not come to fruition for many years. At the same time,
we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision which
remains untouched by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In
these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions
can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing
first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be
extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account
the statutory policy as adumbrated by us hereinabove so that interference
is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in
inherent jurisdiction.”

The Apex Court further held that serious disputes as to jurisdiction

would not amount to lack of jurisdiction. At best it there can be stated

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to be a mere error of law, which could not, in any case, be interfered

with under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

24. In Intercontinental Hotels Group (India) Pvt. Ltd & Anr Vs.

Waterline Hotels Private Ltd., reported in (2022) 7 SCC 662, the Apex

Court referring to Vidya Drolia Vs. Durga Trading Corp, reported in

(2021) 2 SCC 1 had accepted the view that Courts have very limited

jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996. The Courts are to

take a “prima facie” view as explained therein, on issues relating to

existence of the arbitration agreement. Usually, the issues of

arbitrability/validity are matters to be adjudicated by the arbitrators.

The only narrow exception curved out was that Courts could adjudicate

to “cut the deadwood”. Ultimately, the Apex Court held that the

watchword for the Courts is “when in doubt, do refer”. The Apex Court

from a study of the precedents came to the following conclusions, with

respect to adjudication of subject matter arbitrability under Section 8 or

11 of the Act, are pertinent:

225.1 In line with the categories laid down by the earlier judgment
of Boghara Polyfab [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab (P)
Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267] the Courts were examining ‘subjectmatter
arbitrability’ at the pre-arbitral stage, prior to the 2015 amendment.

225.2 Post the 2015 amendment, judicial interference at the reference
stage has been substantially curtailed.

225.3 Although subject matter arbitrability and public policy objections are
provided separately Under Section 34 of the Act, the Courts herein have

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understood the same to be interchangeable under the Act. Further,
subject matter arbitrability is interlinked with in rem rights.

225.4 There are special classes of rights and privileges, which ensure to
the benefit of a citizen, by virtue of constitutional or legislative instrument,
which may affect the arbitrability of a subjectmatter.”

The further conclusions arrived at by the Apex Court are indicated at

Paragraph 244 as under:

“244. Before we part, the conclusions reached, with respect to question
No. 1, are:

244.1 Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to
judicial interference.

244.2 Usually, subject matter arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage
of Sections 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it’s a clear case of deadwood.

244.3 The Court, Under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to
arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party
has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of nonexistence of
valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he
is entitled to such a finding.

244.4 The Court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration
agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down
above, i.e., ‘when in doubt, do refer’.

244.5 The scope of the Court to examine the prima facie validity of an
arbitration agreement includes only:

244.5.1 Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? Or

244.5.2 Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of
letters, telecommunication etc?

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244.5.3 Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration
agreement were fulfilled?

244.5.4 On rare occasions, whether the subject matter of dispute is
arbitrable?”

25. Coming to the facts of the present proceedings what is

required to be taken note of is that the petitioners have also submitted

to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and filed its counter claim. In

this context, the Apex Court in the State of West Bengal Vs. Sarkar and

Sarkar, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 736 held as under:

“In any case, even Section 7(4)(c) of the Arbitration act, in such

factual circumstances would lead to the same conclusion. Therefore, in

the facts and circumstances of this case, there is also no dispute about

the fact, that as against the claim raised by the respondent Sarkar &

Sarkar before the arbitrator, the appellant State of West Bengal, had

indeed raised a counter-claim and having done so, it must be deemed

to have submitted before the arbitrator, a request to adjudicate its

claim as well. When both the parties, had approached the arbitrator,

and submitted themselves to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, independent

of all other factual and legal consideration, the arbitrability of the

disputes was clearly made out under Section 7(4)(c) of the Arbitration

Act.”

26. In Waryam Singh and Another vs. Amarnath and Another reported

in (1954) 1 SCC 51, the Apex Court held that “

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This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by
Harries C. J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee(2), to be
exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the
Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting
mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case
before us the lower courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted
arbitrarily. The lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to
do what was by section 13 (2) (i) incumbent on them to do and thereby
refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a
case which called for an interference by the court of the Judicial Commissioner
and it acted quite properly in doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on
which in an appeal by special leave under article 136 we should interfere. The
appeal, therefore, must stand dismissed with costs.

27. Again in Achutananda Baidya vs. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and Others

reported in (1997) 5 SCC 76 the Apex Court held as follows:

” 9. We are, however, unable to accept such contention of Mr.
Bhattacharya. In this case, the High Court has rightly held that the
appellate authority came to the finding of non-existence of oral
agreement of reconveyance without considering the evidence on
record. If the appellate authority does not consider the materials on
record having a bearing on a finding of fact and makes the finding of
fact, such finding of fact arrived without consideration of relevant
materials on record cannot be sustained in law. The High Court, in
such circumstances, will be competent to consider the validity of the
finding of fact assailed before it with reference to materials on record.

10. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article
227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative
superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the
power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court
under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the Courts and
Tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required
to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the
High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in
cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction,

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refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as
distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary to capricious
exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure,
arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or
resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the
inferior court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the
subordinate court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was
erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the
powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the
subordinate court came to the conclusion without any evidence or
upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in
improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse.

11. If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not
at all taken into consideration and without reference to such
evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior court or Tribunal,
such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis.
In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article
227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse
finding of fact.”

28. In Jasbir Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2006) 8 SCC 294,

the Apex Court held that the power of superintendence over all the

subordinate courts and tribunals is given to the High Court under Article

227 of the Constitution. The said power is both of administrative and

judicial nature and it could be exercised suo motu also. However, such

power of superintendence does not imply that the High Court can

influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in a

particular manner. While invoking the provisions of Article 227 the High

Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in

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appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the

bounds of their authority. It cannot intervene in the judicial functions of

the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the

discharge of their functions is of paramount importance, just as the

independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial

functions is. It is the members of the subordinate judiciary who directly

interact with the parties in the course of proceedings of the case and,

therefore, it is no less important that their independence should be

protected effectively to the satisfaction of the litigants. The

independence of the judiciary has been considered as a part of the

basic structure of the Constitution and such independence is postulated

not only from the executive, but also from all other sources of pressure.

The apex Court also held that in the course of inspection, the High

Court Judge is required to examine whether the courts are functioning

within the norms laid down by the High Court. Mostly the inspection is

to be confined to the administrative functioning of the courts and its

officers. If any member of the administrative staff is not doing the work

assigned to him or is causing any delay in the process of administration

of justice, the Inspecting Judge can give proper direction and see that

the courts function smoothly. But under no circumstances, the

Inspecting Judge, as part of his administrative duty enjoys the power to

interfere with the judicial functions of the subordinate courts in

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individual cases. In the course of inspection, a High Court Judge cannot

pass any order on interim applications, such as bail petitions or transfer

applications or applications for interim injunction, howsoever justified

they may be. Orders on bail applications are passed under the

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under various other

enactments, which provide for grant of bail and such orders are passed

as part of the judicial work. The Inspecting Judge is not supposed to

pass any judicial order in individual cases in the course of inspection. Of

course, he can give administrative directions to the presiding officer or

to any of the subordinate staff, if such directions are pertinent in the

context of administration of justice. Except giving general directions

regarding any matter concerning administration of justice, any

interference in the judicial functions of the presiding officer would

amount to interference with the independence of the subordinate

judiciary.

29. In the State of Orissa and Others. Vs. Gokulananda Jena reported

in (2003) 6 SCC 465, the Apex Court held that

” In view of Section 16 read with Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, as

interpreted in Konkan Rly. Case (2002) 2 SCC 388, almost all disputes

which could be presently contemplated can be raised and agitated

before the arbitrator appointed by the Designated Judge under Section

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11(6) of the Act. From the perusal of the said provisions of the Act, it

follows that there is hardly any area of dispute which cannot be decided

by the arbitrator appointed by the Designated Judge. So, since an

efficacious alternative remedy is available before the arbitrator, a writ

court normally would not entertain a challenge to an order of

Designated Judge made under Section 11(6) of the Act which includes

considering the question of jurisdiction of the arbitrator himself.

Therefore, even though a writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution is available to an aggrieved party, ground available for

challenge in such a petition is limited because of the alternative remedy

available under the Act itself.”

On the facts of that case the Apex Court therefore declined to

exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

30. In Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. reported in (1983) 4

SCC 566 the nature and scope of a High Court’s jurisdiction under

Article 227 was considered. The Apex Court held that the supervisory

jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India ” to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal

functions within the limits of its authority”, and not to correct an error

apparent on the face of the records, much less an error of law. In this

case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error

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apparent on the fact of the record. There was no failure on the part of

the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in

disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure

adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by

law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High

Court does not act as an appellant court or tribunal. It will not review or

re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior

court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the

decision.

31. Upon careful examination of the precedents discussed above, it is

evident that the consistent view of the Courts is that under the scheme

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, minimal Court interference

is prescribed and at the stage of orders being passed under Section

11(6), the only requirement for the Courts is to see the existence of a

valid arbitration agreement. Even an improperly or an understamped

underlying contract containing an arbitration clause or an agreement

would not hinder referring the parties to an arbitration agreement as

the arbitration agreement has been presumed to be a separate contract

from the underlying contract which may contain such an arbitration

clause. Under such circumstances, there is no gainsaying that the

legislative wisdom as is discernable from the provisions of the statue of

the Act of 1996 is that where the parties agree to refer the disputes to

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an arbitration and an Arbitral Tribunal is validly constituted under

orders of the Court under Section 11, the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

including the arbitrability of the dispute at the first instances is to be

decided by the Arbitral Tribunal.

32. Any party aggrieved by the award of the Arbitral Tribunal has a

right of appeal under Section 34 and further appeal under Section 37 as

prescribed under the Act of 1996. Furthermore, by the earlier order

dated 18.12.2022 passed in Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021; Arbitration

Petition No. 22/2021 and Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021 out of which

the order dated 11.11.2023 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in

Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021 and Arbitration petition No. 22/2021 is

presently assailed in this writ petition.

33 A careful perusal of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench

revels that the Co-ordinate Bench had examined the provisions of the

contract in minute detailed and thereafter appointed the learned

arbitrator and left it to the learned arbitrator to decide the disputes

including the issue of arbitrability. The order dated 18.12.2022 passed

by the Co-ordinate Bench in Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021;

Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021 and Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021

was passed after hearing both the parties including the present writ

petitioners. Pursuant to the orders passed by the Co-ordinate Bench

appointing the arbitrator and directing the parties to appear before the

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arbitrator and leaving the question of arbitrability of the issue to be

decided by the arbitrator. The petitioner before this Court participated

in the arbitration proceedings. The said order was never assailed before

any other forum. As such the order dated 18.12.2022 passed in

Arbitration Petition No. 20/2021; Arbitration Petition No. 22/2021 and

Arbitration Petition No. 28/2021 appointing the learned arbitrator to

arbitrate on the issues and also to decide on the question of the

arbitrability of the issues had attained finality. It is also not in dispute

that the petitioners have in the meantime submitted to the jurisdiction

of the Arbitral Tribunal and besides filing written statement have also

filed counter claims.

34. Under such circumstances and in view of the elaborate discussion

of the precedents above, this Court does not find that there is any

infirmity which calls for exercise of a writ under Article 226 or 227 of

the Constitution of India. The issues before the Arbitral Tribunal

including the question of jurisdiction can be assailed by the petitioner

before the appellate forum prescribed under Sections 34 & 37 of the

Act of 1996. There is no allegation of fraud or forgery made against any

of the parties during the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal

leading to the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal which are

presently impugned in the present proceedings. The only question to be

decided is whether the disputes which the respondent has raised are

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capable of being decided in arbitration in the terms of the contract

agreement. There is no dispute on facts that the contract agreement

contained an arbitration clause. There is also no dispute that in respect

of the contract work differences had arisen between the parties which

had led to certain disputes.

35. In view of the arbitration clause available in the contract

agreement, these disputes are required to be resolved through

arbitration. Whether these disputes are capable of being resolved

through arbitration taking into consideration the various clauses and

conditions of the contract act was an issue which is left to be decided

by the Arbitral Tribunal by the Co-ordinate Bench vide order dated

18.12.2022 while exercising powers under Section 11(6) appointing the

arbitrator. By way of the impugned orders, the arbitrator has held that

the disputes are capable of being decided through arbitration and has

assumed jurisdiction accordingly. In view of the authoritative findings of

the Apex Court, more particularly, in view of the recent law laid down

by the Apex Court in RE:- Interplay between arbitration agreements

under Arbitration Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 reported in

2024 (6) SCC 1, the conclusions and the findings arrived at by the Co-

ordinate Bench in its order rendered in ATW (India Pvt. Ltd.) vs. Union

of India reported 2024 SCC Online Gau 2602 will no longer be binding

on this Court.

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As discussed above, the petitioners have also submitted to the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal by submitted counter claims.

36. The power of writ under the Article 227 is a constitutional power

which cannot be curtailed by any statute. The same is available to a

writ court in its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure subordinate courts

and tribunals function within their powers / jurisdiction conferred. When

any order is passed by such a tribunal exceeding their jurisdiction or

order is obtained by fraud or it fails to exercise its jurisdiction then a

writ court under Art 227 can certainly interfere. But such is not the case

here. The tribunal has been conferred its jurisdiction by this court under

sec 11(6) to decide the question of arbitrability of the dispute.

Therefore it cannot be said that the Tribunal has assumed jurisdiction it

did not have or that it failed to exercise its jurisdiction. The order dated

18.12.2022 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench under section 11(6) has

attained finality as no appeal has been preferred. The facts pleaded and

discussed above before this Court does not reveal any occasion which

calls for interference of the impugned order under the extra ordinary

powers under Article 226 or 227. No doubt, the powers of a writ Court

under Article 226 or 227 are being constitutional powers, the same

cannot be excluded by any non-obstantive clause under any statute

including that of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, however,

in the facts pleaded and submitted before this Court, there is no

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occasion which warrants this Court to invoke its powers under Sections

226 or 227 to interfere with the orders dated 11.11.2023 passed by the

learned Arbitrator in Arbitration Proceeding No. AH-02/2022 and the

arbitration proceeding No. AH-03/2022. The parties have a forum for

appeal under Section 34 & 37 of the Act of 1996 and the same would

be available to be aggrieved party in the event of any award that is

being passed by the Arbitral Tribunal.

37. Under such circumstances, this Court is disinclined to invoke its

powers under Article 226 and 227 for issuances of a writ to interfere

with the orders dated 11.11.2023 passed by the learned Arbitrator in

Arbitration Proceeding No. AH-02/2022 and the Arbitration Proceeding

No. AH-03/2022. The writ petition is, therefore, devoid of merit and the

same is therefore dismissed. No order as to cost.

38. The Arbitral Tribunal is permitted to proceed in the Arbitration

Proceedings without any further delay. Interim order passed earlier

stands vacated. The parties will appear before the Arbitral Tribunal

forthwith.

JUDGE
Comparing Assistant

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