Supreme Court of India
Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi Thr. Its Secretary, … vs M/S. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. on 17 May, 2024
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta, Surya Kant
2024 INSC 454 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 414 OF 2023
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857/2016
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY,
LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT
& ANOTHER …APPLICANTS
VERSUS
M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LIMITED
AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH
MA No.808/2023 in C.A. No.12239/2016
R.P.(C) No.882/2017 in C.A. No. 11846/2016
MA No.159/2018 in C.A. No.11857/2016
R.P.(C) No.396/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
satish kumar yadav
Date: 2024.05.24
R.P.(C) No.409/2023 in C.A. No. 8511/2016
18:43:58 IST
R.P.(C) No.410/2023 in C.A. No. 8925/2016
Reason:
R.P.(C) No.412/2023 in C.A. No. 12114/2016
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R.P.(C) No.414/2023 in C.A. No. 8898/2016
R.P.(C) No.416/2023 in C.A. No. 4599/2016
R.P.(C) No.419/2023 in C.A. No. 10206/2016
R.P.(C) No.418/2023 in C.A. No. 8505/2016
R.P.(C) No.425/2023 in C.A. No. 8929/2016
R.P.(C) No.428/2023 in C.A. No. 8545/2016
R.P.(C) No.1731/2023 in C.A. No. 9598/2016
R.P.(C) No.429/2023 in C.A. No. 11256/2016
R.P.(C) No.431/2023 in C.A. No. 9597/2016
R.P.(C) No.432/2023 in C.A. No. 11841/2016
CONMT.PET.(C) No.735/2018 in C.A. No.
11857/2016
R.P.(C) No.398/2023 in C.A. No. 8529/2016
R.P.(C) No.399/2023 in C.A. No. 11857/2016
R.P.(C) No.400/2023 in C.A. No. 8899/2016
R.P.(C) No.401/2023 in C.A. No. 8527/2016
R.P.(C) No.402/2023 in C.A. No. 8547/2016
R.P.(C) No.403/2023 in C.A. No. 8952/2016
R.P.(C) No.405/2023 in C.A. No. 8935/2016
R.P.(C) No.406/2023 in C.A. No. 8954/2016
R.P.(C) No.407/2023 in C.A. No. 9049/2016
R.P.(C) No.408/2023 in C.A. No. 8559/2016
R.P.(C) No.411/2023 in C.A. No. 9214/2016
R.P.(C) No.413/2023 in C.A. No. 9595/2016
R.P.(C) No.397/2023 in C.A. No. 8909/2016
R.P.(C) No.417/2023 in C.A. No. 8921/2016
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R.P.(C) No.420/2023 in C.A. No. 8904/2016
R.P.(C) No.421/2023 in C.A. No. 9719/2016
R.P.(C) No.423/2023 in C.A. No. 8957/2016
R.P.(C) No.424/2023 in C.A. No. 8922/2016
R.P.(C) No.426/2023 in SLP(C) No. 17316/2016
R.P.(C) No.430/2023 in C.A. No. 11854/2016
C.A. No.1522/2023
Diary No(s). 14831/2023
Diary No(s). 15893/2023
R.P.(C) No. 422/2023 in C.A. No. 12046/2016
R.P.(C) No. 404/2023 in C.A. No. 12111/2016
R.P.(C) No. 415/2023 in C.A. No. 11853/2016
J U D G M E N T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. PREFACE …………………………………………………………………………………… 4
B. THE REFERENCE ………………………………………………………………………….. 5
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY ………………………………………………………………….. 6
D. FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE REVIEW PETITIONS ………………………………… 13
E. THE SPLIT VERDICT ……………………………………………………………………. 15
F. SUBMISSIONS…………………………………………………………………………… 19
G. QUESTIONS BEFORE US ………………………………………………………………. 25
H. LAW ON REVIEW JURISDICTION …………………………………………………….. 26
I. PRECEDENTS CONSIDERING THE EXPLANATION ………………………………….. 36
J. OTHER PRECEDENTS ON REVIEW ……………………………………………………. 41
K. ANALYSIS ……………………………………………………………………………….. 45
L. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………. 79
Page 3 of 90
1. Day in and day out, as Judges of this Court, we are
majorly addressed by learned counsel for the parties that the
High Courts are either right or wrong; here, in view of a split
verdict rendered by an Hon’ble Division Bench (“said Division
Bench”, hereafter) comprising two Hon’ble Judges of this
Court, we have been addressed by the parties that our
distinguished colleagues on the Bench have been right and
wrong at the same time. To complete the task that has been
entrusted to us, one of the opinions of the Hon’ble Judges
comprising the said Division Bench has to be held incorrect
unless, of course, harmonization of the two opinions, in any
manner, is possible. In the process of considering the rival
claims, the exercise of declaring one view as correct and the
other incorrect or to harmonize the two views, have
necessarily taken us back to the basics of the substantive and
procedural laws regulating review jurisdiction of this Court.
The effort, we have no hesitation to say, has been really
educative as well as rewarding because the erudite arguments
advanced from the Bar opened up a new vista of thinking to
appreciate points of debate that emerged not only from the
facts of the petitions before us but also points arising from
Page 4 of 90
certain connected matters, decided by this Court. We record
our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered
by the members of the Bar who had the occasion to address
this larger Bench.
2. The two Hon’ble Judges comprising the said Division
Bench were considering a clutch of review petitions (“RPs”,
hereafter), presented either by the Delhi Development
Authority or the Government of NCT, Delhi, or the Land and
Building Department, etc. (“review petitioners”, hereafter).
The RPs urged review of the judgments/orders passed by this
Court on either Civil Appeals or Special Leave Petitions carried
by the review petitioners from judgments and orders of the
High Court of Delhi (“High Court”, hereafter), declaring land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”, hereafter) as deemed to have lapsed
under section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act (“2013 Act”, hereafter). By the
judgments/orders under review, the said Civil Appeals/Special
Leave Petitions stood dismissed. The RPs having been listed
before the said Division Bench, the respondents therein (i.e.,
Page 5 of 90
landowners) had questioned the maintainability of the same
by referring to the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, Code
of Civil Procedure (“CPC”, hereafter). As noted earlier, a split
verdict emerged in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. K.L. Rathi
Steels Limited and ors.1, being the lead matter. Briefly put,
the Hon’ble Judge presiding over the Bench ruled in favour of
maintainability of the RPs whereas the Hon’ble companion
Judge on the Bench disagreed and held that the RPs were not
maintainable. An order was, thus, made by the Bench on 17th
March, 2023 requiring the papers of the RPs to be placed
before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Such order has been the
immediate reason for His Lordship to constitute this larger
Bench and refer the RPs to resolve which of the two views on
maintainability of the RPs is the correct view; hence, all such
RPs are now before this larger Bench.
3. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by
the reference, it would be apposite to trace the judicial
trajectory of proceedings in this Court on interpretation of
section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that preceded the split verdict.
1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 288
Page 6 of 90
4. The 2013 Act was enforced with effect from 1 st
January, 2014. Soon thereafter, the interpretation of section
24(2) of the 2013 Act fell for consideration before this Court.
A three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble R.M. Lodha, Hon’ble Madan
B. Lokur and Hon’ble Kurian Joseph, JJ.) in Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki 2 explained,
in the light of section 31 of the 2013 Act what the expression
“compensation has not been paid” occurring in section 24(2)
meant. The verb “paid” in the same sub-section was also
explained. Perhaps, since no argument was advanced, the
Bench did not have the occasion to consider whether the
conjunction “or” between the expressions “compensation has
not been paid” and “possession has not been taken” in sub-
section (2) should be read as “or” as it is, or read as “and”.
5. However, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was
doubted by a two-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra and
Hon’ble Amitava Roy, JJ.) in Indore Development Authority
v. Shailendra [2-Judge]3 wherein it was of the opinion that
the issue should be considered by a larger Bench.
2
(2014) 3 SCC 183
3
(2018) 1 SCC 733
Page 7 of 90
6. Consequently, a Bench of three-Judges (cor. Hon’ble
Arun Mishra, Hon’ble A.K. Goel and Hon’ble M.
Shantanagoudar, JJ.) was constituted. The majority speaking
through Hon’ble Arun Mishra, J. in Indore Development
Authority v. Shailendra [3-Judge]4 held Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) per incuriam but deemed it not
necessary to refer to a larger Bench. Relevant excerpts from
such decision are set out hereunder:
216. With respect to the decision of this Court in Pune
Municipal Corpn. we have given deep thinking whether
to refer it to further larger Bench but it was not
considered necessary as we are of the opinion that
Pune Municipal Corpn. has to be held per incuriam,
inter alia, for the following reasons:
***
217. The decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn.,
which is related to Question (i) and other decisions
following, the view taken in Pune Municipal Corpn. are
per incuriam. … The decisions rendered on the basis of
Pune Municipal Corpn. are open to be reviewed in
appropriate cases on the basis of this decision.”
7. It is relevant to highlight that one of the Judges
(Hon’ble M. Shantanagoudar, J.) partly dissented by recording
the following observations:
4
(2018) 3 SCC 412
Page 8 of 90
“295.2. …However, according to me the judgment in
Pune Municipal Corpn. is not rendered per incuriam. In
view of the above, the judgment in Pune Municipal
Corpn. may have to be reconsidered by a larger Bench,
inasmuch as Pune Municipal Corpn. was decided by a
Bench of three Judges.”
8. The aforesaid decision, as it was destined, gave rise to
uncertainty rendered by two contradictory decisions by
Benches of co-equal strength. Hence, a three-Judge Bench
(cor. Hon’ble Madan B. Lokur, Hon’ble Kurian Joseph and
Hon’ble Deepak Gupta, JJ.) in State of Haryana v. G.D.
Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited 5 while deferring a
hearing as to whether the matter should at all be referred to a
larger Bench directed that pending decision on the question of
reference, the High Courts may not deal with any case relating
to the interpretation of or concerning section 24 of the 2013
Act.
9. Two orders dated 22nd February, 2018 passed by
different Benches of co-equal strength followed. While a Bench
(cor. Hon’ble A.K. Goel and Hon’ble U.U. Lalit, JJ.) by an order
passed in Indore Development Authority v. Shyam
Verma6 directed the matters to be placed before an
5
(2018) 3 SCC 585
6
(2020) 15 SCC 342
Page 9 of 90
appropriate Bench the next day as per orders of the Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India, a similar order was passed by a
coordinate Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra and Hon’ble
Amitava Roy, JJ.) vide its order in State of Haryana v.
Maharana Pratap Charitable Trust (Regd)7.
10. A five-Judge Constitution Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun
Mishra, Hon’ble Indira Banerjee, Hon’ble Vineet Saran, Hon’ble
M.R. Shah and Hon’ble S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.) was thereafter
constituted.
11. Ultimately, vide the judgment in Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]8,
the controversy was finally put to rest. The conclusions in
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) are recorded in
paragraphs 365 and 366. However, paragraph 365 being
relevant for a decision here, is quoted hereunder:
“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune
Municipal Corpn. is hereby overruled and all other
decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. has been
followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji
Nagar Residential Assn. cannot be said to be laying
down good law, is overruled and other decisions
following the same are also overruled. In Indore
Development Authority v. Shailendra [3-judge] , the
aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and7
Civil Appeal No. 4835/2015
8
(2020) 8 SCC 129Page 10 of 90
whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was not
placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too
cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the
present judgment.”
12. Ironically, during the hearing, a controversy was raised
by the respondents therein regarding the composition of the
Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). A
preliminary objection for recusal of the presiding Judge of the
said Constitution Bench was sought on the ground that His
Lordship was a part of the three-Judge Bench in Shailendra
[3-Judge] (supra) wherein the correctness of the three-Judge
Bench decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was
doubted and by 2:1 majority, held to be per incuriam. It was
contended that in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), His
Lordship did not merely express reservations about the
precedent i.e., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra),
instead, His Lordship effectively annulled the judgment by
asserting that it held no legal value, departing thereby from
established principles of stare decisis and judicial discipline.
Rejecting the aforesaid arguments, a detailed order was
rendered by His Lordship in Indore Development Authority
v. Manoharlal [5-Judge, recusal]9. The plea of recusal was
9
(2020) 6 SCC 304
Page 11 of 90
declined, and it was observed that “accepting the plea of
recusal would sound a death knell to the independent system
of justice delivery where litigants would dictate participation of
judges of their liking in particular cases or causes” 10. While the
lead opinion was delivered by the concerned Judge, the four
other member Judges on the Bench delivered a joint
concurring opinion.
13. For completing the narrative, it is to be noted that the
ball did not stop rolling with Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra). By an order dated 16 th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [Recall
Order]11, a three-Judge Bench (cor. Hon’ble Arun Mishra,
Hon’ble Vineet Saran and Hon’ble M.R. Shah, JJ.) allowed
several applications, thereby recalling the judgment in Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra).
14. What is, therefore, laid bare by these facts is that
firstly, Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was doubted in
Shailendra [2-Judge] (supra), whereafter it was declared
per incuriam in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), followed by
its overruling in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and
10
(2020) 6 SCC 304, Para 45
11
2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471
Page 12 of 90
ultimately recalled on 16 th July, 2020 in Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki [Recall Order] (supra).
15. Immediately after Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra) was decided, several writ petitions came to be
instituted not only in the High Court but also in different high
courts across the country seeking similar declaration, viz.
owing to the requisite conditions mentioned in Section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act being met, land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the 1894 Act stood lapsed. These RPs arise out
of writ proceedings on the file of the High Court, which have
since attained finality by reason of the judgments and orders
under review.
16. The facts are noticed from the Review Petition arising
out of the Writ Petition 12 instituted by the first respondent, K.L.
Rathi Steels Limited, which is the lead matter. Relying upon
the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra) and similar line of decisions, the High Court vide its
judgment and order dated 7th July, 2015, allowed the writ
petition taking a view that the necessary ingredients of section
12
W.P. (C) No. 9200/2014
Page 13 of 90
24(2), as interpreted by this Court, having been met, the
acquisition proceedings under challenge therein are deemed
to have lapsed. Aggrieved, the first respondent carried such
judgment and order in a Civil Appeal 13 praying for it to be set
aside. This Court, vide a common judgment and order dated
29th November, 2016 concerning various civil appeals,
dismissed the appeals and granted a period of one year to the
appellants (review petitioners herein) to exercise liberty
granted under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of
acquisition proceedings afresh.
17. Availing what they call is a ‘liberty’ granted by this
Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), the appellants in the
Civil Appeal (review petitioners herein) approached this Court
seeking a review of the aforesaid judgment and order dated
29th November, 2016. Although the review petition suffered
from substantial delay, the same stood condoned by the said
Division Bench after the split verdict.
18. It is relevant to mention at this stage that during the
entire period of controversy, the observation in paragraph 217
of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) was construed as ‘liberty’
13
Civil Appeal No. 11857/2016
Page 14 of 90
by not only the appellants in the Civil Appeal but also by other
similarly placed appellants/special leave petitioners leading
them to approach this Court seeking review of all those
decisions whereby, relying upon Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and similar line of cases, it was declared
that land acquisition proceedings were deemed to have lapsed
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
19. Heavy reliance was placed by the review petitioners
before the said Division Bench on paragraphs 365 and 366 of
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and paragraph 217 of
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). They also relied on Board of
Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club 14 in
support of the contention that a party for sufficient reason
could urge the court to exercise its review jurisdiction. On
behalf of the respondent landowners, various decisions were
cited to contend that the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII,
CPC would not permit a review of the judgments/orders under
review.
14
2005 4 SCC 741
Page 15 of 90
20. The presiding Judge allowed the review/recall
petitions. Noting the specific overruling of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and all the decisions which were
rendered following it by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra), and referring to paragraph 217 of the decision in
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), the Hon’ble Judge felt that
“some meaning” had to be given to such observations. The
contention of the respondents that the case falls under Rule 1
of Order XLVII, CPC and the subsequent overruling of Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra) cannot be a ground to review
the earlier judgments and orders was rejected by reasoning
that “here is a peculiar case where the earlier decision in Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra), upon which reliance has been
placed earlier, was itself doubted in the subsequent decision
in the case of … and that the matter was referred to the
Constitution Bench and thereafter the Constitution Bench has
declared the law as above, more particularly paragraphs 365
and 366 of the judgment in the case of …”.
21. Lastly, it was noted that in most of the cases that were
sought to be reviewed, the lands had already been utilised by
the beneficiaries of acquisition and in view of the orders passed
declaring the deemed lapse of acquisition, “(T)he resultant
Page 16 of 90
effect would be to return the possession of the land/s which
might have been used by the beneficiary authorities”. It was,
therefore held that the RPs should be allowed in the larger
public interest and the authorities should be given an
opportunity to put forward their case afresh, “which shall be in
the larger public interest”.
22. In contrast, the Hon’ble companion Judge while
dissenting with the Hon’ble presiding Judge proceeded to
examine the RPs on the basis of their very maintainability, in
the light of the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC.
Multiple decisions of this Court, on the parameters on which a
review petition could be entertained by this Court, were
examined and it was held that in view of the specific bar that
the Explanation creates on taking into consideration the
subsequent overruling of a determinative judgment, the RPs
could not be held to be maintainable. Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) being good law as on date when the
impugned judgments were rendered, it was held that the said
impugned judgments could not be reviewed on the ground of
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) being overruled, the
course of action being expressly prohibited by the Explanation
to Rule 1 of Order XLVII. It was further held that the decisions
Page 17 of 90
relying on Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) had attained
finality and were binding on the parties, and that the decision
to review such final decisions would fly in the face of the public
policy underlining the Explanation i.e., interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium (it is in the interest of the State that there should
be an end to a litigation). In thus rejecting the RPs on the
ground of maintainability, the Hon’ble Judge was guided, inter
alia, by decisions of this Court in Chajju Ram v. Neki15 and
Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik16 wherein this Court had
held that the grounds for review laid down by Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, CPC do not include within their ambit, the rehearing of
a dispute solely on the ground that the judgment on which the
decision in the dispute had been relied upon, was overruled.
Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was distinguished by observing
that “exercise of review jurisdiction in that case, based on a
subsequent event was confined to purely the facts of the said
case involving a controversy between rival Cricket
Associations” and hence could not be applied as a general
ratio.
15
AIR 1922 PC 112
16
(2006) 4 SCC 78
Page 18 of 90
23. It is as a consequence of the split-verdict that the RPs
were heard by the present three-Judge Bench to decide the
point of maintainability of the RPs and to settle the ancillary
issues raised in K.L. Rathi Steels Limited (supra).
24. Though it may not be absolutely necessary to note the
elaborate submissions advanced from the Bar by learned
senior counsel/counsel for the parties since such submissions
have been captured in the minutest detail in the split-verdict,
for the sake of completeness, we shall briefly refer to the
same.
25. Ms. Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the review petitioners (the Govt. of
NCT, Delhi), with all the passion at her command, argued that
the RPs are maintainable and advanced, in support of
maintainability, the following submissions:
a) The specific and categoric overruling of Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra), and all other
decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra) was followed, leads to the conclusion, in
absolute terms, that land acquisition proceedings
Page 19 of 90
cannot be deemed to have lapsed under section24(2) unless the conditions enumerated in
paragraph 366 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) are satisfied.
b) Vide order dated 16th July, 2020 in Pune Municipal
Corporation [Recall Order] (supra), the decision
in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been
recalled and the position of law, as expounded
therein, stands erased, leading the findings
operating inter se the parties to cease.
c) To dismiss the review/recall petitions at the
threshold as not being maintainable will lead to a
great injustice and undermine the public interest,
particularly in the light of the ‘liberty’ granted by this
Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). The RPs
deserve to be decided on merits on a case-to-case
basis on various parameters including the stage of
litigation, the reason for incomplete acquisition by
the State, stage of acquisition, status of possession
and compensation, reasons for the delay in filing
Page 20 of 90
review/recall petitions, and the purpose of theacquisition.
d) Urging this Court to equally weigh equitable
considerations involved in the matter, Ms. Bhati
prayed that the RPs may not be dismissed at the
threshold.
26. Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel,
representing the Delhi Development Authority contended that
having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances that
have emerged since overruling of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra), public interest indeed is one of the factors requiring
paramount consideration and, on the anvil thereof, the opinion
of the Hon’ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench ought
to be accepted. According to him, it is justice that the courts
are duty bound to dispense and it would not amount to
dispensing justice if the respondent landowners’ objection to
the maintainability of the RPs, based on an overruled
judgment, were upheld.
27. Mr. Sen, learned senior counsel, also appearing on
behalf of the Delhi Development Authority, apart from
Page 21 of 90
adopting the submissions of Ms. Bhati and Mr. Vasdev,
asserted the maintainability of the RPs by submitting as
follows:
a) Maintainability of the RPs ought not to be decided by
a blanket order as the RPs have been filed not on the
solitary ground of overruling of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) but in terms of the ‘liberty’
granted by this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge]
(supra), which has the force of law under Article 141
of the Constitution. In arguendo, Article 137 comes
to the rescue of the review petitioners granting them
the liberty to file a review.
b) Public interest must be given precedence over
private interest in case of a conflict. The present
lands are required for implementing residential
schemes for low-income groups and significant
construction had already been carried out in other
acquired portions.
c) The jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution
ought to be invoked to ensure substantial justice
Page 22 of 90
considering the threat to public good involved in thematter.
28. Urging that the RPs are maintainable and deserve a
hearing on merits, Mr. Sen urged that the RPs be held
maintainable and heard on its own merits.
29. The landowner respondents, represented by Mr. Divan,
Mr. Giri, Mr. Chib and Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel and by
Ms. Swaraj, learned counsel, supported the opinion expressed
by the Hon’ble companion Judge on the said Division Bench
and urged this Bench to take the same recourse. The following
submissions were advanced by them:
a) The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) does not come to the rescue of the review
petitioners, it must operate prospectively and cannot
reopen claims which have attained finality.
b) BSNL v. Union of India17 and Neelima Srivastava
v. State of U.P.18 were relied upon to support the
contention that overruling of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) merely takes away the
17
(2006) 3 SCC 1
18
2021 SCC OnLine SC 610Page 23 of 90
precedential value; it, however, does not affect thebinding nature of a decision that has attained finality
inter se the parties.
c) This Court has limited jurisdiction available in review
and in terms of the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, CPC, overruling of earlier judgments would
not constitute a ground for review.
d) Further, the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge,
lapse] (supra) did not, in any manner whatsoever,
endorse the purported liberty granted by
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) in paragraph 217 to
the review petitioners to file the present RPs; on the
contrary, it has been overruled. Moreover,
Shailendra [3-Judge], having been decided by a
Bench of co-equal strength, could neither have
granted liberty to file the RPs, nor could have
declared Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per
incuriam.
e) Most of the RPs had been filed after periods of
inordinate delay where no sufficient explanation had
been provided for the same by the review
Page 24 of 90
petitioners. In any event, the present RPs were alsofiled belatedly after the purported liberty granted by
this Court in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra).
30. Praying that the RPs are not maintainable, the learned
counsel urged this Court to dismiss them in limine.
31. The parties have been heard and the materials on
record perused, in the light of the law regulating exercise of
power by the Supreme Court to review its earlier
judgment/order under the extant laws. We are of the opinion
that on the rival contentions, the following questions arise for
answers on the facts of these RPs:
a) Can the review petitioners, on the basis of the
pleadings in the RPs, be considered persons
aggrieved?
b) Whether the last sentence of paragraph 217 of
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) grants ‘liberty’ to
any party to seek a review of Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra)?
Page 25 of 90
c) If the answer to (b) is in the affirmative, did such
‘liberty’ survive after the decision in Manoharlal [5-
Judge, lapse] (supra)?
d) Can the RPs be held to be maintainable, giving due
regard to the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order XLVII,
CPC vis-à-vis Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra)?
e) If the answer to (d) is in the negative, do the RPs still
deserve to be entertained on the other grounds
urged therein?
f) Are the miscellaneous applications maintainable?
32. While answering the aforesaid questions, we feel
obliged and, hence, intend to address certain ancillary issues
too.
33. The law regulating exercise of review jurisdiction by
the Supreme Court is so well-settled that any detailed
discussion would, in the first place, seem to be unnecessary.
However, we cannot overlook the vociferous arguments on
behalf of both the review petitioners and the respondents that
Page 26 of 90
the Hon’ble Judges of the said Division Bench have erred in
their respective appreciation of the law relating to exercise of
review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. In view thereof and
particularly in the light of the authorities considered in the split
verdict and those which have been cited in course of the
debate that unfolded before us, calls for a relook at the
relevant provisions and the precedents bearing in mind the
respective approaches of the Hon’ble Judges in the split
verdict: one of them has given public interest paramount
importance, no matter what the law ordains; while the other
has stuck to the law, no matter what public interest demands.
34. Power of the Supreme Court to review its own
judgment and/or order has its genesis in Articles 137 and 145
of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court
Rules, 2013 (“2013 Rules”, hereafter). Rule 1 of Order XLVII
of the 2013 Rules, in no uncertain terms, lays down that no
application for review in a civil proceeding will be entertained
by this Court except on the ground mentioned in Rule 1 Order
XLVII, CPC. Review in civil proceedings is governed by section
114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII thereof. It would,
therefore, not be inapt to read section 114 and Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, CPC once again:
Page 27 of 90
114. Review.— Subject as aforesaid, any person
considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has
been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed by this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the order, and
the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.
ORDER XLVII
1. Application for review of judgment.— (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved—
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is
allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is
allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake
or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any
other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of
the decree passed or order made against him, may
apply for a review of judgment of the Court which
passed the decree or made the order.
Page 28 of 90
35. Read in conjunction with section 114 of the CPC, Order
XLVII Rule 1 thereof has three broad components which need
to be satisfied to set the ball for a review in motion – (i) ‘who’,
means the person applying must demonstrate that he is a
person aggrieved; (ii) ‘when’, means the circumstances a
review could be sought; and (iii) ‘why’, means the grounds on
which a review of the order/decree ought to be made. Finally,
comes the ‘what’, meaning thereby the order the Court may
make if it thinks fit. Not much attention is generally required
to be paid to components (i) and (ii), because of the
overarching difficulties posed by component (iii). However, in
deciding this reference, component (i) would also have a
significant role apart from the Explanation inserted by way of
an amendment of the CPC.
36. Let us now briefly attempt a deeper analysis of the
provision. We are conscious that the provisions relating to
review have been considered in a catena of decisions, but the
special features of these RPs coupled with the fact that two
Hon’ble Judges of this Court have delivered a split verdict
make it imperative for us not to miss any significant aspect.
Page 29 of 90
37. A peep into the legislative history would reveal that
Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC, which is part of the First Schedule
appended thereto, bears very close resemblance to its
predecessor statutes, i.e., Section 623 of the Codes of Civil
Procedure of 1877 and 1882. The solitary legislative change
brought about in 1976 in Order XLVII, CPC resulted in insertion
of an Explanation at the foot of Rule 1, which is at the heart of
the controversy here.
38. The first and foremost condition that is required to be
satisfied by a party to invoke the review jurisdiction of the
court, whose order or decree, as the case may be, is sought
to be reviewed, is that the said party must be someone who is
aggrieved by the order/decree. The words “person aggrieved”
are found in several statutes; however, the meaning thereof
has to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and
provisions of the statute. In one sense, the said words could
correspond to the requirement of ‘locus standi’ in relation to
judicial remedies. The need to ascertain the ‘locus standi’ of a
review petitioner could arise, if he is not a party to the
proceedings but claims the order or decree to have adversely
affected his interest. In terms of Order XLVII of the 2013 Rules
read with Order XLVII, CPC, a petition for review at the
Page 30 of 90
instance of a third party to the proceedings too is
maintainable, the quintessence being that he must be
aggrieved by a judgment/order passed by this Court. This is
what has been held in Union of India v. Nareshkumar
Badrikumar Jagad19. That is, of course, not the case here.
Normally, in the context of Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC, it is
that person (being a party to the proceedings) suffering an
adverse order and/or decree who, feeling aggrieved thereby,
usually seeks a review of the order/decree on any of the
grounds outlined therein. The circumstances where a review
would lie are spelt out in clauses (a) to (c).
39. Order XVLII does not end with the circumstances as
section 114, CPC, the substantive provision, does. Review
power under section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC is
available to be exercised, subject to fulfilment of the above
conditions, on setting up by the review petitioner any of the
following grounds:
(i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence; or
(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
19
(2019) 18 SCC 586Page 31 of 90
(iii) any other sufficient reason.
40. Insofar as (i) (supra) is concerned, the review
petitioner has to show that such evidence (a) was actually
available on the date the court made the order/decree, (b)
with reasonable care and diligence, it could not be brought by
him before the court at the time of the order/decree, (c) it was
relevant and material for a decision, and (d) by reason of its
absence, a miscarriage of justice has been caused in the sense
that had it been produced and considered by the court, the
ultimate decision would have been otherwise.
41. Regarding (ii) (supra), the review petitioner has to
satisfy the court that the mistake or error committed by it is
self-evident and such mistake or error can be pointed out
without any long-drawn process of reasoning; and, if such
mistake or error is not corrected and is permitted to stand, the
same will lead to a failure of justice. There cannot be a fit-in-
all definition of “mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record” and it has been considered prudent by the courts to
determine whether any mistake or error does exist considering
the facts of each individual case coming before it.
Page 32 of 90
42. With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better than
refer to the traditional view in Chhajju Ram (supra), a
decision of a Bench of seven Law Lords of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. It was held there that the
words “any other sufficient reason” means “a reason sufficient
on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately
previously”, meaning thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably,
Chhajju Ram (supra) has been consistently followed by this
Court in a number of decisions starting with Moran Mar
Basselios Catholics v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose
Athanasius20.
43. There are recent decisions of this Court which have
viewed ‘mistake’ as an independent ground to seek a review.
Whether or not such decisions express the correct view need
not detain us since the review here is basically prayed in view
of the subsequent event.
44. As noted above, the Explanation in Rule 1 Order XLVII
was inserted in 1976. It reads:
“Explanation.— The fact that the decision on a question
of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has
been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision20
AIR 1954 SC 526Page 33 of 90
of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a
ground for the review of such judgment.”
45. The above insertion was preceded by a
recommendation contained in the 54 th report of the Law
Commission. The decisions in Syed Liaqat Husain v. Mohd.
Razi21, Lachhmi Narain Balu v. Ghisa Bihari 22 and Patel
Naranbhai Jinabhai v. Patel Gopaldas Venidas 23 held that
the fact that the view of the law taken in a judgment has been
altered by a subsequent decision of a superior court in another
case, is not a ground for review of such judgment. On the
contrary, in Thadikulangara Pylee’s Son Pathrose v.
Ayyazhiveettil Lakshmi Amma’s son Kuttan24 law was laid
down that the fact that a subsequent binding authority took a
different view of the law from what had been taken in the
decision sought to be reviewed, was a good ground for review.
Upon consideration of these decisions, the Law Commission
had recommended as follows:
“Recommendation
It is felt that the position should be settled on this
point. If the law is altered by judicial pronouncement21
AIR 1944 Oudh 198
22
AIR 1960 Punjab 43
23
AIR 1972 Gujarat 229
24
AIR 1969 Kerala 186Page 34 of 90
of a higher court, the party affected should not, in our
opinion, have a right to get the judgment reviewed.
An amendment adopting the Kerala view will create a
serious practical problem. It will keep alive the
possibility of review indefinitely. Under the Limitation
Act, the period of limitation for an application for
review has been prescribed, but the delay can, ‘for
sufficient cause’, be condoned by the Court under that
Act. Where an application for review is made on the
ground of a later binding authority, the party applying
for review will usually be able to plead ‘sufficient
cause’, because it is only when the superior court has
made a pronouncement that he will have a ground for
review; and he can, therefore, argue with considerable
force that there was ‘sufficient cause’ for his not
making the application earlier.
Recommendation
We, therefore, recommend that the following
Explanation should be added below Order 47/XLVII
Rule 125.”
46. A comparative study of the terms of the Explanation
recommended by the Law Commission and the Explanation,
which ultimately had the approval of the Parliament and came
to be inserted in Order XLVII are not in variance except
alteration of some words.
47. It is of some worth to note that even prior to the
decisions of the Oudh, Punjab and Gujarat High Courts
25
“Explanation.— The fact that the view taken on a question of law in the
judgment of a Court has been reversed or modified by the subsequent
decision of a superior court in another case is not a ground for review of
the judgment.”
Page 35 of 90
considered by the Law Commission in its 54th report, two
chartered high courts of the country had taken the same view.
The High Court at Calcutta way back on 15 th February, 1927
in Sudananda Moral v. Rakhal Sana 26, considering the
decision of the Privy Council in Rajah Kotagiri Venkata
Subbamma Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao27,
opined that reversal of a relied-on decision subsequent to the
decree in the suit was not a ground for review of the judgment.
Also, the High Court of Madras in Ravella Krishnamurthy v.
Yarlagadda28 observed that for review on the ground of
discovery of new and important matter, such matter must be
in existence at the date of the decree. The exposition of law
on the point, therefore, dates back to almost a quarter and a
century back.
48. There are a few decisions of this Court where the
Explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC has since been
considered.
26
XXXI CWN 822 = AIR 1927 Cal 920
27
LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 197
28
AIR 1933 Madras 485
Page 36 of 90
49. The earliest decision is Shanti Devi v. State of
Haryana29 where the Court rejected the review petition by
holding that the contention that the judgment sought to be
reviewed was overruled in another case subsequently is no
ground for reviewing the said decision. Explanation to Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly rules out
such type of review proceedings.
50. Reference may next be made to the decision in Union
of India v. Mohd Nayyar Khalil 30. There, the impugned
order had followed a three-Judge Bench judgment of this
Court. Such judgment was admittedly pending consideration
before a Constitution Bench. Taking note of such facts, it was
held that:
“2. *** Even if the question regarding the legality of
the said three-Judge Bench decision is pending
scrutiny before the Constitution Bench the same is not
relevant for deciding the review petition for two
obvious reasons — firstly, this was not pointed out to
the Bench which decided the civil appeal; and
secondly, by the time the impugned order was passed
the three-Judge Bench judgment had not been upset
and even in future if the Constitution Bench takes a
contrary view it would be a subsequent event which
cannot be a ground for review as is clear from the
explanation to Order 47 Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure ***”.
29
(1999) 5 SCC 703
30
(2000) 9 SCC 252Page 37 of 90
(emphasis supplied)The principle, thus, laid down is that a decision being upset in
the future would be a subsequent event which could not be a
ground to seek review.
51. In Nand Kishore Ahirwar v. Haridas Parsedia31, a
Bench of three Hon’ble Judges, while dismissing the review
petitions before it, made pertinent observations reaching out
to the very core of the said Explanation. This Court observed
that simply because there has been a Constitution Bench
decision, passed in the aftermath of the judgment impugned,
would be no ground for a review of the said judgment. It also
went on to observe that a reference to a Constitution Bench
would stand on a still weaker footing (emphasis supplied).
52. The question arising for decision in State of West
Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta32 was whether a tribunal
established under section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985 can review its decision on the basis of a subsequent
order/decision/judgment rendered by a coordinate or larger
Bench or any superior court or on the basis of subsequent
31
(2001) 9 SCC 325
32
(2008) 8 SCC 612
Page 38 of 90
event/development. It was contended on behalf of the State
that any subsequent decision on an identical or similar point
by a coordinate or larger Bench or even change of law cannot
be made the basis for recording a finding that the order sought
to be reviewed suffers from an error apparent on the face of
the record. After considering a host of decisions with a fine-
tooth comb, the Court went on to cull out the principles of
review in paragraph 35 of the decision which is extracted
hereunder:
“35. The principles which can be culled out from the
abovenoted judgments are:
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its
order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is
akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under
Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the
grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not
otherwise.
(iii) The expression ‘any other sufficient reason’
appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in
the light of other specified grounds.
(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can
be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot
be treated as an error apparent on the face of record
justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).
(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in
the guise of exercise of power of review.
(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section
22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgmentPage 39 of 90
of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a
superior court.
(vii) While considering an application for review, the
tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to
material which was available at the time of initial
decision. The happening of some subsequent event or
development cannot be taken note of for declaring the
initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.
(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party
seeking review has also to show that such matter or
evidence was not within its knowledge and even after
the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be
produced before the court/tribunal earlier.”(emphasis supplied)
53. This Court, in Subramanian Swamy v. State of
Tamil Nadu33, has read the Explanation as follows:
“52. *** The Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of
Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides that if the
decision on a question of law on which the judgment of
the court is based, is reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of a superior court in any other
case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be
a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first
and foremost requirement of entertaining a review
petition is that the order, review of which is sought,
suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order
and in absence of any such error, finality attached to
the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.”33
(2014) 5 SCC 75Page 40 of 90
54. The final one is a decision of the Constitution Bench in
Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy34. The majority
was of the following view:
“2. The present review petitions have been filed
against the final judgment and order dated 26-9-2018.
We have perused the review petitions as well as the
grounds in support thereof. In our opinion, no case for
review of judgment and order dated 26-9-2018 is
made out. We hasten to add that change in the law or
subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or
larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground
for review. The review petitions are accordingly
dismissed.”
55. Precedents on the aspect of review are legion and we
do not wish to burden this judgment by tracing all the
decisions. However, only a few that were considered in the
split verdict, some which were cited by the parties before us
and some that have emerged on our research on the subject
and considered relevant, are discussed/referred to here.
56. Two of these decisions, viz. A.C. Estates v.
Serajuddin35 and Raja Shatrunji v. Mohd. Azmat Azim
Khan36 were rendered prior to introduction of the Explanation
34
(2021) 3 SCC 1
35
(1966) 1 SCR 235
36
(1971) 2 SCC 200
Page 41 of 90
in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC. Significantly, even without the
Explanation, substantially the same view was expressed.
57. In A.C. Estates (supra), a bench of three Hon’ble
Judges of this Court, while dismissing the civil appeal and
upholding the order of the High Court at Calcutta, held as
follows:
“Our attention in this connection is drawn to Section
29(5) of the Act which gives power to the Controller to
review his orders and the conditions laid down under
Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But this cannot
be a case of review on the ground of discovery of new
and important matter, for such matter has to be
something which exist at the date of the order and
there can be no review of an order which was right
when made on the ground of the happening of some
subsequent event (see Rajah Kotagiri Venkata
Subbamma Rao v. Raja Vellanki Venkatrama Rao37).
(emphasis supplied)
58. The next is the decision of a Bench of two Hon’ble
Judges of this Court in Raja Shatrunji (supra). While
dismissing an appeal and upholding the order of the Allahabad
High Court, reference was made to “any other sufficient
reason” in Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC and the decision in
37
LR (1899-1900) 27 IA 197
Page 42 of 90
Rajah Kotagiri Venkata Subbamma Rao (supra)
whereupon it was held:
“13. *** the principles of review are defined by the
Code and the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ in
Order 47 of the Code would mean a reason sufficient
on grounds analogous to those specified immediately
previously in that order. The grounds for review are the
discovery of new matters or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or the review is
asked for on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record. In Rajah Kotagiri
Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Rajah Vellanki Venkatrama
Rao Lord Davey at p. 205 of the Report said that ‘the
section does not authorise the review of a decree which
was right when it was made on the ground of the
happening of some subsequent event’.”(emphasis supplied)
59. What was laid down in Netaji Cricket Club (supra),
upon reading Order XLVII, CPC, can be better understood in
the words of the Hon’ble Judge authoring the judgment. The
relevant passages are quoted hereunder:
“88. *** Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to
review its order if the conditions precedent laid down
therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law
does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the
court except those which are expressly provided in
Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is
empowered to make such order as it thinks fit.
89. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an
application for review. Such an application for reviewPage 43 of 90
would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a
new and important piece of evidence or when there
exists an error apparent on the face of the record but
also if the same is necessitated on account of some
mistake or for any other sufficient reason.
90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which
would include a mistake in the nature of the
undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An
application for review would also be maintainable if
there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would
constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts
and circumstances of the case. The words ‘sufficient
reason’ in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough
to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or
even an advocate. An application for review may be
necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine ‘actus
curiae neminem gravabit’.”In the next paragraph, Their Lordships quoted a portion of
paragraph 32 from the Larger Bench decision in Moran Mar
Basselios Catholics (supra) but held that “the said rule is not
universal”.
60. Netaji Cricket Club (supra) was followed in
Jagmohan Singh v. State of Punjab 38. It was held there
that Rule 1 of Order XLVII, CPC does not preclude the High
Court or a court to take into consideration any subsequent
event and that if imparting of justice in a given situation is the
38
(2008) 7 SCC 38
Page 44 of 90
goal of the judiciary, the court may take into consideration (of
course on rare occasions) the subsequent events.
61. This Court, in paragraph 20 of the decision in Kamlesh
Verma v. Mayawati39, after surveying previous authorities
and following Chhajju Ram (supra) and Moran Mar
Basselios Catholics (supra) summarized the principles of
review and illustrated when a review would be and would not
be maintainable. Despite the observation in Netaji Cricket
Club (supra) limiting Moran Mar Basselios Catholics
(supra), Kamlesh Verma (supra) thought it fit to agree with
the latter decision.
62. Recently, in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana
Reddy40, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges has accepted the
meaning of the ground “for any other sufficient reason” as
explained in Chhajju Ram (supra), Moran Mar Basselios
Catholics (supra) and Kamlesh Verma (supra).
63. Before answering question (a), we take up questions
(b), (c) and (d) first with (b) and (c) together for answers.
39
(2013) 8 SCC 320
40
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034
Page 45 of 90
64. It was with more than sufficient intensity, force,
vehemence and seriousness that learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the review petitioners argued, based on
their understanding of paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-
Judge] (supra) that, irrespective of anything else, the same
did grant them ‘liberty’ to apply for review, that availing such
‘liberty’ granted by this Court the RPs were filed, and that this
Bench being of co-equal strength, instead of taking a different
view, ought to read the last sentence of paragraph 217 in the
manner they (learned senior counsel) understood it, and to
accept the same for holding the RPs maintainable.
65. For reasons more than one, the decision in Shailendra
[3-Judge] (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the review
petitioners.
66. The first reason is that the submission of a ‘liberty’
being granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) makes it
abundantly clear that but for such ‘liberty’, the review
petitioners would not have even thought of applying for review
since the law on the point was no longer res integra. It is,
therefore, an admission on their part that the judgments and
orders under review, as on the dates they were
Page 46 of 90
delivered/made, were neither erroneous (which is a possible
ground for appeal, if an appeal were allowed by law) nor
suffering from any error apparent on the face of the record (a
possible ground for review). Therefore, merely based on
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), a subsequent event, the
review jurisdiction of this Court which is a limited jurisdiction
could not have been invoked.
67. Next, we need to consider whether the last sentence of
paragraph 217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) can at all be
read and understood to have granted a ‘liberty’ of the nature
claimed by the review petitioners.
68. This Court sitting in a combination of five-Hon’ble
Judges in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 41
had the occasion to consider an appeal where the facts were
quite alike. A learned Judge (Varma, J.) of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court had granted bail to the appellant. While the
appellant was enjoying the concession of bail and such order
had not been challenged, a co-accused moved for bail.
Noticing the earlier order granting bail in favour of the
appellant, another learned Judge (Gupta, J.) in his order
41
1992 Supp (3) SCC 62
Page 47 of 90
observed that the appellant did not deserve to be enlarged on
bail, and that it was “a fit case where the State should apply
for cancellation of bail of all the accused persons”. In view of
this observation, the State filed a petition for cancellation of
the bail order passed by Varma, J. In this application, neither
any additional fact was stated nor any allegation was made
against the appellant which could be relevant for cancellation
of the earlier bail order. The prayer for cancellation was
founded only on the observations in the order of Gupta, J.,
which was verbatim quoted in the application. The same was
listed before Gupta, J. who by the impugned order cancelled
the earlier order of Varma, J. and while so doing made strong
remarks against grant of bail in cases like the one under
consideration. This order of cancellation was carried in appeal
before this Court. The Constitution Bench observed that no
bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate bench
of the same court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate
court over its decision (emphasis supplied). While allowing the
appeal, it was further observed that the State not having filed
any appeal against the order of Varma, J. granting bail to the
appellant, the same had become final so far as the high court
was concerned and that in the absence of any allegation of
Page 48 of 90
misuse of the concession of bail by the appellant, Gupta, J.
had no authority to upset the earlier order of Varma, J
(emphasis supplied). In conclusion, it was also observed as
follows:
“2. *** That which could not be done directly could
also not be done indirectly. Otherwise a party
aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High
Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter
reopened before another bench, and there would not
be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not
consistent with the judicial discipline which must be
maintained by courts both in the interest of
administration of justice by assuring the binding nature
of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the
people in the judiciary ***.”
69. We do believe that what was said of a high court in this
decision, would squarely apply to this Court. The Supreme
Court of India, a revered institution, is one Court which
operates through separate Benches owing to administrative
exigency and practical expedience. These Benches are
essential to efficiently manage the diverse and voluminous
cases that come before the Court and to discharge the solemn
judicial duty for which the Court exists. It would be an
erroneous perception to regard this division as a cause for din
within the Court. When faced with a peculiar circumstance as
before us presently, one might just be compelled to ask
Page 49 of 90
whether one voice of this Court is louder than another? The
answer to this is that this Court, as one, might speak through
a singular voice or several voices as the occasion might
demand. In any event, these voices, though marked by their
individual tone(s), enjoin to form a collective melody, akin to
a choir of justice. It cannot be forgotten that no matter the
strength, all these voices bear the symbol of the Supreme
Court of India. While we may have our specific functions and
jurisdictions, the collective objective is to find our bearings
towards धर्म (duty) and न्याय (justice). In this sense, it can be
said that each Bench speaks for the Court as a whole,
contributing to the intricate symphony of justice that defines
the Supreme Court of India.
70. It is here that the need arises for a Bench to be careful,
cautious, and circumspect while being critical of a precedent
of a previous Bench. Every Bench is supposed to bear in mind
two overriding considerations. The first is that of deference to
the views expressed by a Bench in a primary decision and the
other is maintaining judicial discipline and propriety if, upon
threadbare consideration, it is found difficult to assent to the
justification for such primary decision. In such an eventuality,
dignity and decency would demand disagreement voiced by
Page 50 of 90
the subsequent Bench and reference of the matter to the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench in a
tone that does not sound like critical observations and adverse
comments in respect of the primary decision rendered by a
coordinate Bench.
71. Here too, the grounds of the RPs refer to the ‘liberty’
granted by the decision in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra).
The question, as noted above, is whether the Bench while
deciding Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have granted
any ‘liberty’ to the review petitioners to apply for review,
assuming that the words “open to be reviewed in appropriate
cases” did mean ‘liberty to apply’.
72. Prior to attempting an answer to that question, it would
also be apposite to note what the dicta in Central Board of
Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra 42 is,
as laid down by another Constitution Bench of this Court. The
legal position summed up in paragraph 12 reads as follows:
“12. Having carefully considered the submissions
made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and
having examined the law laid down by the Constitution
Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to
sum up the legal position in the following terms:
42
(2005) 2 SCC 673
Page 51 of 90
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision
delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on
any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or
dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of
larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of
lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the
Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed
for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the
Bench whose decision has come up for consideration.
It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to
express an opinion doubting the correctness of the
view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength,
whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing
before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the
one which pronounced the decision laying down the law
the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i)
the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the
Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the
roster and who can direct any particular matter to be
placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any
strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down
hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for
hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that
Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a
Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs
correction or reconsideration then by way of exception
(and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may
proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness
of the previous decision in question dispensing with the
need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief
Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. ***”
(emphasis supplied)
73. Although the larger Bench in Shailendra [3-Judge]
(supra) appears to have considered in excess of 250 decisions,
the above opinions of the Constitution Benches do not seem
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to have been presented before it. It is, thus, clear as crystal
from the majority opinion delivered by Hon’ble Arun Mishra
and Hon’ble A.K. Goel, JJ. that recourse was taken to declare
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) per incuriam without
having the benefit of the caution sounded by this Court in
Vikramjit Singh (supra) and Central Board of Dawoodi
Bohra Community (supra).
74. Having regard to the opinions expressed by
Constitution Bench decisions of this Court, there is absolutely
no scope for a Bench of three-Hon’ble Judges to declare a
previous decision of a Bench of co-equal strength per incuriam.
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), at the highest, could have
doubted Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and referred
it for decision by a yet larger Bench but could not have, by any
stretch of reasoning, declared it per incuriam. But, the same
logic applies to this Bench too. Respectfully following the
binding dictum in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community (supra) and also having regard to our sense of
judicial discipline and propriety, we restrain ourselves from
declaring Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) as per incuriam
notwithstanding our firm conviction in this behalf.
Page 53 of 90
75. However, nothing much turns on our restraint for there
are weightier reasons to reject the contention of the review
petitioners; and this, we say, to specifically answer question
(c).
76. In paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) itself, it has been held by the Constitution Bench that
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) did not have the occasion to
consider certain aspects for which that decision cannot prevail.
Learned senior counsel for the respondents, based on such
statement, contended that Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra)
stands overruled. This submission has been disputed by
learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. According to
them, Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) has not been expressly
overruled; only because of aspects referred to in paragraph
365 and the discussion preceding, it ceases to be a precedent.
77. We have not held Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to
be per incuriam for the reason indicated above but the
statement in paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) has to be given some meaning. Although it is true that
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) was not expressly overruled
by Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), what stands out
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as a direct impact of paragraph 365 thereof is that Shailendra
[3-Judge] (supra), not having considered certain vital
aspects and more particularly as to how the conjunction ‘or’ in
sub-section (2) of section 24 of the 2013 Act has to be read
as well as the proviso thereto, the very basis for Shailendra
[3-Judge] (supra) to declare Pune Municipal Corporation
(supra) per incuriam stands removed. Since the reasoning for
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) to declare Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) per incuriam does not survive, it would
be unreasonable and inappropriate to hold that the
consequential observation would nevertheless survive.
Significantly, in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), one
does not find any observation of like nature as in paragraph
217 of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra).
78. That apart, being members of a larger Bench of co-
equal strength as in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra), we are
not precluded by any law from interpreting the last sentence
of paragraph 217 of the said decision and to say what the
Court exactly intended even if it is assumed notwithstanding
what has been said in paragraph 365 of Manoharlal [5-
Judge, lapse] (supra) that the observation in paragraph 217
survives. In our humble understanding, what the majority in
Page 55 of 90
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) intended to say is that if
review petitions were pending on the date of the decision, i.e.,
8th February, 2018, seeking review of decisions which had
been rendered relying on the decision in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra), such review petitions could be
entertained and considered on the basis of the discussion in
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) declaring Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) per incuriam and the decisions
reviewed; nothing more, nothing less. We do not think that
the majority in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have and
did, in fact, give a carte blanche to the land acquiring
authorities to apply for review of decisions already made by
courts relying on the decision in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra), even though the remedy of appeal or
review had not been pursued earlier and without the successful
landowners being on record before the court.
79. The role of the Court, it is needless to observe, is to
adjudicate; it cannot, in the absence of exercising its advisory
jurisdiction under Article 143 of the Constitution, take upon
itself the role of the advisor to any party to the proceedings,
to wit, the land acquiring authorities. The maxim heavily relied
on by the review petitioners, i.e., actus curiae neminem
Page 56 of 90
gravabit, in such a situation would kick in to prevent any
harmful act being perpetrated.
80. There is another perspective which cannot be lost sight
of. If the understanding of learned senior counsel for the
review petitioners of the relevant sentence in paragraph 217
of Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) is accepted, it would result
in utter chaos and confusion in the justice delivery system
apart from disturbing the principle of finality of judicial
decisions. Should we read “open to be reviewed” as connoting
a ‘liberty’ granted to apply for review, any number of review
petitions could be filed based on such liberty for review of
decisions between parties which have attained finality not only
in this Court but also in the high courts. From the practical
point of view, the results could be pernicious. A landowner,
satisfied with a final decision of a court, could find himself
requiring to contest a review petition filed on the basis of the
‘liberty’ granted by none other than the Supreme Court of
India in proceedings where such landowner was not even
noticed. We would be inclined to the thought that no court,
much less the Supreme Court (because of its status as the
apex court), should pass any judicial order affecting the right
of a party who has not been put on notice. If such an order is
Page 57 of 90
passed, there cannot be a more egregious violation of
principles of natural justice.
81. Notably, if a judgment and/or order has attained
finality because a judicial remedy is either not available in law
or even if available, such remedy has been lost, it is not open
for a higher court of law by a judicial fiat either to create a
remedy for the party on the losing side to pursue or to grant
liberty to him to pursue an otherwise available remedy – which
by passage of time might have been lost – behind the back of
a party who would obviously be seriously affected if he were
compelled to contest the proceedings once again. Such an act
of court would be without the authority of law, and this is
precisely what Vikramjit Singh (supra) has held.
82. Moreover, as on the dates the RPs were filed, the
decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) had not
seen the light of the day. A review petition, under the law,
cannot be filed in anticipation of a favourable judgment in the
future.
83. For the reasons discussed above, we cannot be
persuaded to accept that the phrase “open to be reviewed in
appropriate cases” occurring in paragraph 217 of the decision
Page 58 of 90
in Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) could have been perceived
by the review petitioners as opening up an avenue for them to
apply for review. Assuming arguendo that the contention
touching ‘liberty’ granted by Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra)
is correct, the plinth thereof crumbles by reason of paragraph
365 of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and, therefore,
is rendered non-existent.
84. All these aspects, we say so with respect, escaped the
attention of the Hon’ble Judge presiding over the said Division
Bench. His Lordship’s opinion on the observations made in
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] and Shailendra [3-Judge]
(supra) are erroneous.
85. Questions (b) and (c) are answered accordingly,
against the review petitioners.
86. Let us now move on to question (d) to answer it.
87. The decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse]
(supra), according to the respondents, did not afford a ground
for maintainability of the RPs while the contrary is argued by
the review petitioners. According to Ms. Bhati, an aggrieved
party can seek a review “for any other sufficient reason” and
overruling of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) followed
Page 59 of 90
by recall thereof brings the claims of the review petitioners
within the coverage of this particular ground. That apart, it has
been urged that when miscarriage of justice occasioned due to
an earlier flawed decision is brought to the notice of this Court
and when public interest would be a casualty resulting from
the operation of such earlier decision, it ought to be the Court’s
duty to pass appropriate orders to set things right.
88. It has been noted that prior to the Explanation being
inserted in Rule 1 Order XLVII, with the sole exception of the
Kerala High Court, there were decisions of the Privy Council
dating back to the commencement of the twentieth century
and at least of five High Courts, starting from 1927, to the
effect that a subsequent judgment of a higher court reversing
the judgment relied on in the order under review would not
afford a ground for review. There are also at least half a dozen
precedents of this Court reiterating such position of law, albeit
with the aid of the Explanation.
89. The relevant principles deducible from the precedents
on the Explanation to Rule 1 that we have considered, for the
purpose of deciding the present reference, are as follows:
Page 60 of 90
a) in case of discovery of a new or important matter or
evidence, such matter or evidence has to be one
which existed at the time when the decree or order
under review was passed or made; and
b) Order XLVII would not authorize the review of a
decree or order which was right when it was made
on the ground of some subsequent event.
What follows is that Order XLVII of the CPC does not authorize
a review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of
some subsequent event (emphasis supplied).
90. With the introduction of the Explanation, there seems
to be little room for any serious debate on the point under
consideration. Parliament, in its wisdom, has accepted what
the Law Commission recommended. Resultantly, what the
statute prohibits, cannot be permitted by the Court. If
permitted, the Court would be acting contrary to law. What the
Parliament has done, the Court cannot undo unless the law
enacted by the Parliament is declared ultra vires. The vires of
the Explanation not being under challenge during more than
four decades of its existence, it is not for the Court to ignore
the Explanation.
Page 61 of 90
91. It is worthwhile to also note at this stage the decision
dated 3rd November, 2020 in Shri Ram Sahu and others v.
Vinod Kumar Rawat43. Upon consideration of the decisions
in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra), Haridas Das
(supra), Kamal Sengupta (supra), etc., this Court speaking
through the Hon’ble presiding Judge of the said Division Bench
was of the opinion that the court of review has a limited
jurisdiction, it cannot overstep such jurisdiction and has to
strictly adhere to the grounds mentioned in Rule 1 of Order
XLVII. It is a pity that the respondent landowners did not cite
the aforesaid decision before the Hon’ble presiding Judge
where the law has been correctly laid down by His Lordship.
92. Concededly, the Constitutional courts have inherent
powers and this Court is also vested by Article 142 of the
Constitution with powers to pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary to do complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it.
93. Insofar as inherent powers are concerned, it has been
held by this Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres 44 that:
43
(2021) 13 SCC 1
44
(1996) 5 SCC 550Page 62 of 90
“22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent
power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its
judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on court.
In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or
proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to
file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained
by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are
resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction.
These powers spring not from legislation but from the
nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts
themselves so as to enable them to maintain their
dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules,
protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to
punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary
for the orderly administration of the court’s business.”
94. A superior court, in exercise of its inherent power, is
authorized to do such justice that the cause before it demands.
Upon satisfaction being reached by a court that a mistake has
been committed by it, which is gross and palpable, it is not the
law that the mistake has to be corrected by exercising the
power of review only. Such power can be exercised, only if the
person aggrieved by the order or decree applies therefor. On
its terms, section 114 of the CPC read with Order XLVII thereof
does not conceive of a suo motu power of review being
exercised by the court. The words “court on its own motion”
are absent in the statutory provision. However, once the court
is satisfied that a mistake committed by it needs to be
rectified, it is always open to exercise the inherent powers to
Page 63 of 90
achieve the desired result. As has been held by the
Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak45, an order
of court – be it judicial or administrative – which is made per
incuriam or in violation of certain Constitutional limitations or
in derogation of principles of natural justice can always be
remedied by the court ex debito justitiae. It can do so in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending
before it without insisting on the formalities of a review
application. After all, “to err is human” is the oft-quoted saying
and courts including the apex court are no exception. To own
up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not
militate against its status or authority; perhaps, it would
enhance both. On the other hand, when it involves invocation
of the power of review and such power is traceable in a statute,
which also has provisions regulating the exercise of the review
power, it has to be held that the power of review is not an
inherent power. That power of review is not an inherent power
has been held in Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji 46. If a power of review is
statutorily conferred, it would be inappropriate, nay
incompetent, for the court exercising review power to travel
45
(1988) 2 SCC 602
46
(1971) 3 SCC 844
Page 64 of 90
beyond the contours of the provision conferring the very
power. A statutorily conferred power to review is not to be
confused with the inherent power of the court to recall any
order. The said power inheres in every court to prevent
miscarriage of justice or when a fraud has been committed on
court or to correct grave and palpable errors.
95. In any event, in the present case, we have not found
exercise of inherent power under section 151, CPC or under
Article 142 by the Hon’ble presiding Judge of the said Division
Bench.
96. It was urged that a court may recall or review any
order exercising its inherent power saved by section 151, CPC
to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process
of the Court. This argument, however, need not detain us for
long in the light of the law, which stands well-settled by this
Court. It is no longer res integra that inherent powers of the
court under section 151, CPC cannot be invoked if there exists
a remedy made available by the CPC itself.
Page 65 of 90
97. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Padam Sen v.
State of Uttar Pradesh47 laid down the law in the following
words:
“8. …The inherent powers of the Court are in addition
to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the
Code. They are complementary to those powers and
therefore it must be held that the Court is free to
exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section
151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is
not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly
provided in the Code or against the intentions of the
Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent
power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be
contrary to or different from the procedure expressly
provided in the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
98. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in My Palace
Mutually Aided Co-operative Society v. B. Mahesh &
others48 held thus:
“27. In exercising powers under Section 151 of the
CPC, it cannot be said that the civil courts can exercise
substantive jurisdiction to unsettle already decided
issues. A Court having jurisdiction over the relevant
subject matter has the power to decide and may come
either to a right or a wrong conclusion. Even if a wrong
conclusion is arrived at or an incorrect decree is passed
by the jurisdictional court, the same is binding on the
parties until it is set aside by an appellate court or
through other remedies provided in law.
28. Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if
there is no alternate remedy available in accordance
with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent
power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create
47
(1961) 1 SCR 884
48
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1063Page 66 of 90
remedies which are not contemplated under the Code.
Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to
filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party
cannot find solace in Section 151 to allege and rectify
historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards
inbuilt in the CPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
99. An alternative remedy, carved out by Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, already exists which the review petitioners have
pursued. Recourse to section 151, CPC, therefore, would not
be available, the object of which is to supplement and not
replace the remedies provided under the CPC.
100. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of the
review petitioners has been to draw inspiration from the
ground “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Rule 1.
There have been decisions of this Court which have construed
the words “any other sufficient reason” expansively, like
Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra),
whereas there are decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios
Catholics (supra), Raja Shatrunji (supra), Kamlesh Verma
(supra) and S. Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), that have
followed Chhajju Ram (supra) explaining that the ground
“any other sufficient reason” means “a reason sufficient on
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grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately
previously”.
101. However, with utmost respect, we do not find any of
those decisions, which have taken an expansive view, looking
at such ground in the manner we propose to look, for recording
our concurrence with the view in Chhajju Ram (supra) that
has unhesitatingly been followed over the years. If indeed “any
other sufficient reason” were to take within its embrace any
situation not analogous to “discovery of new matter or
evidence” and “on account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record”, we wonder why the legislature
chose to keep “any other sufficient reason” immediately after
the aforesaid two grounds. If “any other sufficient reason”
were to be read independent of the said two grounds, we
believe the long line in Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not
have been drafted in the manner it presently reads. In lieu of
referring to the said two grounds as grounds on which a review
could be sought, the legislature could well have kept it open-
ended as in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 where it is
provided, without any strings attached, that any appeal or any
application may be admitted after the prescribed period of
limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that
Page 68 of 90
he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal or the
application earlier. If the intention of the legislature were to
give an expanded meaning, Order XLVII Rule 1 would have
read somewhat like this: any person considering himself
aggrieved by a decree or order or decision of the nature
indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) for any sufficient reason
desires to obtain a review of the decree or order made against
him, may apply for a review. But that is not what the provision
says and means. Reading Order XLVII Rule 1 in juxtaposition
to section 5 of the Limitation Act drives us to accept the view
in Chhajju Ram (supra) as having interpreted the law
correctly and acceptance of the same by this Court and high
courts over the years, coupled with the fact that the Parliament
did not consider it necessary to amend Rule 1 when it inserted
the Explanation in 1976. Giving a wider meaning to the ground
“any other sufficient reason” in Netaji Cricket Club (supra)
and Jagmohan Singh (supra), therefore, must have been
intended and necessitated by this Court because the justice of
the cases so demanded but the same would have no
application in a case of this nature.
102. Having regard to the aforesaid distinction in the
exercise of review power and the power that inheres in every
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court, we are unable to be ad idem with the decision in Netaji
Cricket Club (supra) as well as the decision in Jagmohan
Singh (supra), which followed the former decision. The said
two decisions are by benches of two Hon’ble Judges, with a
common author. With the deepest of respect and reverence
we have for His Lordship, we find limiting the application of
the principles regarding exercise of the power of review, as
expounded in Moran Mar Basselios Catholics (supra) (a
decision rendered by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges, which
has stood the test of time), to be against established principles
flowing from Article 141 of the Constitution by which the
Supreme Court is also bound. Also, laying down as a matter of
principle that subsequent events could be considered while
hearing a review petition, is unprecedented. The Court in
Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh (supra)
read something in the statute which apart from being
unnecessary, is seen to run contrary to the terms of Order
XLVII, CPC as expounded in A.C. Estates (supra) (decision of
a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges) and Raja Shatrunji (supra).
To save Netaji Cricket Club (supra) and Jagmohan Singh
(supra) from being declared as decisions rendered per
incuriam, we prefer to hold, as the Hon’ble companion Judge
Page 70 of 90
on the said Division Bench did, that such decisions turned on
the very special facts and circumstances of the cases and
cannot guide us in the present endeavor.
103. Ms. Bhati put forth the dissent authored by Hon’ble Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) in
Beghar Foundation (supra) to argue that the Explanation
could not be a bar to the maintainability of the RPs in the
present case. However, when a view is expressed by a
member-Judge of a Constitution Bench which turns out to be
the minority view, judicial discipline demands that a Bench of
lesser strength does not accept the minority view in preference
to the majority view. In any event, on a closer reading of the
dissent itself, more particularly paragraph 18, it is revealed
that the RPs had already been filed and were pending on the
date when reference was made to a larger Bench for which His
Lordship did not consider it necessary even to consider the
Explanation. The issue before us, as held earlier, cannot be
resolved without looking at the Explanation and, thus, the
contention advanced by Ms. Bhati is rejected.
104. We, thus, hold that no review is available upon a
change or reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court
Page 71 of 90
or by a larger Bench of this Court overruling its earlier
exposition of law whereon the judgment/order under review
was based. We also hold that notwithstanding the fact that
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has since been wiped
out of existence, the said decision being the law of the land
when the Civil Appeals/Special Leave Petitions were finally
decided, the subsequent overruling of such decision and even
its recall, for that matter, would not afford a ground for review
within the parameters of Order XLVII of the CPC.
105. Question (d) is, therefore, answered in the negative.
106. Let us now turn to question (a), which incidentally
arises, and answer it.
107. Reverting to the facts, these cases would not call for
ascertainment of the ‘locus standi’ of the review petitioners,
since they were parties to the proceedings from which the RPs
have arisen. However, in the context of a review, a distinction
can yet be drawn between a person who, not being a party to
the original proceedings, has the ‘locus standi’ to invoke the
review jurisdiction and a person who, despite being a party to
the proceedings, can be considered as not aggrieved by the
judgment/order of which he seeks a review. This question
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would obviously require a deep scrutiny, having regard to the
materials on record and the objection to the maintainability of
the RPs specifically raised by the respondent landowners. In
the eyes of an unsuspecting person, obviously the review
petitioners are persons aggrieved because of declaration of
land acquisition proceedings initiated by them as deemed to
have lapsed. But, as is evident from the factual narrative, the
dates on which the High Court had disposed of the writ
petitions by declaring that the land acquisition proceedings
were deemed to have lapsed, it is the law laid down by a
binding authority, i.e., Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)
that was holding the field at the relevant time and which the
High Court applied in reaching its conclusions. This Court too
had dismissed the Civil Appeals and the Special Leave Petitions
bearing in mind that the issue raised was no longer res integra
in view of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). If indeed
the judgments and orders were right, could the review
petitioners be categorized as aggrieved persons?
108. For the reason that the judgments and orders under
review were right on the dates they were rendered, we do not
consider the review petitioners as persons aggrieved who can
maintain a review petition citing either Manoharlal [5-
Page 73 of 90
Judge, lapse] and Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). We,
however, hold that the review petitioners can yet be
considered persons aggrieved for what we proceed to say and
hold immediately hereafter.
109. Insofar as question (e) is concerned, which has been
framed based on the arguments of Mr. Sen, it is true that the
RPs include under the caption ‘GROUNDS’ reference to points
which, according to the review petitioners, are sufficient to
review the judgments/orders under review, apart from
reference to the so-called ‘liberty’ granted by this Court vide
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Mr. Sen thus argued that
even if the RPs are held not to be maintainable based on
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra) and Manoharlal [5-Judge,
lapse] (supra), the same ought to be decided upon
consideration of such other grounds; and, for such purpose,
the larger Bench may remit the RPs for being considered by
an appropriate Bench on such other grounds. Viewed in the
light of such contention, the review petitioners are persons
aggrieved and the RPs cannot be shut out on the ground that
the same are not maintainable for reasons discussed above.
However, this finding does not take the cause of the review
petitioners any forward.
Page 74 of 90
110. We have perused the ‘GROUNDS’ in each of the RPs
opposed by Mr. Divan and Mr. Giri. All such grounds are factual
in nature. In fact, the review petitioners have raised
‘GROUNDS’ without even averring what was pleaded in their
counter affidavits filed before the High Court and what were
the defences raised which, because of non-consideration by
this Court, could be said to amount to an error apparent on
the face of the record. The RPs are silent as to on which specific
ground referrable to Rule 1 of Order XLVII the review has been
asked for. Even then, having considered such ‘GROUNDS’, we
are of the considered opinion that the judgments/orders under
review do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of
the record.
111. Thus, we have no hesitation to reject Mr. Sen’s
contention and answer question (e) against the review
petitioners.
112. As we approach the end, we need to address question
(f) regarding the maintainability of several miscellaneous
applications in the present batch that seek recall of certain
orders of this Court, whereby some of the land acquisition
proceedings were declared to have lapsed.
Page 75 of 90
113. Notably, while these have been filed in the form of
miscellaneous applications, they are in essence akin to the RPs
as they also seek reconsideration of this Court’s orders. Since
these miscellaneous applications also rely on Manoharlal [5-
Judge, lapse] (supra) as a ground for review/reconsideration
of the previous orders, they are squarely covered by the
foregoing analysis in this judgment. If we were to hold
otherwise, we would be permitting the review petitioners to do
something indirectly—i.e., seeking review through
miscellaneous applications, which they could not have done
directly—i.e., seeking review through RPs. This would open the
law to being misused and lead to by-passing the legislative
intent behind introduction of Explanation 1 to Rule 1 of Order
XLVII, CPC which, as noticed in paragraph 91 of this judgment,
cannot be permitted by the Court.
114. In this regard, we find sufficient support in the decision
in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and
others49, where this Court held:
“17. We next come to applications described as
applications for ‘clarification’, ‘modification’ or ‘recall’
of judgments or orders finally passed. We may point
out that under the relevant Rule XL of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1966 a review application has first to go
before the learned Judges in circulation and it will be
49
(2000) 7 SCC 296Page 76 of 90
for the Court to consider whether the application is to
be rejected without giving an oral hearing or whether
notice is to be issued. […] However, with a view to
avoid this procedure of ‘no hearing’, we find that
sometimes applications are filed for ‘clarification’,
‘modification’ or ‘recall’ etc. not because any such
clarification, modification is indeed necessary but
because the applicant in reality wants a review and also
wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of the same in
chambers by way of circulation. Such applications, if
they are in substance review applications, deserve to
be rejected straight away inasmuch as the attempt is
obviously to bypass Order XL Rule 3 relating to
circulation of the application in chambers for
consideration without oral hearing. By describing an
application as one for ‘clarification’ or ‘modification’, —
though it is really one of review — a party cannot be
permitted to circumvent or bypass the circulation
procedure and indirectly obtain a hearing in the open
court. What cannot be done directly cannot be
permitted to be done indirectly. [See in this connection
a detailed order of the then Registrar of this Court in
Sone Lal v. State of U.P. (1982) 2 SCC 398 deprecating
a similar practice.]”.
115. Similarly, and more recently, this Court in Supertech
Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare
Association and others50 held:
“13. The hallmark of a judicial pronouncement is its
stability and finality. Judicial verdicts are not like sand
dunes which are subject to the vagaries of wind and
weather [See, Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy,
(2010) 8 SCC 383]. A disturbing trend has emerged in
this Court of repeated applications, styled as
miscellaneous applications, being filed after a final
judgment has been pronounced. Such a practice has
no legal foundation and must be firmly discouraged. It
reduces litigation to a gambit. Miscellaneous50
(2023) 10 SCC 817Page 77 of 90
applications are becoming a preferred course to those
with resources to pursue strategies to avoid
compliance with judicial decisions. A judicial
pronouncement cannot be subject to modification once
the judgment has been pronounced, by filing a
miscellaneous application. Filing of a miscellaneous
application seeking modification/clarification of a
judgment is not envisaged in law. Further, it is a settled
legal principle that one cannot do indirectly what one
cannot do directly (‘Quando aliquid prohibetur ex
directo, prohibetur et per obliquum’)”.
116. We must clarify that our statement does not imply an
absolute prohibition against filing of miscellaneous applications
seeking ‘clarification,’ ‘modification,’ or ‘recall’ following the
initial disposal of a matter. We are only emphasizing the need
for the Court to exercise prudence and ascertain whether such
an application is, in substance, in the nature of a RP. In case
such an application is found to be nothing but a disguised
version of a RP, it ought to be treated in similar manner a RP
is treated.
117. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the
miscellaneous applications are not maintainable.
Page 78 of 90
118. To sum up, our answers to all the questions [(b), (c),
(d), (e) and (f)] are in the negative while (a) is partly negative
and partly affirmative.
119. We respectfully concur with the opinion expressed by
the Hon’ble companion Judge on the said Division Bench and
record our inability to be ad idem with the Hon’ble presiding
Judge.
120. The reference is answered accordingly.
121. Under the circumstances, dismissal of the RPs and
miscellaneous applications would have been logical and we
could have ended our judgment here by ordering so. However,
there is something more of a balancing act that needs to be
done having regard to the disclosures that were made in
course of progress of other proceedings before us, which
followed immediately after judgment on this set of RPs and
miscellaneous applications was reserved. Such other
proceedings arose out of appeals carried from orders of the
High Court declaring land acquisition proceedings as lapsed
based on the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation
Page 79 of 90
(supra) as distinguished from RPs and miscellaneous
applications of the nature under consideration. Since all such
proceedings have more or less a common genesis and have
followed similar trajectory, it would be eminently desirable to
find a solution that benefits all. We may hasten to add here
that the exercise of inherent powers conferred on this Court
by Article 142, in such circumstances, is not just inevitable but
also pivotal for disposal of the matters at hand, given their
impact on public interest at large as well as to secure
uniformity and consistency in our decisions; hence, we
consider it expedient to pass such orders or directions for
ensuring complete justice in the matters under consideration
before us. Notwithstanding our discussion on the reference
which was necessitated to answer the question of law on which
there was a disagreement between the Hon’ble Judges of the
Division Bench, taking an overall and holistic view of the
matter and in the light of the larger public interest that is
involved, in each of the RPs and miscellaneous applications
that have been dealt with by this judgment (except those
remanded to the High Court and those de-tagged for separate
listing infra), we issue the following directions:
Page 80 of 90
a) The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition
proceedings in terms of the provisions contained in
section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is extended by a year
starting from 01st August, 2024 whereupon
compensation to the affected landowners may be
paid in accordance with law, failing which
consequences, also as per law, shall follow;
b) The parties shall maintain status quo regarding
possession, change of land use and creation of third-
party rights till fresh acquisition proceedings, as
directed above, are completed;
c) Since the landowners are not primarily dependent
upon the subject lands as their source of sustenance
and most of these lands were/are under use for other
than agricultural purposes, we deem it appropriate
to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution and dispense with the compliance of
Chapters II and III of the 2013 Act whereunder it is
essential to prepare a Social Impact Assessment
Study Report and/or to develop alternative multi-
crop irrigated agricultural land. We do so to ensure
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that the timeline of one year extended at (a) above
to complete the acquisition process can be adhered
to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which would
also likely be beneficial to the expropriated
landowners;
d) Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20
of the 2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subject-
lands are predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature
and had earlier been acquired for public purposes of
paramount importance. In order to simplify the
compliance of direction at (a) above, it is further
directed that every Notification issued under section
4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of cases, shall be
treated as a Preliminary Notification within the
meaning of section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be
deemed to have been published as on 01st January,
2014;
e) The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as
per section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for
any Social Impact Assessment Report and shall,
thereafter, proceed to take necessary steps as per
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the procedure contemplated under section 21
onwards of Chapter-IV of 2013 Act, save and except
where compliance of any provision has been
expressly or impliedly dispensed with;
f) The landowners may submit their objections within a
period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement
of this order. Such objections shall not question the
legality of the acquisition process and shall be limited
only to clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(1) of the
2013 Act;
g) The Collector shall publish a public notice on his
website and in one English and one vernacular
newspapers, within two weeks of expiry of the period
of four weeks granted under direction (f) above;
h) The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as
early as possible but not exceeding six months,
regardless of the maximum period of twelve months
contemplated under section 25 of the 2013 Act. The
market value of the land shall be assessed as on 01st
January, 2014 and the compensation shall be
awarded along with all other monetary benefits in
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accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act
except the claim like rehabilitation etc.;
i) The Collector shall consider all the parameters
prescribed under section 28 of the 2013 Act for
determining the compensation for the acquired land.
Similarly, the Collector shall determine the market
value of the building or assets attached with the land
in accordance with section 29 and shall further award
solatium in accordance with section 30 of the 2013
Act;
j) In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
since it is difficult to reverse the clock back, the
compliance of Chapter (V) pertaining to
“Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award” is hereby
dispensed with; and
k) The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to seek
reference for enhancement of compensation in
accordance with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act.
122. Before we part, we must address a minor task that
remains unfinished. Specifically, we are currently handling two
sets of RPs. The first set pertains to landowners who continue
Page 84 of 90
to maintain their status as landowners from the date of
Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act. The second set
includes landowners who, subsequent to the aforementioned
Notification under section 4(1), have transferred their
properties—the subject of acquisition—to purchasers
(“subsequent purchasers”, hereafter) through methods such
as executing sale deeds, deeds of assignment, or even via
power of attorney. In addition to the allegations regarding
fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale
transactions, the second set may also involve ownership title
disputes, etc.
123. The cases falling under the second set are listed below:
a) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. TARUN KAPAHI
[R.P.(C) No. 425/2023];
b) GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. NARENDER SHARMA
[R.P.(C) No. 426/2023];
c) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. M/S. RUNWEELL (INDIA) PVT. LTD. [R.P.(C) No. 428/2023]; Page 85 of 90 d) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MAHARAJ SINGH [R.P.(C) No. 429/2023]; and e) DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SURENDER SINGH [R.P.(C) No. 409/2023].
124. As a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to ascertain the
rightful claimant for receiving the compensation, which is to
be determined as directed in paragraph 121 supra, we hereby
set aside the orders of the High Court that were under
challenge in the Civil Appeals out of which the aforementioned
RPs have arisen. We revive the relevant writ petitions [W.P.
(C) No. 5107/2015, W.P. (C) No. 5063/2014, W.P. (C) No.
4780/2014, W.P. (C) No. 1637/2015, W.P. (C) No.
6897/2014], which shall stand restored on the file of the High
Court for this limited purpose on remand being ordered. The
Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to constitute a
dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions in the manner
indicated hereafter. The nominated bench will accord an
opportunity to the landowners/subsequent purchasers, the
GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional documents on
affidavits whereupon such bench shall embark on an exercise
to decide who between the landowner(s) and the subsequent
Page 86 of 90
purchaser(s) is the rightful claimant to receive compensation.
The nominated bench will have the authority to obtain
independent fact-finding enquiry reports, if deemed
necessary. The inquiry could include determination as to
whether after the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894
Act, any transfer could have been effected and even if
effected, whether such transfer is permitted by any law. Once
compensation is determined, the relevant authority in the land
acquisition department shall deposit the same with the
reference court. The reference court shall then invest the
deposited amount in a short-term interest-bearing fixed
deposit account with a nationalized bank, ensuring its
periodical renewal until the relevant writ petition is disposed
of by the nominated bench. Release of the invested amount
together with accrued interest to the rightful claimant will be
contingent upon the decision of the High Court. Upon enquiry
being completed, the High Court shall decide the relevant writ
petitions in accordance with law.
125. The directions issued in paragraph 121 supra do not
extend to eight miscellaneous matters that were erroneously
included in the present batch. These cases shall be listed
Page 87 of 90
separately in the week commencing 22 nd July, 2024. The
details of the cases are as follows:
a) In these two cases outlined below, no notice has
been issued by this Court for condonation of delay
and/or otherwise; hence, they need to be de-tagged
and listed separately:
i. GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S. K.L.
RATHI STEELS LTD. [M.A. No. 414/2023 in C.A.
No. 11857/2016]; and
ii. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HARI
PRAKASH [R.P. (C) No. 432/2023 in C.A. No.
11841/2016].
b) The following are three cases where neither a RP nor
a miscellaneous application has been filed. These
cases are Special Leave Petitions filed before this
Court and thus necessitate separate hearing:
i. GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S BEADS
PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. [C.A. No. 1522/2023];
ii. LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. RAM
SINGH [Diary No. 14831/2023]; and
Page 88 of 90
iii. LAND AND BUILDING DEPARTMENT v. SUMITBANSAL [Diary No. 15893/2023].
c) The following two cases, although RPs, were filed
before the change in law, i.e., prior to the decision in
Shailendra [3-Judge] (supra). Consequently, they
need to be de-tagged to be assessed based on their
individual merits:
i. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SWARN
SINGH CHAWLA [R.P. (C) No. 882/2017 in C.A.
No. 11846/2016]; and
ii. GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI v. M/S. K.L. RATHI
STEELS LTD. [M.A. No. 159/2019 in C.A. No.
11857/2016].
d) The following case concerns a contempt petition, viz.
M/S K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD v. ANSHU PRAKASH
[Conmt. Pet. (C) No. 735/2018 in C.A. No.
11857/2016]. The same needs to be de-tagged to be
assessed on its individual merits.
Page 89 of 90
126. All other RPs and miscellaneous applications stand
disposed of, without order for costs. Pending applications, if
any, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………………J
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………………………………J
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
New Delhi;
17th May, 2024.
Page 90 of 90