Madhya Pradesh High Court
Laxminarayan Rawat vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 12 November, 2024
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:19813
1 MCRC-47295-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 12th OF NOVEMBER, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 47295 of 2024
LAXMINARAYAN RAWAT AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajesh Kumar Shukla, Advocate for the applicants.
Shri A.K.Nirankari, Government Advocate for respnodent no.1/State.
ORDER
This application, under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (S.528 of BNSS)
has been filed for quashment of criminal proceedings pending in the Court of
JMFC, Morena in Criminal Case No. 1675/2024 for the offences under
sections 498A, 323, 294 and 506/34 of the IPC.
2. It is submitted by counsel for the applicants that applicant no.1 is
father-in-law, applicant no.2 is elder brother-in-law and applicant no.3 is
husband of respondent no.2.
3. Challenging the charge-sheet filed by the Police in Crime No.
18/24, it is submitted by counsel for applicants that respondent no.2 lodged
an FIR on the allegation that she got married to applicant no.3 on 29/04/2017
as per Hindu rites and rituals. Her parents had given Rs.11 lacs in cash, 25
Tolas of Gold, 500 gms of silver ornaments apart from house-hold articles.
When she came to her matrimonial house, then for some time behaviour of
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her husband and in-laws was good. Thereafter, she noticed a Tatoo of S&G
on the hand of her husband. When she enquired from her husband about it,
he became aggressive. Thereafter, she also started visiting her parental
home. In the meanwhile, she gave birth to her child and came to her
parental home at Morena. At that time, the applicants demanded a four-
wheeler vehicle. In December, 2018 when her husband came to take her
back, then he again raised a demand that either a four-wheeler be given to
him or an amount of Rs.20 lacs in cash be given and only then he would take
her back. When she requested that her parents are old and they do not have
the resources for fulfillment of his demand, then she was beaten by her
husband by kicks and fists. He also abused her filthily in the name of mother
and sister. Thereafter, her parents tried to convince him and only on their
persuasion, he brought her back to the matrimonial house. However, the
applicants continuously harassed her physically and mentally on the ground
of non fulfilment of demand of dowry. On 6/9/2023, her mother-in-law
expired and on 23/9/2023 she was ousted by the applicants from her
matrimonial house along with her child. Thereafter, she came back to her
parental home at Morena. On 14/11/2023, her husband came to Morena and
told the complainant that her parents had neither given four-wheeler vehicle
nor cash of Rs.20 lacs. When the complainant tried to persuade him, then
again she was beaten and abused filthily in the name of mother and sister.
When she narrated this fact to applicant nos.1 and 2, then they also raised a
demand of Rs.20 lacs and scolded that if her parents are not in a position to
give the said amount then she should not come to her matrimonial home.
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Since then, she is residing in her parental home.
4. Challenging the FIR, it is submitted by counsel for the applicants
that FIR has been lodged by way of counter-blast to divorce petition. The
FIR was lodged on 30/7/2024 whereas the divorce petition was filed on
21/3/2024 and immediately after receiving notice, the FIR was lodged. It is
further submitted that the allegations are made with malafide intention and,
therefore, the FIR is required to be quashed in the light of judgement of the
Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported
in AIR 1992 SCS 604 . It is further submitted that the allegations made in the
FIR are false. It is further submitted that respondent no.2 is residing in
adultery. Respondent no.2 had also lodged a Gum Insaan report at Police
Station Agar, District Agar Malwa alleging that applicant no.3 is missing and
in the said proceedings, respondent no.2 did not allege any thing about
cruelty and, thus, it is clear that the allegations made in the FIR are
afterthought and false.
5. Heard, learned counsel for the applicants.
6. So far as report lodged by respondent no.2 regarding missing of
applicant no.3 is concerned, it is true that in those proceedings respondent
no.2 had not alleged any cruelty against her husband, but the only fact is that
in the Gum Insaan report she has reported at Police Station Agar, District
Agar Malwa only regarding missing of applicant. Therefore, if she did not
narrate anything about cruelty, then it cannot be said that the said statement
can be utilized for adjudicating correctness of the allegations made in the
FIR in question. The scope of missing person report was different and the
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scope of present FIR is entirely different. If respondent no.2 confined herself
to report as to missing of applicant no.3 which was lodged at Police Station
Agar, District Agar Malwa, then it cannot be said that the allegations made in
the impugned FIR are afterthought. Furthermore, counsel for the applicants
could not point out as to how this Court can compare the statement made in
the present case with the statement of respondent no.2 which was recorded in
missing person report to verify as to whether the report lodged in the present
case is correct or not.
7. It is well established principle of law that this Court, in exercise of
powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (S.528 of BNSS) cannot adjudicate
upon the correctness of the allegations. Even otherwise in the light of
judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the cases of XYZ v. State of
Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin
& Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay Kumar Das v. State of
Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State
of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of A.P. v. Gourishetty
Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana,
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported in (2019) 10
SCC 686, State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed
in Cr.A. No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2018) 5
SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221,
State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S.
Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600, Sangeeta Agrawal
v. State of U.P., reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
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Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs.
Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha
v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682 , this Court can quash
the proceedings only if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out an
offence. Furthermore, this Court in exercise of powers under S..482 of
Cr.P.C. (S.528 of BNSS) cannot conduct a roving enquiry to hold as to
whether the allegations made in the FIR are correct or not.
8. So far as the allegation of adultery made by applicants against
respondent no.2 is concerned, it is a question of fact which cannot be
adjudicated by this Court at this stage.
9. So far as the contention of counsel for the applicants that FIR has
been lodged by way of counter-blast to proceedings under section 13 of the
Hindu marriage Act is concerned, the said submission is misconceived. The
Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha vs Rameshwari Devi & Ors reported
in (2007) 12 SCC 369 has held as under:
“14. From a plain reading of the findings arrived at by the High
Court while quashing the FIR, it is apparent that the High Court
had relied on extraneous considerations and acted beyond the
allegations made in the FIR for quashing the same in exercise of
its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. We have
already noted the illustrations enumerated in Bhajan Lal case
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] and from a careful
reading of these illustrations, we are of the view that the
allegations emerging from the FIR are not covered by any of the
illustrations as noted hereinabove. For example, we may take up
one of the findings of the High Court as noted hereinabove. The
High Court has drawn an adverse inference on account of the FIR
being lodged on 31-12-2001 while the appellant was forced out of
the matrimonial home on 25-5- 2001.
15. In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference
against the appellant wife for lodging the FIR on 31-12- 2001 on
the ground that she had left the matrimonial home at least six
months before that. This is because, in our view, the High Court
had failed to appreciate that the appellant and her family membersSignature Not Verified
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were, during this period, making all possible efforts to enter into a
settlement so that Respondent 2 husband would take her back to
the matrimonial home. If any complaint was made during this
period, there was every possibility of not entering into any
settlement with Respondent 2 husband.
16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only when
all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed and
Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce petition under Section
13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing
of a divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to quash
criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as it is well
settled that criminal and civil proceedings are separate and
independent and the pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring
to an end a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same
set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view
that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482
of the Code has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and
has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High
Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the
allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous
considerations.
22. For the reasons aforesaid, we are inclined to interfere with the
order of the High Court and hold that the High Court in quashing
the FIR in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code by relying on the investigation report and the findings
made therein has acted beyond its jurisdiction. For the purpose of
finding out the commission of a cognizable offence, the High
Court was only required to look into the allegations made in the
complaint or the FIR and to conclude whether a prima facie
offence had been made out by the complainant in the FIR or the
complaint or not.”
10. If the FIR is read in its entirety, then it is clear that specific
allegations have been made against all the applicants regarding cruelty, as
well as, demand of dowry. Furthermore, respondent no.2 was ousted from
her matrimonial house and is residing in her parental home from
23/09/2023. The Supreme Court in the case of Rupali Devi Vs. State of U.P.
reported in (2019) 5 SCC 384 has held that mental cruelty may persist even
after the wife has left the matrimonial house and has held as under:
“14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under Section 498-
A IPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “the
intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering
on a living creature, esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage
(abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)”. Cruelty can be bothSignature Not Verified
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:198137 MCRC-47295-2024
physical or mental cruelty. The impact on the mental health of the
wife by overt acts on the part of the husband or his relatives; the
mental stress and trauma of being driven away from the
matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same
home for fear of being ill-treated are aspects that cannot be
ignored while understanding the meaning of the expression
“cruelty” appearing in Section 498- A of the Penal Code. The
emotional distress or psychological effect on the wife, if not the
physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatise the wife even
after she leaves the matrimonial home and takes shelter at the
parental home. Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in
the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do not occur
at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental trauma
and the psychological distress caused by the acts of the husband
including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to
leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents
would continue to persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty
borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal
exchanges would continue in the parental home even though there
may not be any overt act of physical cruelty at such place.”
11. Similarly, this Court in the case of in the case of Amar Singh vs.
Smt. Vimla decided on 22.06.2021 in Criminal Revision No.2376/2020
(Gwalior Bench) has held that compelling a married women to live in her
parental home amounts to cruelty.
12. So far as the malafides are concerned, it is clear that this Court
cannot adjudicate upon the fact as to whether the allegations are malafide or
not. The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar and
others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 346 has held as under:-
“9 . “8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case of this
nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not
confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the
inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of
CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of
functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is theSignature Not Verified
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doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely
recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All
courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers
as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle of quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non
potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that
without which it cannot exist). While exercising the powers under
the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do
real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3
SCR 388] this Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii)
where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute
an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p.
869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent
with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process
should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needlessSignature Not Verified
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harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it
would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to
unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time
the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to
short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The
scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the
categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power
under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR
1992 SC 604] . A note of caution was, however, added that the
power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of
rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as
follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
‘(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.’
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of
the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be
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careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this power, is based
on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,
more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be
laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.)
v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would
not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine
whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises
arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It
would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude
that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information
is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the
mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It
is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led
in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The
allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing
the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990
Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142], State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Rupan
Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC
651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996)
7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415],
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC
728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of
Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]”
The above position was again reiterated in State of Karnataka v.
M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , State
of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) 353] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13
SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-
11.””
Thus, it is clear that when the allegations prima facie make out a
cognizable offence, then malafide of the informer becomes secondary.
13. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warrantingSignature Not Verified
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interference.
14. Accordingly, the application fails and is, hereby, dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE(and)
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SHRIVASTAVA
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