Supreme Court of India
Ramesh vs The State Of Karnataka Home Department … on 18 September, 2024
Author: Sanjay Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar, Sanjay Kumar
2024 INSC 701 Non-reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1467 OF 2012
Ramesh and another ….. Appellants
Versus
State of Karnataka ….. Respondent
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KUMAR, J
1. The two appellants before us were implicated in FIR No. 26 of 2005
registered under Sections 143, 147, 148 and 302 read with 149 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), by Bannerghatta Police Station, Bangalore Rural
District. They were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II,
Bangalore Rural District, in Sessions Case No. 232 of 2005, along with
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2024.09.18
15:31:39 IST
Reason:
three other accused persons, for offences under the aforesaid provisions
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and also Section 120B IPC. By judgment dated 03.05.2006, the Trial Court
acquitted all five of them of all charges. Aggrieved by their acquittal, the
State of Karnataka preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1544 of 2006 before the
High Court. By the impugned judgment dated 29.03.2011, a Division Bench
of the High Court reversed the acquittal judgment passed by the Trial Court
and held all five accused guilty of offences punishable under Sections 143,
147, 148, 120B and 302 read with 149 IPC.
2. Aggrieved thereby, all the five accused persons joined together in
filing this appeal before this Court. However, as they failed to surrender
after their application for exemption from surrendering was rejected, the
appeal stood dismissed in its entirety, pursuant to the order dated
01.03.2012. Thereafter, upon the surrender of Ramesh, Kumara and
Praveen Alexander, Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 5, the appeal was restored in
so far as they were concerned. The appeal was admitted on 28.03.2016
and at that time, this Court dismissed the appeal in so far as Appellant Nos.
3 and 4 were concerned, as they had not surrendered. Praveen Alexander,
Appellant No. 5, expired thereafter and taking note of the same, vide order
dated 01.04.2019, this Court dismissed the appeal in so far as he was
concerned on the ground of abatement. In effect, only Appellant Nos. 1 and
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2 remain in the picture. They were granted bail by this Court on
29.04.2019.
3. The crucial aspect to be noted first and foremost is that the High
Court has reversed a judgment of acquittal. The High Court was also
conscious of this, as it was duly noted in paragraph 9 of the impugned
judgment. The parameters for interference with an acquittal judgment being
well defined, we would have to see whether the High Court was justified in
doing so.
4. The case of the prosecution was that the five accused hatched a
criminal conspiracy to murder Babureddy, the deceased, and attacked him
with deadly weapons on 07.02.2005 at about 7:30 AM. This attack was
stated to have taken place near Hullahalli Gate Bus Stand in Bangalore
Rural District. The deceased was doing real estate business in partnership
with M. Ramaiah (PW-1). Ramesh, Appellant No. 1 and his brother are
stated to have approached the deceased for selling their land admeasuring
Acs. 2.06 Guntas. Thereupon, the deceased is said to have mediated the
sale of this land to one Narayanareddy (PW-10) and ₹2,50,000/- was
allegedly given as advance to Appellant No. 1 and his family members by
Narayanareddy (PW-10). However, about 15 days prior to the death of the
deceased, Appellant No. 1 is said to have approached him along with his
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mother and asked him to get the sale transaction cancelled by taking back
the advance amount received by them. The deceased supposedly told
them to approach Narayanareddy (PW-10) directly as he was only a
mediator. Appellant No. 1 is stated to have abused the deceased saying
that he would teach him a lesson. This was the alleged motive for the
criminal conspiracy and the consequential fatal attack upon the deceased.
5. It is the case of the prosecution that on 07.02.2005 at about 7:30 AM,
the deceased was standing along with M. Ramaiah (PW-1),
Munikrishnappa (PW-2) and Venkatesh (PW-3) near Hullahalli Gate Bus
Stand and at that time, Ramesh, Appellant No. 1 came there on a scooter
while the other accused came in an autorickshaw, armed with deadly
weapons like longs (akin to swords), choppers and knives, and assaulted
the deceased. The deceased was then shifted in a Maruti Van to St. John’s
Hospital at Bangalore but he succumbed to his injuries en route. M.
Ramaiah (PW-1) lodged a written complaint at 9:30 AM on 07.02.2005
before the Police Sub-Inspector, on the strength of which, FIR No. 26 of
2005 was registered.
6. Twenty-five witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove its
case. Documents and material objects were also marked in evidence.
Noting that the deceased had suffered as many as 21 external injuries and
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4 internal injuries, the Trial Court held that he had suffered a homicidal
death. The partner of the deceased, M. Ramaiah (PW-1) was the star
witness for the prosecution as he described, in great detail, the attack upon
the deceased by each of the accused. In his deposition before the Trial
Court, he named the accused, one by one, with full particulars of the
weapons wielded by each of them. He stated that there were 10 people at
the bus stand but no efforts were made by those present at the scene to
intervene and rescue the deceased, as the accused could have assaulted
them also. He then stated that the deceased was shifted in a white Maruti
Van to St. John’s Hospital, Bangalore, and Munikrishnappa (PW-2) and
Venkatesh (PW-3) along with Muniswamy, the younger brother of the
deceased, came with him to the hospital. He stated that their clothes were
stained with blood while lifting the deceased. He then stated that he, along
with Venu and Manjunath, went to Bannerghatta Police Station at 9:30 AM
and lodged a written complaint. According to him, on the same day at about
3:00 PM, the police visited the scene of occurrence and recorded the Spot
Mahazar (Ex-P2). In his cross-examination, PW-1 stated that Ramesh,
Appellant No. 1, was his brother-in-law, but he never went to his house. He
further stated that Munikrishnappa (PW-2) was the son of his maternal aunt
and Venkatesh (PW-3) was his cousin. He admitted that he and
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Munikrishnappa (PW-2) had mobile phones with them but they did not
inform the police about the assault on the deceased either at the time it
was taking place or thereafter, while taking the deceased to the hospital.
7. Munikrishnappa (PW-2), on the other hand, contradicted M. Ramaiah
(PW-1) by stating that it was M. Ramaiah (PW-1) alone, who took the
deceased to the hospital. He asserted that Venkatesh (PW-3), Krishnappa
(PW-4) and he remained at the spot of the incident only. According to him,
M. Ramaiah (PW-1) returned to the spot after some time and informed
them that the deceased had passed away on the way to the hospital. He
said that PW-1 then went to the police station and filed his complaint. He
stated that the police visited the spot of the incident at about 8:30 or 9:00
AM and recorded the Spot Mahazar in their presence. In his
cross-examination, PW-2 stated that there were about 20 to 25 persons
waiting at the bus stand. He changed his earlier version and said that M.
Ramaiah (PW-1) informed him about the death of the deceased at 8:00 AM
on that day over the phone, while he was still at the spot of the incident.
8. Venkatesh (PW-3) also stated that M. Ramaiah (PW-1) alone took the
deceased to the hospital. In his cross-examination, PW-3 changed his story
and said that M. Ramaiah (PW-1), Munikrishnappa (PW-2),
Muniswamireddy and he had taken the deceased to the hospital in a white
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Maruti Van. He further said that their clothes were stained with blood.
According to him, the police visited the scene of the occurrence at about
6:00 PM and recorded the Spot Mahazar in their presence.
9. Krishnappa (PW-4) stated that he had a petty shop at Hullahalli Gate
which he usually opened between 6:00 and 7:00 AM every day. He further
stated that on 07.02.2005, when he opened his shop, he came to know that
somebody had assaulted Babureddy at a distance of 20 to 25 meters from
his shop and that he was taken to the hospital. He claimed that he informed
the said fact to one Shivaramareddy, cousin of the deceased, over the
phone and Shivaramareddy then came to the spot within 10 minutes. He
said that they went to the Jigani Hospital to see Babureddy and came to
know that Babureddy was taken to St. John’s Hospital, Bangalore.
Thereafter, they went to St. John’s Hospital and saw that Babureddy had
died.
10. The Trial Court duly took note of the discrepancies and contradictions
in the above noted depositions of the witnesses. The fact that none of the
witnesses tried to intervene and rescue the deceased weighed with the
Trial Court. Their conduct in not informing the police despite having mobile
phones was also taken note of. The Trial Court noted that none of the
witnesses had anything to say about the autorickshaw in which Accused
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Nos. 2 to 5 allegedly came to the spot. However, R. Shashikumar (PW-11)
was produced by the prosecution, who claimed that it was his autorickshaw
that was used by the accused persons. According to him, he dropped the
accused persons near the bus stand and at that time, another person came
there on a scooter and took Accused Nos. 2 to 5 with him and, after half an
hour, they returned back with blood-stained clothes. Significantly, the police
recorded the statement of this witness one month and two days after the
date of the incident. No explanation was offered by the police as to how
they detected the whereabouts of this witness and the role played by him in
the incident. The credibility of this witness was found to be highly suspect,
given the delay in his surfacing and the contradictions in his evidence. If he
was waiting near the bus stand, PW-11 would have himself witnessed the
actual attack on the deceased, but he did not state so. He merely said that
the accused returned ‘after half an hour’ with blood-stained clothes.
11. Further, the Trial Court noted that, in terms of the evidence of
Krishnappa (PW-4), the attack on the deceased occurred not at 07:30 AM
as claimed by the prosecution but much earlier. The contradiction in the
testimonies of the so-called eyewitnesses as to when the Spot Mahazar
was recorded by the police was one more factor to dilute their credibility.
According to Prema Sai Guddappa Rai, Circle Police Inspector (PW-22),
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who was the Investigating Officer, the Spot Mahazar was recorded from
10:30 AM to 11:00 AM. However, each of the so-called eyewitnesses had a
different time to offer in that regard. This clearly cast a suspicion on their
presence at the spot and indicated clear possibility of manipulation of the
evidence to suit the prosecution’s case. No independent witness was found
by the Investigating Officer except for related witnesses, who were
projected as eyewitnesses to prove the prosecution’s case. No effort was
made to seize the clothes of these so-called eyewitnesses, which were
stated to have been stained with the blood of the deceased while they were
lifting him into the Maruti Van.
12. More damaging is the fact that the statements of PW-2 and PW-3, the
so-called eyewitnesses, were recorded under Section 161 CrPC one month
after the date of the incident. This delay on the part of the Investigating
Officer in recording their statements weighed heavily against the
prosecution. Reliance was placed by the Trial Court on the judgment of this
court in Gayadin vs. State of M.P.1 to infer the possibility of these
witnesses being planted witnesses.
13. The Trial Court also noted the fact that, in his complaint lodged with
the police in the first instance, M. Ramaiah (PW-1) did not name Accused
Nos. 2 and 5 but in the course of his deposition, he not only named them
1
(2005) 12 SCC 267
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but also furnished minute details of the attack by each of them. Even the
motive attributed to the accused stood diluted as the Investigating Officer
admitted that he had not obtained any record in proof of the deceased
mediating the alleged sale transaction between Ramesh, Appellant No. 1
and Narayanareddy (PW-10). It was in these circumstances that the Trial
Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and extended the benefit of such doubt to them.
14. However, in appeal, the High Court merely summed up the
depositions of the so-called eyewitnesses and baldly concluded that the
presence of the eyewitnesses, PWs 1 to 3, could not be doubted.
Surprisingly, despite the Trial Court detailing, at great length, the
contradictions and discrepancies in their depositions, the High Court
observed that the Trial Court had not pointed out any major contradictions
which would discredit the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 and the evidence of other
witnesses. According to the High Court, the evidence adduced by the
prosecution outweighed the findings recorded by the Trial Court, but no
reasons worth the name were recorded by the High Court to support this
conclusion. On the strength of these cryptic observations, the High Court
deemed it fit to reverse the judgment of acquittal; hold the accused guilty of
the offences as charged and sentence them to imprisonment for life.
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15. We may point out that, once the Trial Court found no evidence to
convict the accused, the burden was upon the High Court, while reversing
the said judgment, to record clear findings in relation to each of the charges
and, more particularly, the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section
120B IPC. However, no such exercise was undertaken by the High Court.
At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled
out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka 2,
regarding the power of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal
against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition
on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may
reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and
sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is
double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed
and strengthened by the trial court.
2
(2007) 4 SCC 415
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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by
the trial court.
16. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar3, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal
against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the
record for discarding the reasons of the Trial Court in order to be able to
reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed
that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the
High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses and it
is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh
impossible for the Trial Court to reject their testimony. This was identified as
the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in
this light, the brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the
appeal, resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing the
cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial Court giving
them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the conviction of
Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 on all charges. The judgment dated 29.03.2012
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.
3
(1977) 2 SCC 205
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1544 of 2006 is set side to that extent. Bail bonds and sureties furnished by
and on behalf of Appellant Nos.1 and 2 shall stand discharged.
………………………,J
(SANJAY KUMAR)
……………………….,J
(ARAVIND KUMAR)
September 18, 2024;
New Delhi.
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